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Abstract
High assurance MILS (multiple independent levels of security) and MLS (multilevel security)
systems require strict limitation of the interactions between different security compartments
based on a security policy. Virtualization can be used to provide a high degree of separation
in such systems. This work provides a study of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products
to support high assurance MLS systems and designs a candidate architecture based on vir-
tualization and trusted execution to provide strong compartmentalization. We then identify
three major security problems in the candidate architecture: the lack of trust in the network,
the problem of patch management, and untrusted graphics. We study and solve each of the
security gaps in detail. More specifically, we design and evaluate a trusted network archi-
tecture for high assurance applications, evaluate an optimal pre-deployment testing time for
effective patch management, and finally design, implement, and formally evaluate a trusted
graphics subsystem.
ii
To my parents
iii
Acknowledgments
I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my adviser, Professor David M. Nicol,
who has always supported me with his excellent guidance, insight, and patience. He has
provided me with an excellent atmosphere to do research. Also, I would like to thank
Professor William H. Sanders, whose great advice and ideas guided my research for the past
several years.
I would like to thank my committee members, Dr. Vikram Adve and Professor Nitin
H. Vaidya, for their support and brilliant suggestions that helped me improve my research.
Without their guidance this dissertation would not have been possible.
I would also like to thank my parents who have always inspired me and whose love and
guidance are with me in whatever I pursue. They are the ultimate role models.
Finally, I would like to thank my loving fiance´, Asal. She has endured this process with
me, always offering endless inspiration, support, and love.
iv
Table of Contents
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 COTS Products and Available Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Tamper Resistant Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Processor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Operating System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6 Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.7 Storage and Personal Storage Drives (PSDs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3 Candidate Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Candidate Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3 Trusted Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4 Security Gaps in the Candidate Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.5 COTS vs. Non-COTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4 Trusted Networks for High Assurance Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2 Control System Security Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3 Security Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.4 Trusted Process Control Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.5 TPCN Requirements and Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.6 NAD Rule Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.7 TPCN Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5 Evaluation of Patch Management Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.2 Patching Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.3 Analytical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4 Stochastic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.5 Simulation Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.6 Verification and Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
v
6 TrustGraph: Trusted Graphics Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.3 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.4 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.5 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.6 Evaluation and Formal Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.7 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7 Simplified Graphics Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.2 Graphics Resources, Methods, and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.3 Necessities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.4 Eliminated Features and Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.5 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.6 Formal Modeling Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.7 Formal Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
8 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Appendix A: Compiler-Based Checkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Appendix B: Code Violations in TrustGraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
vi
List of Figures
2.1 MLS sample architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Trusted network as an alternative to traditional perimeter security . . . . . . 25
3.1 Process-level MLS architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Machine-level MLS architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Measuring VMM using SMX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 A chain of trust using TPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5 Memory protection in Intel TXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.6 Protected graphics model in Intel TXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.7 VMM measurement success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.8 VMM measurement failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1 Paired firewalls PCN architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2 Trusted process control network (TPCN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3 NADs and subnets inside a TPCN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1 The stochastic model of the patching system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.2 Vulnerability discovery for different browsers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.3 Vulnerability discovery from the stochastic model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.4 The number of open vulnerabilities for various faulty fractions . . . . . . . . 83
5.5 The number of open vulnerabilities for various testing times . . . . . . . . . 84
5.6 The number of open vulnerabilities for the different browsers . . . . . . . . . 85
6.1 Architecture of a graphics subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.2 Label flow in TrustGraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.1 A simplified graphics subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
vii
List of Tables
3.1 Modifications to grub configuration for trusted boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 Creating LCP and VL policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Loading policies to the TPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1 Feasibility of attack patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.1 Patch development time for different browsers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.1 Label-propagating methods in TrustGraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.2 ACL2 scripts and their pseudo code meanings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.3 TrustGraph label flow scripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.4 Label flow security theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.5 Window ordering model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.6 Sample violations in TrustGraph code found using static analysis . . . . . . 114
7.1 Simplified graphical methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.2 Implementation of a window . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.3 Implementation of a surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.4 Implementation of a data buffer and an event buffer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.5 Modeling a window . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.6 Modeling a surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.7 Modeling a security label . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.8 Modeling CreateSurface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.9 Modeling GetSurface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.10 Modeling drawing functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.11 A security theorem on GetSurface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.12 A security theorem on GetDataBuffer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.13 Formal model of the graphical resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.14 Helper functions of the formal model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.15 Formal model of the simplified graphics subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.16 Security theorems of the simplified graphics subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A.1 Complete list of Compass checkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
B.1 The list of security or coding violations in TrustGraph . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
viii
1 Introduction
High assurance secure systems require strict compliance of the system activities with a se-
curity policy. Multiple independent levels of security (MILS) and multilevel security (MLS)
systems are two such systems. MILS policy usually requires strict isolation between differ-
ent compartments of the processes and resources in the system with little or no interaction
between them. MLS systems on the other hand allow limited communication between differ-
ent security levels according to the security policy (e.g. Bell-LaPadula and/or Biba policy).
High assurance MILS and MLS workstations require strong compartmentalization of the
system to ensure that no information leakage or interference can happen between different
security levels.
In this work, we first investigate different components available from the commercial and
research communities which can be used to build MLS systems. The study of the available
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products, the security functionalities they provide, their
workings, and readiness status suggest a candidate architecture based on trusted execution,
virtualization of the environment, secure IO, and the TPM chip functionalities. In this
architecture, MLS security policy can be implemented by the VMM or the separation kernel.
Trusted networks and MLS-enabled peripherals (e.g. storage) offer security outside the host
boundaries. We then identify a number of major security gaps in the candidate architecture:
the lack of trust in the network, the problem of patch/update testing and management, and
the problem of I/O and especially the lack trusted graphics.
Although some approaches have been proposed to extend security labeling to the network
and make it security aware [1, 2], they do not extend “trust” to the network. Simple network
traffic labeling has its shortcomings. Namely, a secured host gets the same network label
as an under-patched host with an old anti-virus version, running an outdated version of
a software if they have the same MLS level. Moreover, the problem of rogue hosts and
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users, unsecured physical access, vulnerable devices, and security device misconfiguration
(e.g. firewall rule conflicts) are not addressed in an untrusted labeled network. We propose a
network architecture based on new technologies collectively referred to as “trusted networks.”
Specifically, we study trusted networks in the context of critical infrastructure, one of the
most important applications of high assurance systems. Trusted networks allow user and
device authentication, configuration validation, automated patch enforcement, device access
control, and posture remediation. We study the architecture and requirements of a trusted
network; especially for high assurance and high availability applications. An algorithm is
proposed to distribute firewall rules across many network access devices in a trusted network
in order to avoid introducing new rule conflicts to the network. The architecture is then
evaluated against known attack patterns.
An inherent problem with automated patch enforcement in trusted networks is pre-
deployment testing, i.e., how much one tests a patch/update before enforcing it in the
system. If the pre-deployment testing phase is long, the patch is less likely to introduce a
new vulnerability (or break the system), while the system has a longer window of vulnera-
bility, and vice versa. We evaluate the pre-deployment testing period using analytical and
simulation models and find an optimal testing time which results in the minimum number
of open vulnerabilities at any time.
Finally, a traditional issue with virtualization is the problem of I/O. Different approaches
have been proposed for virtualizing I/O [3]. In modern systems, three main approaches exist
for I/O virtualization. The first approach is to have a separate I/O device for each VM.
In this case, each VM has its own subsystem (driver and manager) to interact with its I/O
device, hence achieving strong isolation between VMs. Although this model can be practical
for network or storage devices, it does not work for keyboard, mouse, or graphics. The
reason is that it is difficult or impractical for a workstation to have multiple copies of these
devices. The second approach is to have one copy of each I/O device with all the I/O drivers
in the VMM. The VMM then presents a virtual device to each VM. In this case, VMs share
each I/O device and the driver that controls it. KVM [4] uses this model. The downside is
that this model makes the VMM complex and large. The third model for I/O virtualization
is to have a separate I/O partition (privileged partition) on top of the VMM which controls
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I/O operations. Any request for I/O from a VM is sent to this partition by the VMM and
the results are forwarded back to the VMs. This model is used by Xen [5].
In the latter two approaches of I/O virtualization, the subsystem that controls an I/O
device is shared between different VMs. Sharing subsystems has an inherent security prob-
lem; namely, information can leak and different security levels can interfere through these
I/O subsystems. Some of the I/O controllers are simple and tiny which reduces the chance
of interference (e.g. keyboard and mouse drivers). A graphics subsystem, on the other hand,
causes many security concerns. It usually consists of a large piece of code which handles
the graphic operations and builds the display output (e.g. the X Window System). The
inherent complexity of the graphics subsystem, along with the fact that it handles data from
different security levels, imposes a high risk of information leakage and interference. In fact,
applications frequently use the graphics subsystem resources as a means of communication
that is not regulated by the security policy [6].
We describe the design and implementation of TrustGraph, a trusted graphics subsystem
for high assurance systems. In TrustGraph, entities (resources) in the graphics subsystem
are labeled with appropriate security tags to prevent unauthorized communication. More-
over, methods and operations are secured so that they comply with the security policy.
TrustGraph can be used in a single secure operating system or in a virtualized architecture.
TrustGraph is implemented using DirectFB [7], a thin graphics library with integrated win-
dowing system. The implementation is evaluated against attacks and information leakages
that are possible under X or vanilla DirectFB, but are prevented in TrustGraph. In addi-
tion, critical parts of the implementation are verified using formal method techniques (using
ACL2). In fact, we have identified several flaws in our initial implementation by formal ver-
ification and corrected them. In order to narrow the gap between the model of the system
that is formally verified and the actual C implementation, compiler-based techniques are
used to perform static analysis of the implementation of TrustGraph. The static analysis
checks the implementation for security violations or bad coding choices which may result in
a breach of control flow integrity (CFI) of the code and deviation between the model and the
implementation. Moreover, we provide an analysis of possible covert channel attacks that
use the graphics API as the means of communication, we measure the channel capacity of
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those covert channels, and reduced the channel capacity using the idea of fuzzy time.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 studies the COTS products
that can be used to build high assurance multilevel security workstations, the services they
provide, and their limitations. A candidate architecture for high assurance MLS systems
based on virtualization and the security gaps in such an architecture are described in Chap-
ter 3. Chapter 4 studies trusted networks in the context of process control systems while
the problem of patch management and pre-deployment testing is evaluated in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 details the design, implementation, and evaluation of TrustGraph. We describe
the design of a simplified version of TrustGraph and its formal evaluation in Chapter 7 before
concluding the work in Chapter 8.
4
2 COTS Products and Available Technologies
2.1 Introduction
A multilevel system architecture implements an MLS security policy. For such architecture
to be secure, there must be no path to bypass or disable the security mechanism. This
goal can be achieved only when every component of the system is trusted or can be verified
by a trusted component. Consequently, a secure MLS system cannot be built with secure
memory and untrusted I/O or with secure end devices and vulnerable network architecture.
It is important to remember that a system is at most as secure as its weakest component.
In this chapter, we discuss a comprehensive MLS system architecture which is built using
trusted components that support MLS functionality. Whenever a device is not trusted or
can be tampered with, it must be verified by a trusted component and must be tamper
evident. Any unsecured component can lead to data leakage or security policy violation.
Figure 2.1 shows various components of an MLS system. Each component is discussed
in a separate section. In each section, we study the mechanisms to secure that component,
different COTS devices which support MLS functionality, their workings, and the extra
features they may provide.
2.1.1 Contributions
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• Different COTS components and devices are studied.
• The functionalities, workings, and features of each device are studied.
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Figure 2.1: MLS sample architecture
• The assurance level (or certification) and the readiness of the components are investi-
gated.
The chapter’s goal is to widely study the available technologies and the services that
they can provide, and it serves as the introduction to the subsequent chapters.
2.2 Tamper Resistant Hardware
A secure MLS system requires support from a tamper resistant hardware. Since it is some-
times necessary to verify the integrity of even the lowest layers of software including the
OS kernel and drivers, these operations cannot be done in software. Furthermore, there are
secret values in a secure system (such as the root secrets) which have to be irremovable from
the platform in order to prove the identity of the system. However, software cannot keep the
root secrets permanently. Warm resets or system crashes may result in the loss of root keys.
Consequently, these operations and storage of platform secrets must be done in hardware.
Two major commercial attempts offer such functionalities.
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2.2.1 IBM 4758 Secure Coprocessor
The IBM 4758 secure coprocessor [8] has been one of the major commercial attempts to
implement a tamper resistant hardware. It supports high-speed cryptographic functions for
data encryption or signing. It has a set of embedded certificates which are used for platform
attestation applications. It implements PKCS#11 and the IBM Common Cryptographic
Architecture standards which support DES and T-DES encryption, single and double key
message authentication codes (MACs), SHA-1 and MD5 hash functions, and symmetric or
asymmetric key distribution algorithms.
The coprocessor can be used for large volume data encryption, data, software, and OS
integrity verification using MACs, trust establishment, and attestation.
The IBM 4758 is tamper resistant. It senses hardware tamper attempts using a randomly
placed grid of wires inside its casing. It responds to tampering by zeroing its secrets and
changing its state. Penetration, temperature extremes, voltage variation, and radiation are
examples of events which trigger tamper alarm.
The coprocessor consists of different layers of software. The first layer is loaded into the
on-board ROM, boots first, and loads the next layer. Other layers reside in a battery-backed
RAM and each is loaded by the previous layer.
The 4758’s hardware (RAM, ROM, Flash...) and its firmware (post, miniboot) can only
be modified or upgraded by IBM; its software (loaders, kernel, OS, and applications), on
the other hand, can be upgraded by the officer of each layer. The officer of each layer has a
unique signing key and is appointed by the previous layer by signing its public key.
The boot sequence starts from the ROM; ROM loads the OS and it, in turn, runs the
applications. To enforce the access control in this strict fashion, IBM 4758 has a number
of ratchet locks. These locks are strictly increasing counters which are advanced whenever
a layer is loaded completely and is ready to load the next layer. Access decisions are made
based on the counter value.
The coprocessor also has a PRNG unit which generates all the random numbers needed.
Note that the coprocessor generates all the seeds to these PRNGs internally. IBM 4758 also
has a feature called “targeting”: commands from the officers can target the coprocessor units
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with specific configurations. The targeting feature facilitates operations and maintenance of
the device. The operating system running on the coprocessor is a modified version of CP/Q
which includes device drivers for different hardware units of 4758. The 4758 also comes with
a C API which is suitable for application development.
IBM 4758 is the world’s first product to be certified at NIST FIPS 140-1 Level 4. The
new versions of IBM 4758 are produced under the new “IBM 4764” name.
2.2.2 Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
TPM [9] is another widely used commercial product which presents a tamper resistant hard-
ware for trusted systems. It is used for applications such as protected storage, data integrity,
trusted execution, secure booting, sealing, attestation, and trust establishment. TPM is cur-
rently certified with Common Criteria at EAL 3.
The architecture has three roots-of-trust and some trusted building blocks (TBBs) built
around them. Roots of trust include the root of trust for measurement (RTM) used for
integrity management and platform attestation, the root of trust for storage (RTS) which
manages secure storage of data and keys outside the primary trusted boundary, and the root
of trust for reporting (RTR) which is used for secure reporting and monitoring.
Integrity measurement in TPM is done using a layered approach in which each layer
verifies the next one by computing hashes and securely storing the reference values. These
values are stored iteratively in platform configuration registers (PCRs). TPM also has five
types of credentials which are used for authentication and attestation purposes: endorsement
(EK), conformance, platform, validation, and identity (AIK) credentials.
Along with normal encryption and signing, TPM supports sealing and sealed-signing
which essentially means that the remote platform must have specific values in its PCRs in
order to decrypt the data. This enables TPM to apply strong policies for data access.
The API which supports the TPM and fills the gap between the software and the chip is
called the TCG Software Stack (TSS). TSS provides a layered stack of APIs which interact
with the higher layer and provide an interface to the lower layer. At the top of the stack
is the application which requires TPM support. The layer beneath the application is called
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the TCG Service Provider (TSP) which provides functions used by the application to TPM
operations. Under TSP, there are three other layers called TSS Core Services (TCS), TCG
Device Driver Library (TDDL), and the TPM Device Driver each facilitating TPM services
for its upper layer.
TSS can be used to develop TPM-based applications at different software layers. For
instance, user applications use TSP as an API to interface with TPM. Kernel applications,
on the other hand, can use TCS or TDDL APIs. Lower layer kernel codes can directly
interface with the device driver.
For the sake of perspicuity, the usages of IBM 4758 and TPM in MLS system are not
described here. They are presented throughout the future sections depending on the com-
ponent deploying them.
2.3 Processor
Modern CPUs provide security functionalities which facilitate the implementation of MLS
policies. In this section, we study four major technologies in new CPUs which can be
deployed to build an MLS system.
Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT or LaGrande)
Intel Trusted Execution Technology [10, 11, 12] is a new feature on Intel CPUs which provides
a trusted execution environment for secure applications. It requires support from the I/O
subsystems, the OS kernel, and the TPM chip, and it provides functionalities such as data
and program protection, attestation, and secure I/O.
Intel TXT Capabilities
Intel TXT delivers the following on-chip capabilities to build a trusted environment:
• Protected Execution: Enables each secure application to run in its own secure and
isolated environment. It prevents malicious applications or malware from observing
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and/or interfering with the execution of a secure application. Each application receives
its dedicated share of resources.
• Sealed Storage: Provides information isolation and data security. Sealed storage es-
sentially means encrypting the policy along with data. Using this feature, a piece of
data is encrypted along with the environment properties (e.g. hash value of the kernel
or value of a set of registers). Data can be decrypted only in the same environment. It
prevents an attacker from tampering with devices, OS, or memory to steal encryption
keys and decrypt data.
• Protected Input: Provides a secure path from input devices (e.g. mouse and keyboard)
to the application. When using this feature, the application domain’s input manager
shares a key with the input device. Any data (e.g. keystrokes) is encrypted with this
key before it is communicated to the machine. Only applications who own the key can
decrypt the input data. It prevents attacks such as key logging.
• Protected Graphics: Provides a secure path between the application and the output
display. Display information is encrypted before the application sends it to the display
context (e.g. window object). It prevents malicious applications from observing or
interfering with display data.
• Attestation: Provides assurance about the applications and the trusted execution en-
vironment to other parties. Using this feature, another party can get a signed list of
processes running in the system, the hashed values of some specific applications (e.g.
drivers), or environment measurements (e.g. hash of the kernel or register values).
Using attestation, different parties can establish mutual trust and can get assurance
that the other party is authentic or has a secure environment.
• Protected Launch: Provides controlled launch of OS and system software components
(e.g. OS kernel, kernel modules, etc.).
To implement the above functionalities, Intel TXT uses processor, chipset, mouse/keyboard,
graphic, and TPM features. The processor enhances event handling and provides instruc-
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tions for working with protected execution environments and for a more secure software
stack. The chipset provides memory protection, enhancement to protected data access from
memory, secure IO and graphics, and TPM interface. Keyboard, mouse, and graphic sub-
system must support secure channels with the application. Finally, the TPM chip provides
encryption, sealing, and attestation services.
Intel TXT Workings
Intel chips that support TXT technology have two modes of operation: standard and pro-
tected. In a standard partition, applications run normally as they do in an IA-32 environ-
ment. This preserves the backward compatibility for old applications and those which do
not require security.
A protected partition, on the other hand, provides isolation and non-interference ser-
vices for the applications running inside it. An application running in a protected partition
is allocated its own memory pages encrypted with keys known only to the application. Unau-
thorized applications cannot read or write to these pages. The chip also blocks any DMA
request to the protected memory pages. Moreover, information paths to and from the ap-
plications in a protected partition are secured against sniffing or modification by encrypting
data from input devices (e.g. mouse/keyboard) and to output graphic display. The software
code that provides isolation between different partitions is called the domain manager.
Secure applications can run entirely inside a protected partition. On the other hand, they
may have standard sections that run normally in a standard partition and critical, secure
sections that run in the protected partition. This facilitates adding secure functionality to
existing applications and decreases protection overhead.
When an application needs to run in a protected partition, it executes a SENTER in-
struction. Some pages of memory are allocated to this application and they are protected
from being read or written by other applications. The processor loads an authenticated code
module into this memory, stores its hash into PCR registers in the TPM, and invokes it. The
authenticated code checks for proper hardware configuration, enables memory protection for
the domain manager, authenticates the domain manager, and invokes it.
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To exit protected execution, the domain manager first sanitizes the protected partition
from any sensitive data. It then executes a SEXIT instruction to disable protected execution
and free up the protected memory. Intel TXT allows exceptions and interrupts only within
the protected partition in order to prevent these events from leaking sensitive data. The
processor also watches for unexpected events such as sudden resets and wipes the protected
memory in those cases before it can be accessed by any other application.
Intel TXT application in MLS
To implement information segregation using Intel TXT, each application with a specific
security level must be executed in a separate domain. This isolates the applications and
prevents information leakage or malicious observation of state.
However, isolating applications in this manner prevents any flow of information between
different security levels. MLS and information flow security policies define a set of rules that
allow some form of data exchange between different domains and block other information
flow. To implement such a policy using Intel TXT, there are two possibilities. One is to
use shared domains. In this case, secure applications run under the same shared domain.
A domain manager (e.g. the OS kernel) enforces the security policy here. In this model,
although secure applications are well protected against other applications, they can observe
or manipulate each other’s state (memory content). Furthermore, this model does not use
TXT functionalities to implement information flow security; rather, it is the domain manager
which implements the policy.
Another approach is to virtualize the execution environment. In this model, each virtual
machine is executed in a separate domain. A virtual machine monitor (VMM) manages these
virtual machines and implements the security policy. This model can potentially provide
better segregation since the applications run in different domains and no direct interference
is allowed between them except through the VMM. Because VMMs are usually smaller than
OS kernels, it is easier to make sure that they are secure or to verify them formally.
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Intel TXT Extra Features
Intel TXT architecture also delivers attestation and trust establishment services using the
TPM chip. To do this, Intel TXT uses the permanent keys embedded in the TPM chip to
handshake with a remote agent in order to establish trust. As the TPM chip is bound to
the hardware (attached to the motherboard for example), this proves the true identity of
the system.
To provide attestation, TPM stores system measurements (e.g. hash values of specific
software, driver, or kernel modules) in its PCR registers. To prove the authenticity of the
system, TPM sends a signed version of these registers to remote parties.
2.3.1 Intel Virtualization Technology (IVT)
Virtualization [13] is another feature that can be deployed to implement secure MLS- enabled
systems. It is supported in most of the new Intel processors as well as many of the older
ones.
IVT application in MLS
Recall that virtualization can be deployed along with trusted execution to implement ap-
plication segregation and MLS policy. More details about this model are discussed in Intel
TXT section. A detailed discussion of the IVT is beyond the scope of this work. Here, we
briefly point out some of its features that are specifically useful for secure applications.
• DMA: IVT supports complete DMA remapping. This makes the VMM much lighter
weight since it does not have to deal with tracking DMAs in the software. Lightweight
VMMs are generally easier to verify and are considered more secure. Note that if
virtualization is used the MLS policy is implemented by the VMM, so it is important
for the VMM to be (provably) secure.
• Interrupt: IVT also remaps interrupt tables completely. As in the case of DMA,
interrupt remapping helps to reduce the size of the VMM.
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• Multilevel page table: Adds an extra step in address translation process. It remaps
the virtual memory for the virtual machines. Multilevel page table also facilitates
virtualization and removes the burden of memory tracking from the VMM.
2.3.2 AMD Secure Virtual Machine (SVM or Pacifica) and Trusted
Execution
SVM
AMD SVM [14] also provides virtualization features. It facilitates DMA and interrupt han-
dling by intercepting and remapping them. Furthermore, SVM improves the virtual machine
performance by offering state switching mechanisms. It saves the state (register values and
pointers) of a host OS and loads the state of the guest OS when switching from host to guest
and vice versa.
In addition, SVM provides an additional virtual address translation step, called nested
page table, along with a tagged TLB to further simplify the VMM.
Trusted Execution
Some of the AMD processors provide TPM and trusted execution support. AMD secure
startup offers attestation and memory protection services which are similar to those offered
by Intel TXT. AMD security features, however, do not offer memory encryption or secure
IO.
The processor starts establishing a protected environment when a SKINIT instruction
is issued. Secure loader (same as Intels domain manager) initializes the SVM hardware,
authenticates an application, and invokes it. To provide memory protection, the processor
blocks any other application from accessing the pages allocated to this domain. The memory,
in contrast, is not encrypted.
TPM keeps the application and environment measures as in the case of Intel TXT and
can provide attestation of the environment to other parties.
In addition, secure startup clears protected memory pages on sudden exits. Called Au-
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tomatic Memory Clear (AMC), this processor unit clears memory content in case of a warm
reset or a system exception. It prevents information leakage by imposing intentional system
exceptions. Intel TXT has the same feature.
2.3.3 Intel vPro Technology
Intel vPro [15] is a recent technology which enhances security and manageability of com-
puters. It allows remote entities to connect to the processor directly when the machine is
shut down, hibernated, or even when the OS is absent or has crashed. This facilitates asset
discovery, inventory checks, automated/remote updating, diagnosis and repair, and patch
management. Intel vPro also provide security services which are described below.
Intel IVT and TXT
Intel vPro technology has trusted execution and virtualization technologies built in. It offers
all IVT features such as DMA and interrupt remapping and virtual memory. It supports
general purpose virtualization which essentially has a guest OS running on top of a host OS.
In addition, there is another mode of operation named special purpose virtualization or
virtual appliance. In this mode, a software stack on top of the VMM virtually produces
an appliance and its services. For example, a virtual appliance can offer intrusion detec-
tion/prevention service. In this model, the virtual appliance runs on top of the VMM as a
piece of software and is connected to the virtual network interface card of the guest OS. Any
traffic to the guest OS is passed through the virtual appliance by the VMM. The virtual
appliance can inspect traffic to the guest OS and block it in case it detects any anomaly in
the packets.
Intel vPro also supports complete TXT functionality. The mobile version of the vPro
technology, Centrino Pro, however, does not yet support TXT.
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Support for Cisco NAC
Intel vPro supports IEEE 802.1x and Cisco NAC technology for network security. It can
be used to send security posture information about the host to posture validation servers
and to keep credentials in the hardware. More details about the Cisco NAC technology are
explained in the network section.
Intel vPros application is MLS
Intel vPro technology can be used to support an MLS system in different ways. Its Cisco
NAC and 802.1x compliance can be used to build trusted networks which are necessary
for communicating tagged information, preserving tags, and enforcing network MLS policy.
Moreover, TXT and IVT technologies can be deployed, as described earlier, to build MLS
systems.
A more important usage of vPro technology in MLS systems can be the virtual appliance
concept. A virtual appliance can have arbitrary control over the traffic to and from a virtual
machine. This makes virtual appliance a good candidate for implementing separation kernel.
A virtual appliance can implement arbitrary information flow security policy for the virtual
machines and provide information segregation. As the control over the communication and
virtual appliance comes directly from the processor, this provides a safer solution than
implementing the separation kernel on the same host as an application or inside the OS
kernel. It also keeps the VMM lightweight and provides a separation of duty between the
VMM and separation kernel.
2.4 Operating System
Another important component of an MLS system is the operating system (OS). An MLS
enabled OS launches secure applications, provides memory protection, and implements an
MLS security policy. It fills the gap between a secure application and a trusted hardware.
Technologies such as Intel TXT’s secure launch require some form of OS support. In this
section, we study major operating systems with MLS functionality and explain their features.
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2.4.1 SE-Linux
Security Enhanced Linux [16] supports a variety of mandatory access control (MAC) secu-
rity policies to restrict accesses and control the flow of information. It implements Type
Enforcement (TE), Role-based Access Control (RBAC), and MLS security policies. To do
that, SE-Linux adopts a MAC framework called FLASK.
The TE policy is one kind of policy in the SE-Linux policy language. In this policy, a
type is associated with each subject (often called the “domain” of the subject) and each
subject can only access the objects of the same type.
Role-based access control is another type of policy implemented in the SE-Linux. In an
RBAC system, there should be two different mappings: the first is the mapping between users
and roles, and the second is the mapping between roles and permissions. In the SE-Linux
RBAC, the first mapping is defined using the “user” construct, but the second mapping uses
the TE as its basis. This generates a mapping between roles and types, and access control
rules are defined only based on types.
Another type of MAC policy supported by SE-Linux is MLS policy. SE-Linux defines
a “security level” for each subject (a user, process, or application) and each object (a file
or process) in the system. It implements the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) security policy for confi-
dentiality which blocks any writing to a lower and any reading from a higher security level
(no-read-up and no-write-down rules). Currently, it does not support Biba security policy
for integrity which blocks any writing to a higher and any reading from a lower security
level (no-read-down and no-write-up rules). It is recommended that type enforcement is
used, instead, to provide integrity. More sophisticated information flow policies can also be
supported by a combination of SE-Linux TE and MLS.
A “security level” in SE-Linux is defined as a sensitivity (e.g. top secret, secret, confi-
dential, and unclassified) and a set of compartments (e.g. a subset of Asia, Europe, Africa,
America). For instance, the security level of a very sensitive document about Asian and
European affairs can be (Top secret, Asia, Europe). A security level dominates another level
if it has a higher sensitivity and a superset of its compartments.
SE-Linux confidentiality rule allows only reading from a dominated object and writing
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to a dominant one, but not vice versa. MLS policy in SE-Linux applies to every activity in
the operating system (even copy-pasting from different windows).
Security levels in SE-Linux are stored in object or subject tags. They are ASCII charac-
ters describing the security level of the element. Security levels can only be modified through
specific, restricted commands.
SE-Linux, however, does not provide network object labeling because it cannot preserve
the security labels across the network. This has to be worked around using other mechanisms
which are described in the network section. SE-Linux is evaluated at Common Criteria EAL
4+.
2.4.2 Trusted Solaris
Trusted Solaris [17, 18] also supports a limited version of MLS policy. It supports BLP con-
fidentiality policy and network labeling. It, however, does not provide integrity or arbitrary
information flow security policy in general.
To implement MLS, Trusted Solaris defines different “zones.” Each process and file
system object is assigned a zone. A zone defines a security label and is isolated from any
other zones. A process is only allowed to read the files from a lower zone and write to files
from a higher zone.
Nevertheless, there is a difficulty in assigning a zone to each process or file. Some pro-
cesses may need to access multiple zones and some files may need to be available to processes
from various zones. For example, access to the /tmp directory is needed by different pro-
cesses. If a single zone is assigned to it, some processes may not be able to access it. To
solve this problem, Trusted Solaris virtualizes the entire application environment into dif-
ferent instances and assigns a label to each of them. This is called poly-instantiation.
Trusted Solaris also provides network labeling functionality to preserve object security
labels across the network. It is evaluated at Common Criteria EAL 4+.
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2.4.3 Trusted BSD, SEBSD, and Trusted IRIX
Two versions of BSD provide MLS functionality. Trusted BSD [19] includes a module, named
MAC Framework, which can enforce arbitrary MAC policies. MAC Framework has different
components such as the policy registration, composition, labeling, and system calls. Policies
are implemented as modules. Examples of policies which can be implemented using Trusted
BSD are Biba, MLS, TE, BLP, etc.
Trusted BSD labels OS elements such as process, file system, network, and IPC objects
in order to enforce the MAC policy. It can further compose multiple policies if there is more
than one available in the system. Consequently, it can support complicated information flow
security policies. Trusted BSD provides APIs for label-aware applications to work with the
OS labels. Trusted BSD conforms to different Common Criteria protection profiles, though
it has not been evaluated for any of them yet.
SEBSD [19] is the port of the FLASK Type Enforcement framework to the BSD OS.
Hence, its working is very similar to that of SE-Linux. In SEBSD and SE-Linux, Linux
Security Module (LSM) functions similar to the MAC Framework in Trusted BSD. Although
versions of SEBSD are available, it is still under development.
Trusted IRIX [20] is yet another flavor of Linux which supports MLS policies. Developed
by the Silicon Graphics, Inc. (SGI), IRIX is a UNIX-like operating system for SGI clusters.
Trusted IRIX implements MLS policy by labeling files and processes and restricting accesses
by mediating access requests as in Trusted BSD. In addition, it offers network labeling using
standard protocols and an extra session manager to enforce additional session level policy.
Trusted IRIX 6.5 has been validated to conform to the National Security Agency Information
Systems Security Organisation’s (ISSO) Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP) and the
ISSO’s Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP).
2.4.4 Trusted Linux
Another version of MLS-enabled Linux is called Trusted Linux [21]. It is sometimes described
as Linux plus TPM. It provides client integrity by deploying loadable kernel modules: TPM,
Extended Verification Module (EVM), and Simple Linux Integrity Module (SLIM). It stores
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the measurements of data files and executables in the TPM at the first open or execution
and verifies their integrity on each access.
Trusted Linux supports MLS confidentiality (also referred to as secrecy) and integrity
policies. It has a fixed set of pre-defined labels for files, namely, “sensitive,” “user,” “pub-
lic,” and “exempt” for confidentiality and “system,” “user,” “untrusted,” and “exempt” for
integrity. Moreover, each process has four security classes:
• Integrity Read Access Class (IRAC)
• Integrity Write/Execute Access Class (IWXAC)
• Secrecy Write Access Class (SWAC)
• Secrecy Read/Execute Access Class (SRXAC)
Trusted Linux enforces the following rules to enforce confidentiality and integrity. These
rules are slightly more general versions of BLP and Biba security policies. If IRAC=IWXAC
and SWAC=SRXAC, the rules reduce to Biba and BLP.
Read:
IRAC(process) <= IAC(object)
SRXAC(process) >= SAC(object)
Write:
IWXAC(process) >= IAC(object)
SWAC(process) <= SAC(object)
Execute:
IWXAC(process) <= IAC(object)
SRXAC(process) >= SAC(object)
Trusted Linux, nonetheless, does not support more flexible security policies or arbitrary
types and labels. Trusted Linux is pending evaluation by the Common Criteria.
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2.4.5 Microsoft Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB or
Palladium)
NGSCB [22] is the kernel designed by Microsoft which drives the Intel TXT. It uses TPM
as the platform for its trusted operations and integrity checks. NGSCB provides Secure
Startup as a means to ensure boot integrity, protect data in an oﬄine system, and increase
the efficiency of TPM deployment.
NGSCB’s Secure Star protects the system against oﬄine attacks by encrypting data using
keys derived from TPM root secret. Furthermore, it prevents OP exploitation and software
hacks by verifying the integrity of the kernel and master boot record (MBR) through mea-
surement values stored in TPM. It also supports key escrow for key recovery and debugging
purposes.
In contrast, NGSCB does not provide any mechanism to protect against hardware tam-
pering, insider attack, post login attack, BIOS reflashing, poor maintenance, and network
or online attacks.
It protects applications and data integrity by deploying Intel TXT’s protected memory
and trusted execution functionality. It launches secure applications in protected areas of
memory, called “curtained memory,” not accessible to any other application even the OS
itself.
NGSCB was first proposed to be implemented in Windows Longhorn and later on Win-
dows Vista. The majority of the features, however, are expected to be released well after
Windows Vista. The only NGSCB feature already available in Windows Vista is BitLocker
which encrypts a whole volume of the file system using keys derived from the TPM secrets.
2.5 Network
Network support is crucial for a secure MLS system. A secure network must prevent the
leakage of sensitive information communicated between two processes on two machines.
This requires that the network preserves the security labels of data and different machines
on the network have the same perception of the security labels. Moreover, a secure network
21
must provide security services such as confidentiality, origin integrity, and data integrity.
In general, it is more difficult to provide security across the network than on a single host.
Various open protocols such as TCP/IP used across a typical network were not designed with
security concerns in mind; hence, they are usually vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks
and exploits. In this section, network technologies supporting MLS systems are discussed.
The solutions are divided into two major sections: untrusted technologies and trusted ones.
2.5.1 Untrusted MLS Network Technologies
There are untrusted network technologies in use which can support MLS systems and provide
some form of security against network-based attacks. Although they are secure against
some classes of attacks, these technologies are “untrusted” in the sense that they cannot
establish the true identity of each party bound to its platform. For example, IPSec provides
confidentiality and integrity services for messages communicated between two parties, but
it does not establish the true identity of either.
IPv4, Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO), and Revised IP Security Option (RIPSO)
The traditional solution for preserving data labels across the network uses IPv4 and encodes
label information in the IP header. In this case, the “option” field in the IP header is used
to carry the label for the information in the payload. Each security level is encoded by a
byte value and placed in predefined locations in the IP options field.
Two Requests for Comments (RFCs) standardize the usage of IP header to carry label
data. Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO) specified in RFC 1108 standardizes such
usage and describes the bit combinations and their location in the IP header.
A revised version of CIPSO is described in the Revised IP Security Option (RIPSO) RFC
1038. It provides more specific details of the standard label values.
Trusted Solaris, Trusted BSD, and Trusted IRIX support CIPSO/RIPSO for preserving
labels across the network. SE-Linux does not have such a capability; however, extensions to
SE-Linux which can support these standards are possible.
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CIPSO/RIPSO does not encrypt label data, so the implicit assumption is that no one
can modify the packet as it traverses the network. IPSec relaxes this condition.
IPSec
A more secure solution for encoding security labels across the network is using IPSec. In
this model, the security label is still placed in the IP options field, but it is protected by the
IPSec AH and ESP headers. AH ensures that the label is not changed across the network
(integrity) and ESP provides label confidentiality. A security association (SA) is assigned
to each security label, i.e., each combination of sensitivity plus compartment.
On the outbound, the security label is inserted in the IP options field; an appropriate
SA is selected based, among other things, on the label; and an IPSec packet is generated
and sent across the network.
On the inbound, the packet is received, its IPSec header is extracted, it is processed using
the appropriate SA, the label is extracted, and finally the MLS security policy is enforced
based on the label value.
Trusted Solaris and Trusted BSD support network labeling using IPSec. Extensions of
SE-Linux can support labeled network over IPSec.
2.5.2 Trusted Network Technologies
Trusted networks [23, 24, 25, 26, 27] extend the concept of trust to the network architecture.
Using existing standards, protocols, and network appliances, they address security concerns
such as rogue devices, rogue users, non-complaint devices, configuration errors, unsecured
physical access, and bypassing of the security mechanism. The complete description of a
trusted network working and the details involved is well beyond the scope of this work.
Nevertheless, we provide a brief explanation of them and describe how they can augment
MLS architectures with their security services.
The trusted network architecture is proposed by the Trusted Computing Group’s (TCG)
Trusted Network Connect (TNC). Commercial implementations of such networks are avail-
able from Cisco TrustSec [24], Cisco CleanAccess [25] (also known previously as Cisco Net-
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work Admission Control or NAC [26]), and Microsoft Network Access Protection (NAP)
[27]. The commercial trusted networks are even interoperable. For instance, Cisco NAC and
Microsoft NAP can work side by side in a network.
Trusted networks provide strong authentication, security posture validation (e.g. patch,
OS, and antivirus verification), automatic remediation of noncompliant machines, directory
service, auditing, and port-based network access control. They also offer the security services
inherent in the protocols they use. For instance, confidentiality and integrity services can be
provided by using IPSec. Trusted networks are a move away from the traditional perimeter
network security model. They provide network security based on trust and from within the
network.
Whenever a client device needs to join the network, the network access device (NAD)
authenticates the device using EAP over 802.1x protocol [28]. The NAD sends the device
credentials to the Authentication, Authorization, and Access control (AAA) server using
RADIUS protocol. The AAA server refers the client device to a set of posture validation
servers (PVSes). PVSes check the compliance of the device with security requirements (e.g.
having a properly patched OS, updated antivirus, and/or authentic version of software).
They send the results to the AAA server using HCAP protocol. Based on the compliance
results, the AAA sends an appropriate network security policy to the NAD for enforcement.
The NAD enforces the policy for any traffic from the device’s physical port. Inter-machine
communication is secured using IPSec over UDP or IPSec over IPv6 which can take place only
after the above authentication and trust establishment steps. Trusted networks can use TPM
for secure authentication and posture validation. Figure 2.2 shows different components of
a trusted network. There are various details involved in the workings of these protocols and
the trusted network which are omitted for the sake of space.
Trusted MLS Network
Trusted networks can implement an MLS security policy in a secure and resilient manner.
Traditional solutions can still be supported by placing security labels in IPSec packets. A
trusted network, nonetheless, can directly implement an MLS policy to achieve a secure MLS
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Figure 2.2: Trusted network as an alternative to traditional perimeter security
network in a more wildcard manner.
The directory server inside the trusted network holds the role or attributes of each client
in its database. These values are used by the AAA server to decide what traffic policy the
NAD enforces for the traffic from the client. The directory can store the security level of
each user in the network. It sends back this information to the AAA server during the
posture validation process using the LDAP protocol. Based on the user’s security level, the
AAA server can then send an MLS policy to the NAD to be enforced on that user’s traffic.
For example, a user with “secret” security clearance must be denied access to a “top secret”
database machine attached to the network.
Since the security level of each entity is determined based on its true identity established
during the authentication phase, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for untrusted users
or devices to get around the security mechanism. Security label tampering or false labels
are prevented using the wildcard enforcement of the policy by the NAD. Note that in this
model, we do not rely on the OS to preserve or provide security labels. The traffic from
the client is tagged by the NAD itself. This remedies OS hacks that cause false labeling or
bypassing the security engine.
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Other Features of Trusted Networks
Besides implementing an MLS policy, trusted networks offer other beneficial security services.
They prevent configuration errors by compliance verification, mitigate malware attacks by
automatic update/patch/antivirus management, and block untrusted devices and users using
strong hardware based (TPM) authentication. Moreover, they prevent bypassing of the
security mechanism by applying the MLS policy to the physical port of the client device.
2.6 Database
There are commercial database systems available which have built-in MLS support. In this
section we briefly explain two major ones.
2.6.1 IBM DB2
IBM DB2 [29] supports MLS policies by labeling objects and subjects in the system. In
DB2, subjects refer to users, tasks, batch jobs, and UNIX daemons. Objects refer to data
sets, a row in a DB2 table, commands, terminals, printers, Direct Access Storage Device
(DASD) volumes, and tapes.
A security label in IBM DB2 is composed of a security level and a set of categories. Recall
the definition of these terms from previous sections. As in the case of SE-Linux, there is a
strict order defined on the security labels (domination notation). It implements BLP MLS
policy; i.e. it denies read-ups and write-downs. “Read” and “write” are generic terms used
here for similar privileges. DB2 standard privileges are “alter,” “delete,” “select,” “insert,”
“update,” etc.
DB2 also supports wildcard access control rules for finer grain information flow control.
This is done through DB2s “GRANT” command. Furthermore, DB2 implements MLS
TCP/IP policy rules which make it even more flexible in expressing flow control policies.
Permissions can be defined based on IP addresses, protocol, and security labels.
IBM DB2 has been evaluated at Common Criteria EAL 4.
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2.6.2 Oracle Label Security and Virtual Private Database (VPD)
Oracle databases [30] implement MLS using label based access control (LBAC). As in other
MLS systems, a label has a level and a set of compartments. It has privileges similar to
those defined for DB2 and enforces MLS confidentiality policy for accesses.
Virtual Private Database (VPD) is another technology implemented in Oracle databases
which facilitates fine-grained access control for fields of a table inside the database. It
defines a shadow of a table (using a SELECT-like command) and defines user privileges
to that shadow. For example, it can be used to block user accesses to a column containing
Social Security numbers in an employee information table, yet allow access to other columns.
Oracle databases are evaluated to conform to Database Management System Protection
Profile at Common Criteria EAL3.
2.7 Storage and Personal Storage Drives (PSDs)
The IBM Tivoli Framework [31] is a major system and storage management platform that
provides MLS support. It defines security level and category as LDAP object attributes.
More details about IBM Tivoli can be found in its manual [31]. It has been evaluated at
Common Criteria EAL 3.
Another research effort [32] proposes a high assurance MLS file server model which can
implement both BLP and GWVr2 policies. Since it uses formal methods for designing the
file system, it can meet Common Criteria EAL 7. It has an MLS message router (MMR)
which handles access requests to the file system. The MLSFS mediates all access requests
to preserve confidentiality, uses MMR to enforce information flow policy, and enforces a
modified version of the BLP security policy. In this policy, writing is strictly limited to one’s
own level instead of higher levels in the original BLP policy.
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) also extends its trust model to storage devices [33].
The TCG model provides three main security benefits: (1) it establishes trust between stor-
age devices and hosts through mutual authentication and trust establishment. (2) It provides
secure control over storage security features which support storage protection and encryption
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for storage devices. (3) Finally, it creates a secure communication channel between hosts and
storage devices. TCGs trusted storage offers fine-grained storage security, improved storage
access control, efficient device-level encryption, and automated backup functionalities. TCG
also makes recommendations for lifecycle management of such storage. MLS labels can be
encoded in the trusted storage access control mechanism.
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3 Candidate Architecture
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we design and study a candidate architecture for high assurance, multilevel
security workstations using available and customized technologies. The reasoning behind
some of the choices is explained, but the architecture is not unique. There may be other
designs for a high assurance MLS system such as a process-based system or application
virtualization systems.
3.1.1 Contributions
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• A candidate architecture based on virtualization for high assurance MLS is designed
and studied.
• We study Intel TXT technology in depth—especially, how it can be deployed in a
trusted system.
• A trusted boot is designed and implemented to measure the hypervisor and virtual-
ization environment.
• Different security gaps in the candidate architecture are identified and explained. The
gaps identified in this study provide the foundation for the subsequent chapters, each
of which solves one of the identified gaps.
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3.2 Candidate Architecture
In a multilevel security system, each entity has a security level. These levels can be the
traditional “top secret,” “secret,” “confidential,” and “unclassified” levels or a more sophis-
ticated set of levels and compartments. Accesses to resources are restricted using these
levels. For instance, “read-ups” and “write-downs” are denied for confidentiality reasons.
An MLS policy can be a simple Bell-LaPadulla policy or a more sophisticated information
flow policy.
3.2.1 Different Approaches
There are two different approaches for building a multilevel security computer system:
process-level and machine-level architectures.
Process Level MLS
The first approach to build an MLS system is to have different processes with different
security levels inside a machine. In this model, the operating system enforces the security
policy (separation policy) when an access to an object (e.g. file) is requested by a process.
Examples of this model are SE-Linux and Trusted Solaris operating systems. Figure 3.1
shows this model. The benefit of using this model is that the operating systems provide many
facilities and flexible policy frameworks to implement MLS. In this model, however, it is hard
to achieve assurance requirements. SE-Linux, for instance, protects against unauthorized
accesses, but it does not ensure that the isolation is never breached.
To achieve such isolation assurance, the Linux Security Module (LSM) must be modified
to support TPM. TPM can be used to isolate process spaces (compartmented attestation)
[34]. This is, however, difficult to achieve and the operating system must be modified
intrusively.
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Figure 3.1: Process-level MLS architecture
Machine Level MLS
The other approach to build an MLS system is to have different machines with different
security levels inside virtual machines. In this model, each machine is assigned a single
security level. The Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM or Separation Kernel) enforces the
isolation policy. It also labels the network traffic of each virtual machine with its appropriate
level. All of the processes inside a virtual machine have the same security level. Note that
in this model the policy is coarser grained because it restricts interactions between virtual
machines instead of processes. Figure 3.2 depicts this architecture.
On the other hand, it is much easier to achieve strong isolation in this model. Intel
Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) uses this model along with TPM support to isolate
VMs. We focus on this approach for its potential to achieve high assurance.
3.2.2 Trusted Execution Technology
The candidate architecture uses Intel’s TXT [10, 11, 12] to achieve isolation. In this model,
different VMs are launched on top of a VMM. TXT measures the VMM to ensure that it is
not tampered with. It also protects the memory of each VM, isolating it from other VMs,
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Figure 3.2: Machine-level MLS architecture
seals the sensitive data, protects input and output devices, and provides attestation.
Attacker Model of TXT
Intel’s TXT protects against a wide range of attacks:
• Memory Manipulation: TXT prevents memory manipulation attacks by isolating VMs
and encrypting their memory spaces. This means that each VM is launched within its
own memory space, inaccessible to other VMs. TXT also controls DMA accesses to
prevent DMA-based memory manipulation.
• Input Manipulation: TXT secures any input channel to the VMs. Input devices such as
mouse and keyboard encrypt data using a session key before it is sent to the application.
This prevents attacks such as changing the keyboard driver or keystroke logging.
• Output Manipulation: Output channels are also protected by the TXT. Display output
is encrypted before sending to the graphic card to prevent attacks that change the
display driver. Screen captures and phishing are also blocked in this fashion.
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Figure 3.3: Measuring VMM using SMX
3.2.3 Candidate Architecture Using TXT
To protect against the above mentioned attacks and to guarantee isolation, the candidate
architecture uses the TXT’s chain-of-trust model.
Chain of Trust
First, the CPU chip (hereafter referred to as “chip”) measures the VMM (separation kernel)
to ensure that it is not tampered with. If the VMM passes this stage, it will be called a
Measured Virtual Machine Monitor or MVMM. A measurement is a cryptographic hash of
the VMM. The result of the measurement (hash value) is stored inside the TPM. Before
each launch, the measurement value is compared with this stored value inside the TPM.
If the VMM passes the measurement (MVMM), the control is passed to it. The MVMM
“mediates” all VM activities after this point and essentially implements the policy.
The chip uses Safer Mode Extension (SMX) instruction to measure the VMM and pass
control to it (as shown in Figure 3.3). Note that at the beginning, there is a guest OS
running on top of the CPU. After running the SMX instruction, the VMM takes the control
and virtualizes the environment, including the starter guest OS.
To make sure that the VMM has never been tampered with during its lifetime, measure-
ments are done incrementally. Incremental measurements essentially keep a history of all
changes to the VMM inside the TPM. In TPM, these measurements are stored in Platform
Configuration Registers (PCRs.) Hence, a PCR is computed as follows:
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Figure 3.4: A chain of trust using TPM
PCR = SHA− 1(OldPCRvalue,NewV alue) (3.1)
Consequently, any deviation from the desired measurement in the history of the VMM
is reflected in its current value. Xen has recently been supported as an MVMM. It can use
SMX instruction to initiate a secure launch of the VMM.
After the launch of the MVMM, it starts to measure the VMs using the Virtual Machine
Extensions (VMX) instructions. These instructions, in turn, measure the VMs, store the
measurements in the TPM, and run the VMs. In essence, TXT establishes a chain-of-trust
in which three steps are done repeatedly:
1. Measure the next entity
2. Store the measurement in TPM
3. Pass control to the next entity
This chain-of-trust has a root-of-trust which is the master key stored inside the TPM in
the factory. Figure 3.4 shows a chain of trusted established by the TPM.
Sensitive pieces of data, in this model, are sealed with the desired PCR values. As a
result, if the environment (PCR values) changes, the data cannot be accessed.
Memory Protection
Another important requirement of the candidate MLS architecture is memory protection.
Lack of memory protection is why operating system based isolation cannot achieve high
assurance. TXT provides page protection and memory encryption to isolate VMs and ensure
I/O protection. In TXT, there are four types of memory access:
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1. MVMM page access: TXT blocks any direct access to the memory from the VMs.
Any page access must be requested from the MVMM. Furthermore, MVMM prevents
VMs from accessing each other’s memory spaces. Each VM is confined to its encrypted
pages.
2. DMA: Devices can access the memory through DMA. Although devices are hardware,
many of them are configurable through software. As a result, an attacker can miscon-
figure a device to access restricted memory areas. TXT solves this problem by defining
a NoDMA table. MVMM controls the NoDMA table to make sure that sensitive mem-
ory areas are not accessible through DMA.
3. System Management Interrupts (SMI) transfer mode (STM): STM prevents accesses
to prohibited memory regions by normal SMI handling code. It blocks attacks which
modify the SMI handling routines to manipulate memory. STM is a peer to MVMM
and the policy (i.e. the location of sensitive regions) is negotiated between them.
4. Trusted Graphics Translation Table (TGTT): Display adapters use DMA to efficiently
access physical memory pages holding graphical data (frame buffers). To provide
assurance that the display output is actually what the applications have sent, TXT uses
TGTT. TGTT provides frame buffer protection by dynamically translating between
the buffer address and physical memory address. MVMM establishes the TGTT,
assigns memory pages to it, and configures the display adapter to use it. TGTT is
protected by NoDMA.
Figure 3.5 depicts memory protection in Intel TXT.
I/O Protection
The candidate architecture uses TXT to protect input/output channels as well. Recall that
I/O manipulation is part of the attack model.
TXT offers I/O protection through trusted channels. Trusted channels are established
between the I/O devices and the applications (VMs) by the TPM. Note that TPM does
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Figure 3.5: Memory protection in Intel TXT
not perform the encryption; It just established the channel at the initial phase, while the
applications and I/O devices are responsible for the encryption. There are two types of
trusted channels:
1. Cryptographic trusted channels: Usually established between an application and a
discrete device, they rely on encryption for the protection of data.
2. Hardware trusted channels: Mostly used for integrated devices, they rely on the diffi-
culty of hardware based attacks for protection.
The I/O devices must be able to support trusted channels for TXT to protect I/O. For
instance, mouse and keyboard must encrypt input events (e.g. keystrokes or wheel rotation)
before sending them to the system. The receiver application can decrypt these events using
session keys established by TPM. Other than this, the workings of these devices are relatively
straightforward. The protected graphics, however, are a little more complicated.
Protected Graphics
Graphics protection relies on hardware trusted channels for integrated graphics, and on
cryptographic channels for discrete ones. In a regular system, physical memory for graphic
display is allocated dynamically. The Graphics Translation Table (GTT) provides mapping
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to the physical memory for the graphics engine (such as the X Server). The graphics display
writes to the display buffer through GTT and the MUX outputs the data to the display.
Figure 3.6: Protected graphics model in Intel TXT
In the trusted architecture, the graphic mapping for trusted applications is kept in the
Trusted Graphics Translation Table (TGTT). This table can only be written by the MVMM.
In this model, the applications write their graphical data to their virtual frame buffers. The
secured driver of the MVMM writes to the actual frame buffer through TGTT (Figure
3.6). This extra level of translation assures that the display output actually comes from the
application and that no application can manipulate other applications’ data.
The protected graphics builds a trusted surface overlaying the display to show the trusted
graphical outputs. This surface is transparent at the regions where untrusted programs are
outputting. The MVMM makes sure that this surface has the highest Z value, meaning that
it is on top of all other windows. Changes to the entire display (such as resolution or depth
changes) result in the trusted surface being torn down and reestablished.
3.3 Trusted Boot
We have implemented a complete trusted boot scheme using TXT and TPM. In this scheme,
we verify the authenticity of a VMM (Xen) using trusted boot by measuring (hashing) its
binary. If the measurement yields the same value as the value stored in the TPM PCRs, the
system loads into the VMM. The VMM then can measure the VMs. Proving the authenticity
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of the VMM does not mean that it has desired security properties (e.g., it provides strong
isolation.) It can only detect any unauthorized modification to the VMM code or any extra
module or rootkit residing in its binary.
3.3.1 Measuring VMM
A small piece of code called the “Authenticated Code” (AC) [35], with a known signature
value stored in the mainboard chipset, measures the VMM and sets the NoDMA tables. If
the measurement matches the good value stored in TPM NV memory, it passes the control
to the VMM. Depending on the chipset model, there are two versions of AC available: X35
and Q35. Our system runs the Q35 version which is a binary code about 25 kB in size stored
in the /boot directory of Linux. AC is added as a module to the bootloader and is loaded
by BIOS during the boot process before the VMM.
Another piece of code called Tboot [36] performs the verified launch of the VMM (Xen
in our case). Tboot is a pre-kernel module that itself is verified by TXT using the Launch
Control Policy (LCP). A set of policies called Verified Launch (VL) verify Xen and initrd.
In order to interface with the TPM, we need an implementation of the TCG Software
Stack (TSS) API. We use an existing open source TSS from IBM called “TrouSerS” [37].
Tboot uses TrouSers to work with the TPM.
3.3.2 Implementation
To measure the VMM, first we have modified the bootloader to load Tboot before Xen. This
is done by modifying Grub configurations as shown in Table 3.1.
We then create the LCP and VL policies as illustrated in Table 3.2. The functions
“lcp mlehash,” “lcp crtpol,” and “tb polgen” are provided by Tboot for creating measure-
ments and policies. Note that the command line is also included in the hash value to ensure
that the attacker cannot bypass the booting process by modifying the grub configurations.
Finally, the LCP and VL policies are loaded to the TPM. To do so, we first load a kernel
module (TPM driver) and take ownership of the TPM. Then we load the policies into the
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Table 3.1: Modifications to grub configuration for trusted boot
Original Grub Configuration:
title Xen 3.2
root (hd0,1)
kernel /boot/xen-3.2.gz
module /boot/vmlinuz-2.6.21.fc8xen root=LABEL=/ ro rhgb
module /boot/initrd-2.6.21.fc8xen.img
Modified Grub Configuration:
title Trusted Xen 3.2
root (hd0,1)
kernel /boot/tboot.gz
module /boot/xen-3.2.gz vtd=1
module /boot/vmlinuz-2.6.21.fc8xen root=LABEL=/ ro rhgb
module /boot/initrd-2.6.21.fc8xen.img
module /boot/Q35_SINIT_16.BIN
Table 3.2: Creating LCP and VL policies
Launch Control Policy (LCP):
lcptools/lcp_mlehash /boot/tboot.gz > good_hash
lcptools/lcp_crtpol -t hashonly -m good_hash -o lcp.pol
Verified Launch (VL) Policy:
tb_polgen/tb_polgen --create --policy_type nonfatal --uuid vmm
--hash_type hash --file vl.pol --cmdline ‘‘module /boot/xen-3.2.gz vtd=1’’
/boot/xen-3.2.gz
tb_polgen/tb_polgen --create --uuid dom0 --hash_type hash --file vl.pol
--cmdline ‘‘module /boot/vmlinuz-2.6.21.fc8xen root=LABEL=/ ro rhgb’’
/boot/vmlinuz-2.6.21.fc8xen /boot/initrd-2.6.21.fc8xen.img
TPM using Tboot “lcp writepol” function (Table 3.3).
In order to collect the boot time messages, we have connected a computer to the trusted
boot computer using the serial link. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate the boot time messages
for when the verification succeeds and when it fails, respectively. If the measurement does
not match the policy, the secure environment is torn down and the system halts.
3.4 Security Gaps in the Candidate Architecture
In this section, we identify major security gaps present in the candidate architecture. Al-
though the usage of TXT and MLS-aware peripherals protects against a wide range of
attacks, these gaps still exist in the system. In a highly secure environment, these gaps must
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Table 3.3: Loading policies to the TPM
Initializing TPM:
modprobe tpm_tis
Tcsd
tpm_takeownership password
Loading Policies to TPM:
lcptools/lcp_writepol -i owner -f lcp.pol -p TPM-password
lcptools/lcp_writepol -i 0x20000001 -f vl.pol -p TPM-password
Figure 3.7: VMM measurement success Figure 3.8: VMM measurement failure
be addressed by appropriate mechanisms.
3.4.1 Trusted Network
Another missing piece in the candidate architecture is the lack of “trust” in the network.
Simple network traffic labeling has its shortcomings. Namely, a secured host gets the same
network label as an under-patched host with an old anti-virus version, running an outdated
version of a software if they have the same MLS level.
Furthermore, it is possible to connect mobile devices (e.g. laptops) to the open Ethernet
ports or wireless access points, essentially bypassing some of the protection mechanisms.
In this case, even if MVMMs behave as expected and VMs’ traffics are labeled properly, a
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malicious device can potentially ignore these mechanisms by directly connecting to unsecured
network access points.
To prevent such attacks, a host’s compliance must be verified before it can connect to
the network. This means that a machine must be “trusted” before it can send or receive
network traffic.
Trusted networks can be used to fill in the gap of trust in the network. They provide user
authentication, comprehensive network device admission control, end-device health check
(compliance checks), policy based access control and traffic filtration, automatic remediation,
and auditing.
A trusted network has the following components:
• Client Machines: optionally have Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
• Network Access Device (NAD): switches, routers, VPN concentrator, or wireless access
points
• Authentication, Authorization, and Access Control server (AAA): holds the policy
• Posture Validation Servers (PVS): anti-virus server, patch server, configuration man-
agement server, or software verification server
• Posture Remediation Servers (PRS): remedy non-compliant clients
• Directory Server (DS): contains the user account and roles
• Audit Server
Figure 2.2 shows different components of a trusted network. A complete description of
the workings of a trusted network is beyond the scope of this work. Here we just review
how an MLS trusted network can be constructed. In such a network, the directory server
keeps user security levels. Each user’s level is determined during the authentication phase.
The AAA server holds the MLS policy to be enforced on client’s traffic. NADs tag the
traffic and enforce the MLS policy fetched from the AAA server. New Intel vPro processors
support trusted networks. Chapter 4 studies trusted networks in detail and describes their
architecture and requirements in the context of process control systems.
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3.4.2 Patch Management
Trusted networks can automatically enforce patch requirements to the machines joining the
network, but this raises the major question of how much a patch/update must be tested
before it is applied to the system. Since posture validation servers can strictly require a
new patch before admission to the network, pre-deployment testing becomes more crucial.
If the testing period is long, it is less likely to introduce new vulnerabilities or disrupt the
availability of the system while the system has a longer window of vulnerability and vice
versa.
Pre-deployment testing is considered as an “always good” practice in the literature and
it is usually done in an ad-hoc fashion. Considering the rates of vulnerability discovery and
patch development, however, it is possible to find an optimal testing period that corresponds
to the minimum number of open vulnerabilities at any time. To the best of our knowledge,
this has not been studied in the related work. Chapter 5 studies the optimal pre-deployment
testing period.
3.4.3 High Assurance Graphics
Protected graphics in the candidate architecture which uses TXT, ensures that the display
actually shows the graphical outputs of the applications. It also prevents applications from
accessing the display buffers of each other.
However, this model does not provide “non-interference” guarantees for the graphical
data. The graphics engine of the MVMM handles different VMs’ data. Graphics engines
(such as X Window system) often have many shared data structures available to all appli-
cations. As a result, it is possible for an application to interfere with other applications’
graphical output. Even with TXT graphics protection, applications can potentially read or
modify other applications’ data.
Note that the malicious applications in this model do not violate the buffer protection
offered by TXT. Instead, they misuse the underlying graphics engine to steal data. Note
also that measuring the MVMM could not prevent these interferences because the MVMM’s
graphics engine is the original version and is not tampered with.
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In Chapter 6, we explain the security threats of an untrusted graphics subsystem in
detail. Then we describe the design and implementation of TrustGraph, a trusted graphics
subsystem.
3.5 COTS vs. Non-COTS
Since both COTS and non-COTS technologies have been used in the candidate architecture,
it is important to make this distinction for each component.
The high assurance VMM used in the candidate architecture must be custom designed.
Although we have implemented a proof of concept system on top of Xen, commercial hyper-
visors (including Xen) are very large and complex. Hence, it is very difficult to prove strict
isolation properties for COTS VMMs.
The trusted execution and trusted boot components of the candidate architecture are
available in COTS form under Intel TXT. Moreover, the measurement of the environment
and hardware supports are provided by TPM which is also COTS.
Many of the trusted network components (NADs, AAA servers, clients, PVS, and PRS)
are available off-the-shelf from different vendors. The trusted network chapter (Chapter 4)
discusses special customizations and algorithms to deploy these components in a trusted and
high availability system. However, complete support of trusted network functionalities on
commodity devices may require software or hardware updates. In some cases, less intelligent
devices may require special drivers to connect to a trusted network. The details of the
trusted network requirements are described in the next chapter.
TrustGraph is implemented using the DirectFB API which is available off-the-shelf. To
implement TrustGraph, the DirectFB API is modified with security labels, policy enforce-
ment, and covert channel mitigation codes. Moreover, several coding flaws in DirectFB have
been corrected in TrustGraph using compiler-based techniques. Thus, TrustGraph can be
viewed as a large patch to a COTS component.
Finally, the simplified graphics subsystem is mostly designed from scratch; thus it is
non-COTS.
43
4 Trusted Networks for High Assurance Systems
4.1 Introduction
Trusted networks cover the gap of trust in the current secure networks. They provide high
assurance posture validation and end-device access control. In this chapter we study the
trusted network technologies in more detail and propose a new network architecture for high
assurance applications. An important realm of high assurance systems is industrial control
networks and critical infrastructure applications. Hence, in order to make the study more
practical, we explore trusted networks in the context of industrial control systems.
The increased interconnectivity of industrial control networks and enterprise networks
has resulted in the proliferation of standard communication protocols in industrial control
systems. Legacy SCADA protocols are often encapsulated in TCP/IP packets for reasons
of efficiency and cost, which blurs the network layer distinction between control traffic and
enterprise traffic. The interconnection of industrial control networks and enterprise networks
using commodity protocols exposes instrumentation and control systems and the critical
infrastructure components they operate to a variety of cyber attacks.
Security surveys reveal significant increases in external attacks that target critical infras-
tructure assets [38]. The percentage of external attacks has increased from 26% (1982-2001)
to 60% (2002-2006). The entry points in most of the incidents were corporate WANs, busi-
ness networks, modems, wireless access points, and the Internet.
Several government agencies and industry associations have proposed standards and se-
curity best practices for industrial control systems [39, 40, 41, 42]. However, these efforts
are based on older technologies and security architectures that rely on the differentiation
and separation of enterprise and control traffic. While the efforts are, no doubt, important,
the underlying security philosophy exposes industrial control systems to attacks that ex-
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ploit misconfigurations, out-of-band connectivity and blind trust in the identities of traffic
sources.
However, new technologies are emerging that provide more pervasive security within
networks [43]. These technologies push security from perimeter devices such as firewalls to
the networked devices themselves. This chapter reviews technologies that can be applied to
designing the next generation of secure industrial control systems [44, 45]. The technologies
are discussed along with their security benefits and design trade-offs.
4.1.1 Contributions
The contributions of this chapter are enumerated as follows:
• We identify the security threats and challenges in the existing process control archi-
tectures.
• We propose a new network architecture based on trusted networks for critical infras-
tructure.
• We study and identify specific requirements, customizations and configurations of the
new architecture in order to achieve high availability required in critical infrastructure
systems.
• A side effect of deploying trusted networks is the distribution of filtering rules across
many network devices. We formally study the problem of rule conflicts; specifically,
we show that the naive approach of distributing rules across the devices may result in
rule conflicts.
• An algorithm is proposed for distributing the filtering rules that does not introduce
any new rule conflict to the system.
• Finally, benefits of the new architecture are studied in light of how they address the
security challenges. Moreover a qualitative evaluation of the architecture is performed
against real attack patterns.
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To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose and study a trusted process
control network architecture.
4.2 Control System Security Recommendations
Industrial control systems (ICSs) are highly distributed networks used for controlling op-
erations in water distribution and treatment plants, electric power systems, oil and gas
refineries, manufacturing facilities and chemical plants. Generally, an industrial complex
comprises two distinct networks: a process control network (PCN) containing controllers,
switches, actuators and low-level control devices, and an enterprise network (EN) incorpo-
rating high-level supervisory nodes and corporate computers [46]. PCN includes supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and distributed control systems [39]. The
main components of a PCN are the control server or master terminal unit (MTU), remote
terminal units (RTUs), intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), programmable logic controllers
(PLCs), operator consoles or human-machine interfaces (HMIs), and data historians.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Instrumentation Systems and Automation (ISA) Society, In-
ternational Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and Industrial Automation Open Networking
Association (IAONA) have specified guidelines for securing ICSs (see, e.g., [39, 40, 41]). In
fact, most security best practices recommend the segregation of PCNs and ENs.
Firewalls are often used to segregate PCNs and ENs [39, 46, 47]. A firewall can be
configured to block unnecessary services, protocols and ports, thereby providing a higher
degree of segregation between a PCN and EN. A router may be positioned in front of the
firewall to perform simple packet filtering, leaving the firewall to perform more sophisticated
tasks such as stateful filtering and acting as a proxy.
Using a single firewall between a PCN and EN has a serious drawback. This is because the
firewall must allow the data historian to have a wide range of access to the PCN. Essentially,
each service needs a “hole” in the firewall to operate correctly. Configuring too many holes
in the firewall reduces PCN-EN segregation and opens the PCN to a slew of attacks. This
problem is typically addressed by creating a “demilitarized zone” (DMZ) [39, 46, 47].
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An architecture deploying a DMZ has three zones: an outside zone containing the EN,
an inside zone containing the PCN, and a DMZ containing the data historian. Firewall rules
are crafted to make the DMZ historian the sole point of contact between the EN and PCN.
The historian can access PCN services that provide it data; in turn, the EN is allowed access
to the historian. Firewall rules block access to the PCN by all devices.
Most attacks originating in (or passing through) the EN and targeting the historian will
not affect the control systems; at worst, they would corrupt the historian’s data (a redundant
copy of this data is stored elsewhere).
A PCN architecture deploying paired firewalls separated by a DMZ [18, 19] is shown in
Figure 4.1. It simplifies the firewall rules and achieves a clear separation of responsibility
as the PCN-side firewall can be managed by the control group and the EN-side firewall by
the IT group [39, 47]. This architecture is highly recommended for ICSs, and best practices
have been identified for configuring the firewalls (see e.g. [40, 41, 46]).
There are also mechanisms to enhance host security in a control system. An important
example of such mechanisms is process-based security (PBS) which is implemented for some
control devices [48]. It shifts the access control paradigm from a user-based model to a
process-based one. In the user-based model, access control rules are tied to user identities.
A rogue process, however, can escalate its privilege and damage the system. In the process-
based security model, on the other hand, fixed access vectors are strictly tied to process
profiles which cannot be modified in the field. PBS reduces the risk of privilege escalation
as a result of an attack.
4.3 Security Challenges
Firewall configuration errors can lead to security vulnerabilities. One problem is that fire-
walls often have large rule sets which are difficult to verify. According to a study by Wool
[49], firewall rule sets may have as many as 2,600 rules with 5,800 objects, and a significant
correlation exists between rule set complexity and the number of configuration errors. A
second problem is that firewalls are usually the main line of defense. Configuration errors
enable attackers to exploit holes in a firewall and target the otherwise defenseless devices
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Figure 4.1: Paired firewalls PCN architecture
inside the network.
Wool [49] notes that 80% of rule sets allow “any” service on inbound traffic and insecure
access to firewalls. He emphasizes that “the analysis of real configuration data shows that
corporate firewalls are often enforcing rule sets that violate well-established security guide-
lines.” The Wool study and others demonstrate that firewall configuration errors pose a real
threat to ICS security.
Even properly configured firewalls can be bypassed [50]. This occurs, for example, when
a vendor creates a direct (e.g., dial-up) connection to a device for maintenance, or when
unsecured wireless access points exist behind a firewall. Firewalls can also be thwarted
by tunneling attack traffic using legitimate means (e.g., via a corporate VPN) or by using
encryption (firewalls do not inspect encrypted packets). A widely reported firewall breach
occurred in January 2003, when the MS SQL Server 2000 worm infected systems at the
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Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio [51]. An investigation revealed that a
contractor established an unprotected connection to the corporate network which bypassed
the power plant firewall and provided a path for the worm.
Vulnerable devices are typically secured by patching their services, updating software or
installing the latest version of the devices. However, manual patch/update/version man-
agement are difficult and costly tasks, especially when careless users introduce vulnerable
(wireless) devices into an industrial control network that establish new entry points for at-
tackers. The mobility of wireless devices makes it difficult for the administrator to manually
manage patches by visiting the devices frequently or dedicating a specific time slot for patch-
ing the systems. Hence, patch/update/version management should be done automatically
and continuously.
Unsecured physical access also exposes ICSs to serious security threats. Open wireless
access points and Ethernet ports on office walls enable attackers to enter ICS networks and
target critical assets. Nothing in the traditional ICS architecture prevents suspect devices
from connecting to the network; thus, serious threats are posed by devices whose hardware,
operating systems, executables and/or configurations have been tampered with by attackers.
Many ICS vulnerabilities admit malware such as worms, viruses, Trojan horses and
rootkits [51, 52]. ICS security trends reveal that external malware attacks are becoming
increasingly common [38]. Finally, rogue users (insiders) are an ever-present threat to ICSs.
4.4 Trusted Process Control Networks
In a traditional network access control model, access is granted to a user without considering
the security state of the user’s machine. That machine may be running a secure operating
system, or it may be a machine that has not been patched for a decade and is riddled with
vulnerabilities and malware. Likewise, firewall access control is agnostic about the security
status of the device that sends traffic. A port on a machine is opened or not opened to traffic
based entirely on the identity of the source.
A trusted network architecture uses information about the hardware and software states
of devices in admission and access control decisions. When a device first “joins” the network,
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its hardware and software are checked; based on these checks, the appropriate access control
rules are applied dynamically to the user, device and traffic. The same principle can be
applied to process control architectures. This section discusses technologies that support
this concept and their application to ICSs.
4.4.1 Trusted Networks
A trusted network (TN) architecture uses the existing standards, protocols, and hardware
devices to extend the concept of “trust” to the network architecture. TNs provide impor-
tant security services such as user authentication, comprehensive network device admission
control, end-device health check, policy-based access control and traffic filtering, automated
remediation of non-compliant devices, and auditing.
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has promulgated industry standards for TNs [23].
Several commercial TN technologies have been developed, including Cisco TrustSec [24],
Cisco CleanAccess [25] (formerly known as Cisco Network Admission Control (NAC) [53,
54, 55]), and Microsoft Network Access Protection (NAP) [56]. Cisco NAC is interoperable
with Microsoft NAP; details about their interoperation can be found in [57].
Trusted Network Components
TN component vendors use a variety of names to describe their products. We use generic
terms with a bias towards those adopted by Cisco CleanAccess.
A TN has the following components:
• Client device: Every client device must be evaluated prior to admission to a TN.
• Network Access Device (NAD): All connectivity to a TN is implemented via an NAD,
which enforces policy. NAD functionality may exist in devices such as switches, routers,
VPN concentrators and wireless access points.
• Authentication, Authorization, and Access Control Server (AAA): This server main-
tains the policy and provides rules to NADs based on the results of authentication and
posture validation.
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• Posture Validation Servers (PVSs): These servers evaluate the compliance of a client
before it can join a TN. A PVS is typically a specialization for one client attribute
(e.g., operating system version and patch or virus signature release).
• Posture Remediation Servers: These servers provide remediation options to a client
device in case of non-compliance. For example, a server may maintain the latest virus
signatures and require a non-compliant client device to load the signatures before
joining a TN.
• Directory Server: This server authenticates client devices based on their identities or
roles.
• Other Servers: These include trusted versions of Audit, DNS, DHCP and VPN servers
[25, 53, 55].
Trusted Network Protocols
TNs leverage existing standards and protocols to implement the required security function-
ality; this reduces the cost of building TNs.
Protocols used in TNs include IPSec for hardening communications [25, 54], EAP and
802.1x for authentication [24, 54, 55], RADIUS/LDAP/Kerberos for directory services and
authentication [25, 54, 55], HCAP for compliance communication [54, 55], and GAME for
communication between the AAA and audit servers [54, 58].
4.4.2 TPCN Architecture
A trusted process control network (TPCN) architecture is presented in Figure 4.2. A client
device intending to join the network communicates its request to the NAD. The NAD estab-
lishes the client device’s identity using EAP over the 802.1x protocol and sends the results
to the AAA server using the RADIUS protocol. The AAA server returns a list of posture
validation requirements and the addresses of the appropriate PVSs.
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Figure 4.2: Trusted process control network (TPCN)
The client then validates its posture with each of the PVSs. If the client is in compliance,
the results are sent to the AAA server using the HCAP protocol. On the other hand, if the
client lacks one or more requirements, the appropriate posture remediation servers suggest
remediation actions to the client.
The directory server determines the client’s group or role. Given all the results from the
PVSs and the directory server, the AAA server determines the set of rules that apply to the
client’s access and traffic and sends them to the NAD for enforcement. From this point on,
the client is permitted to communicate via the NAD and all its activities are monitored for
policy compliance. Interested readers are referred to [25, 53, 55] for additional details.
The policy held by the AAA server is in the form of an authentication requirement and
a list of posture validation requirements. For example, token based authentication may be
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required and postures must be validated with the anti-virus server, patch management server
and driver validation server. When a client device joins the network, a NAD communicates
with an AAA server on behalf of the device. The AAA server authenticates the device and
provides rules based on the device’s security postures to the NAD. From this point on, the
NAD enforces the policy on all ingress and egress traffic to/from the device. For example,
an RTU with valid firmware is allowed to communicate with the historian; all other traffic
is blocked. The two examples below further clarify the workings of a TPCN.
Example 1: Consider a scenario where an analyst on a workstation intends to connect
wirelessly to the PCN to access historical data about plant operations. The workstation
connects to a wireless access point (AP) in the enterprise network with NAD functionality.
The AP applies the default policy, which is to block all traffic except what is needed to
establish trust. The workstation then authenticates with the AP using EAP over the 802.1x
protocol to send a stored certificate. The AP uses RADIUS to send the workstation’s
identity to the AAA server. The AAA server then sends the user’s identity to the directory
server, which knows the user’s role (“analyst”). The AAA server uses RADIUS to send
the workstation a list of posture requirements (anti-virus version number and OS patch
history). The workstation uses a trusted platform monitor (TPM) chip to sign in and send
the posture values to the relevant PVSs, which proceed to validate these values. The patch
management PVS discovers that the workstation OS has a missing patch and coordinates
with the remediation server to have the appropriate patch sent to the workstation. The PVSs
transmit the results back to the AAA server using the HCAP protocol. If the workstation
is compliant, the AAA sends a rule set to the AP for enforcement. Since the user role is
“analyst,” the rule set allows TCP connections to the historian but blocks access to all other
devices.
Example 2: Consider a scenario where an RTU intends to join the PCN. The RTU
connects to a switch on the factory floor via a network cable; the switch has NAD function-
ality. The protocols used are the same as in Example 1, so we avoid repetition. The switch
authenticates the RTU using the RTU’s stored token. The AAA server requires the RTU
to validate its configuration with a configuration management server. The RTU sends its
configuration to the configuration management server, which returns the successful result to
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the AAA server. The AAA server, in turn, sends the appropriate rule set for the compliant
RTU to the switch for enforcement. The RTU may now communicate with other RTUs, the
MTU and the historian; the switch blocks all other traffic. In the next section, we show how
to perform authentication and posture validation without losing availability for important
devices. Essentially, the AAA server holds two sets of roles and two sets of policies. The
devices can still connect to the network through the backup policy before we ensure that
configuration validation does not interrupt service.
4.5 TPCN Requirements and Availability
In order to transform an existing PCN into a TPCN, there are specific changes necessary
ranging from a simple patching of the existing software to new hardware and devices. This
section discusses the requirements of a TPCN and the cost/security tradeoff. More impor-
tantly, the issue of availability is the centerpiece in any process control system architecture.
We discuss how to customize a TN to achieve high availability required for a TPCN.
4.5.1 TPCN Requirements
For added security and separation of duty, a TPCN requires at least two NADs (switches
with firewalls) and a AAA server (Figure 4.2). An enterprise can add as many PVSs as
required, e.g., an anti-virus validation server to ensure that devices have up-to-date virus
protection, a patch management server to check that devices have the correct patches and a
software validation server to verify the authenticity of embedded device firmware. Various
PVSs are available off-the-shelf and often it is only necessary to configure them with the
appropriate requirements for the control system. Incorporating multiple PVSs adds to the
cost of a TPCN, but enhances security.
All NADs (switches, routers, wireless access points, etc.) must support trusted network
functionality. Many vendors offer products with trusted network functionality. Therefore,
if an enterprise is already using new equipment, implementing a TPCN may be very cost-
effective. Older systems would likely involve significant upgrades, which can be costly. Note
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that in a TPCN architecture the firewall functionality is integrated in NADs.
Client devices may need software and firmware upgrades to support trusted network
functionality. A trusted network client is required for authentication with the AAA server
and for sending posture values. For secure applications, TPM chips can be used to verify
configurations and obtain posture signatures. Devices such as RTUs and PLCs do not usually
have TPMs; however, as some RTUs already come with built-in web servers, adding TPM to
these devices is feasible, especially if government regulations mandate the implementation
of trusted ICS architectures.
A client device must be intelligent and configurable to be evaluated by PVSs. At a
minimum, the device must be able to run a small piece of software that sends its configuration
to a PVS. If the end device is not intelligent (e.g., a simple mechanical relay), it is not
necessary to check its configuration; rather, PVSs check the postures of the more intelligent
device that controls it (e.g., the RTU that controls the relay). The trusted network client
software is available for different platforms off-the-shelf from various vendors, but for special
or small devices it may be necessary to develop the piece of code that sends the configuration
to PVSs.
In principle, TN can be implemented on top of any physical and link layer (e.g. wireless,
LAN, or serial). However, to the best of our knowledge, the current TN technologies only
support LAN and wireless media. There are two options to establish trust with serial control
devices using the existing TN technology. The first option is to put the trusted network client
software in the main device that is connected to the LAN and controls the serial device. In
this case, the client software in the main device is responsible for acquiring the posture of
the serial device and performing authentication with the AAA server. The client software
on the controlling device blocks any communication of the serially connected device before
the authentication is successful and the posture is validated. This option has the benefit of
using the existing hardware. The other option for connecting serial devices to a TPCN is
to use serial-to-Ethernet converters [59, 60] and directly connect the devices to the NAD.
These converters translate serial (RS-232/422/485) to TCP or UDP packets and transmit
them over the Ethernet. The converter can be configured to use a specific IP address. Serial-
to-Ethernet converters can be used in the compact form [59] to connect one serial device or
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as a rack [60] to connect multiple serial devices to the Ethernet. Using serial-to-Ethernet
converter has the benefit of making serial control devices stand-alone; on the other hand, it
has the drawback of extra hardware cost and extra latency due to the network delays. The
choice of which option to use when connecting serial devices to a TPCN depends on the
acceptable cost and the latency requirements for the specific control system.
4.5.2 TPCN Availability
To apply updates to the system, the administrator puts the new requirements in the AAA or
posture validation servers. After that point, the AAA server informs end-devices of the new
policy. If they have the update, they establish its existence with a posture validation server
and continue working in the network. However, if they do not have the new requirements,
the server provides them with appropriate patches (or installs the patches automatically on
them). Now we discuss the use of backup roles and policies to prevent the new requirements
from interrupting the service.
TPCNs have the same availability issues as traditional PCNs—applying patches can
cause components to crash. Therefore, every patch or update must be tested thoroughly
before being placed on the AAA server. Exact replicas of TPCN components should be used
for testing. If concerns exist after testing, a backup device may be placed in the TPCN.
In such a situation, the AAA server holds two different policies for the device. One policy
is associated with the actual role and the other policy with the backup role. The backup
policy does not enforce the new requirement on the backup device until the actual device is
verified to function correctly with the patch. It is only then that the administrator applies
the requirement to the backup device as well. Note that if the actual device is affected by the
patch, the backup device can function correctly since it is not required by its policy to have
the patch in order to connect to the network. TPCNs do not positively or negatively affect
system availability; they merely enforce the requirements. It is the testing phase, before the
specification of a requirement, that determines whether or not system availability is affected.
To enhance the availability of a TPCN, redundant servers must be used in the archi-
tecture. If important servers of a TPCN fail, devices cannot join the network, endangering
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the availability of the control system. Commercial TN servers support a mode called “high-
availability” (HA-mode). In this mode, important TN servers (such as AAA or PVSs) have a
standby replica available. A “heartbeat” signal is exchanged frequently between the primary
and the standby server over a dedicated serial connection or using UDP packets over the
Ethernet. If a failover occurs and the heartbeat signal stops (e.g., as a result of a crash or
a restart), the standby server immediately takes the role of the failed server, preventing an
interruption in the service. Since availability has a high priority in the context of process
control, it is recommended that HA-mode is used for TPCNs.
It is important to differentiate between backup devices and standby servers. Backup
devices and roles prevent failure of the control devices (e.g., MTUs or RTUs) as a result
of applying new patches or updates. The use of backup policy ensures that the backup
device can provide service if the main device fails after an update. Standby servers, on the
other hand, increase the availability of the TPCN infrastructure, ensuring that a control
device can access the network at any time even when the primary server has crashed (using
automatic failover mechanism). These two customizations address the high availability needs
of a TPCN, minimizing the risk of service interruption.
4.6 NAD Rule Conflicts
Conflict in the firewall rules (more generally referred to as filter conflicts) always endangers
the security or availability of instrumentation and control systems. Such conflicts may result
in unwanted traffic being allowed to the process control network, exposing it to attacks or
legitimate traffic being denied, endangering the availability of the system.
In this section, we study the nature of conflicts in firewall rules and show that the total
number of effective conflicts in a distributed filtration environment is no greater than that
of a traditional network.
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4.6.1 Filter Conflicts
Filter conflicts happen when there is an ambiguity in classifying packets using a set of
filtration rules. Although we study filter conflicts in the context of firewall rules, they can
exist in any network access device such as a router, VPN, or QoS device that classifies
packets based on a ruleset.
Each filter R is an n-tuple (R[1], R[2],..., R[n]) where R[i] defines a subset of values
acceptable for that field. Each field is usually defined as a prefix. For instance, the prefix
10.* for source IP refers to the subset of all IP quartets that have 10 in their first entry. A
rule is a filter R followed by an action Act(R) (typically allow or deny). Although there can
be many different fields in each filter depending on the device, we focus on the five most
common fields in firewall rules: source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, and
protocol. Note, however, that the analysis presented here is general and can be applied to
any n-tuple.
We use the definition by Hari et al. [61] for rule conflicts.
Definition 1: Rule A is said to be the prefix of rule B if for every field i, A[i] is the
prefix of B[i] and A[i] is a strict prefix of B[i] for at least one i.
Two rules conflict with each other if and only if their filters intersect (i.e. there exists
traffic to which both rules apply), one is not the prefix of the other, and their actions are
not equal. More formally, we have the following.
Definition 2: Rules A and B conflict with each other if and only if all of the following
hold:
1. For all i, A[i] and B[i] are not disjoint.
2. A is not a prefix of B.
3. B is not a prefix of A.
4. Act(A) is not equal to Act(B).
Definition 3: A ruleset is an ordered set of rules.
For example, consider the following rules in an internal firewall inside a PCN:
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R1: <PCN.MTU.* any PCN.RTU_farm1.* any TCP> allow
R2: <PCN.MTU.* any PCN.RTU_farm2.* any TCP> allow
R3: <PCN.* any PCN.RTU_farm1.* any TCP> deny
R4: <PCN.* any PCN.RTU_farm2.* any TCP> deny
R5: <PCN.RTU_farm1.* any PCN.* any TCP> allow
R6: <PCN.RTU_farm2.* any PCN.* any TCP> allow
The first two rules ensure that any connection from MTU IP addresses to RTU farms
is allowed. These two rules do not conflict with any other rule because either the fields are
disjoint or they are prefixes of another rule. For instance, R1 is disjoint from R4, R5, and
R6 while it is a prefix of R3.
However, there are conflicts between R3 and R6, and R4 and R5. R3 and R6 both apply
to traffic from any address in RTU farm2 to any address in RTU farm1, yet R3 denies the
traffic while R6 allows it. There is a similar conflict between R4 and R5.
In many firewall implementations, the first encountered rule is given higher priority. How-
ever, in a situation like this, there can be no ordering which provides the desired behavior.
This happens when rule ordering results in a cycle as shown by Hari et al. [61]. The solution
in such a situation is to “add” rules that cover the intersection of the conflicting rules to
the ruleset. Such rules are called “conflict resolution” rules. For instance, R7 is a conflict
resolution rule for R4 and R5.
R7: <PCN.RTU_farm1.* any PCN.RTU_farm2.* any TCP> deny
4.6.2 Conflicts in Distributed Firewalls
In this section, we show that the total number of conflicts in a distributed firewall environ-
ment (such as TPCNs) is no greater than the number of conflicts in traditional architecture.
The total number of conflicts in a TPCN is the number of conflicts in all of the network
access devices’ (NAD) rulesets. Note that the rules are distributed among NADs and each
NAD potentially has a much smaller ruleset which makes it less complex and more man-
ageable. Now we show that the total number of conflicts is still bounded by the number of
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conflicts in the single ruleset model.
To prove this property, first consider the simple “ordered subset” operation on the ruleset.
We say that ruleset ℜA is an ordered subset of ℜB if and only if:
1. Every rule in ℜA is in ℜB.
2. For each pair of rules Ri and Rj in ℜA, if Ri precedes Rj in ℜB, then Ri precedes Rj
in ℜA too.
The ordered subset operation is simply taking a number of rules from a ruleset while
preserving the order. We cannot state anything about the number of conflicts in ℜA. It can
even be more than the number of conflicts in ℜB. To observe this, consider three rules: R1,
R2, and R3 in which R1 and R2 conflict and R3 is the intersection of the two rules that
resolves the conflict. If ℜB contains R1-R3 and ℜA only contains R1 and R2, then ℜB is
conflict-free, but ℜA has one conflict. The increase in the number of conflicts arises from
the fact that the ordered subset operation may eliminate conflict-resolution rules.
Now consider the following method for distributing a single firewall ruleset among differ-
ent NADs.
1. Every rule in the firewall ruleset for which the source or destination is in the subnet
controlled by a NAD is added to that NAD’s ruleset.
2. For each pair of rules Ri and Rj in the NAD ruleset, if Ri precedes Rj in the firewall,
then it precedes in the NAD ruleset too.
This method puts every rule related to a subnet in the subnet’s NAD ruleset while pre-
serving the order. Note that there can be bad rules in the firewall (as a result of configuration
mistakes) that do not apply to any subnet controlled by that firewall. These rules are not
included in any NAD ruleset. Hence, here we consider “effective conflicts” which involve
flows that actually reach the firewall.
Theorem 1: In a distributed firewall system in which each NAD ruleset is constructed
using the above method, the total number of effective conflicts is no greater than that of the
single firewall.
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Figure 4.3: NADs and subnets inside a TPCN
Proof: Suppose not. Let R1 and R2 be the rules that conflict under partition but not in
the firewall. Note that R1 and R2 are in the same NAD without a conflict resolution rule,
but there must be a rule R3 in the firewall which covers the conflict, yet is not present in the
NAD ruleset. R3 is the intersection of R1 and R2, and thus is more restrictive than either
of them. But the definition of the distribution method implies that R3 must be included in
the NAD ruleset; hence, the presumed conflict between R1 and R2 does not exist. This is a
contradiction.
As an example, consider the architecture in Figure 4.3 and the following ruleset.
R1: <PCN.* any PCN.RTU_farm1.* any TCP> deny
R2: <PCN.RTU_farm2.* any PCN.* any TCP> allow
R3: <PCN.* any PCN.MTU.* any TCP> deny
R4: <PCN.RTU_farm2.* any PCN.RTU_farm1.* any TCP> deny
NAD2 ruleset contains rules R1, R2, and R4 while NAD1 contains R3. Note that NAD2
ruleset includes R4, which resolves the conflict between R1 and R2.
Theorem 1 shows that although in the distributed firewall architecture each NAD poten-
tially contains a smaller ruleset which makes it more manageable and less error-prone, the
total number of effective conflicts is no greater than that of the traditional architecture.
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Firewall rule conflicts can endanger the security of the network by allowing attack traffic
to enter the network. More importantly, they can endanger the availability of the network
by blocking legitimate traffic. Considering the importance of availability in PCNs, it is
crucial to address this problem in the context of TPCNs. In this section, we provided a
recipe for distributing PCN firewall rules between TPCN NADs to avoid introducing new
rule conflicts. Moreover, we prove that if the rules are divided using this method, the number
of total conflicts in the NADs is no greater than the lumped ruleset model.
4.7 TPCN Evaluation
The benefits of a TPCN are best seen in light of how it addresses the security issues that
impact traditional networks. A TPCN addresses the following security issues either partially
or completely.
• Firewall Configuration Errors (partial): A TPCN breaks the set of firewall rules
into smaller rule sets associated with each access control group or role. These rule
sets are sent by the AAA server to the NADs for enforcement upon completion of
the authentication phase. According to Wool [49], the number of configuration errors
decreases logarithmically as the rule set complexity decreases. Because a TPCN has
smaller rule sets, the potential for firewall configuration errors is correspondingly lower.
Moreover, access rules in a TPCN are defined based on groups or roles, not just IP
addresses; this helps reduce confusion and, consequently, configuration errors. Note
that configuration errors will never be completely eliminated; therefore, TPCN only
provides a partial solution to the problem.
• Bypassing Firewalls (Complete): TPCNs explicitly address this issue by securing
all NADs and requiring them to establish trust relationships with client devices before
forwarding traffic (including wireless traffic and VPN traffic). Furthermore, the access
control and traffic rules are applied at every access point. It is not possible to bypass
the rules by hooking a line behind a firewall; this is because the line’s switch (access
point) enforces the rules.
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• Vulnerable Devices (Partial): In a traditional network architecture, patch/update/
version/configuration management is performed manually by the network administra-
tor. This is an extremely difficult task for remote and mobile devices. As a result,
it may be done less frequently than recommended or it may be simply ignored. In a
TPCN, the state of a device is checked automatically before it can join the network.
Moreover, its behavior is continuously monitored upon entry and status checks can be
performed at the desired frequency. Consequently, a TPCN is less vulnerable to known
attacks. Note, however, that a TPCN is still vulnerable to zero-day attacks.
• Unsecured Physical Access (Complete): TPCNs again address this problem by
enforcing security policies on NAD ports. This is sometimes referred to as “port-based
access control.” Thus, a malicious or careless user cannot hook a device to an open
Ethernet port and gain entry into the network. Note also that ports on TPCN switches
and wireless access points do not forward traffic until trust relationships are established
with the communicating entities.
• Malware (Partial): The compliance rules enforced on devices before and after joining
a TPCN reduce the likelihood of infections by malware. A SCADA security study [38]
notes that “the majority of worm events occurred months or years after the worm
was widely known in the IT world and patches were available.” This implies that the
majority of incidents can be prevented by enforcing compliance rules before a node
joins a network. Since nearly 78% of the (external) SCADA security incidents are
caused by malware [38], TPCN incidents are reduced dramatically. Nevertheless, a
TPCN remains vulnerable to zero-day attacks.
• Untrusted Devices (Complete): TPCNs address this problem explicitly by verify-
ing the signatures of the critical components of a device using the TPM chip and also
checking the device status. Note that if the TPM chip is trusted, the device can attest
to its identity.
• Untrusted Users (Partial): By using stronger authentication methods and clearly
defining user roles, TPCNs prevent attacks such as password cracking/stealing, access
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violations and impersonation. Also, by blocking all unnecessary accesses, TPCNs
partially prevent accidents caused by careless insiders that account for more than 30%
of all security incidents [38].
We employed the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
database [62] to further compare the TPCN architecture with traditional PCN designs.
CAPEC contains twelve attack categories along with their descriptions, prerequisites, meth-
ods, consequences and mitigation strategies. We consider nine attack categories (with 31
attack patterns), which we believe are meaningful in the ICS context and showcase the dif-
ferences between TPCNs and traditional PCNs. For example, while buffer overflow attacks
are effective against software applications, they are not relevant when evaluating network
designs.
Table 4.1 presents the results of the comparison. The descriptor H (high) means that
an attack is performed with little effort and cost; M (medium) implies that an attack is
still possible but requires expert knowledge and is costly; L (low) indicates that an attack
is highly unlikely or involves enormous effort, time and/or cost. The last column shows the
security controls provided by a TPCN to address the attack (if any).
Considering the 31 total attack patterns, a PCN is vulnerable to nineteen (61.3%) high,
nine (29%) medium, and three (9.7%) low feasibility attacks. On the other hand, a TPCN
is vulnerable to only two (6.5%) high feasibility attacks along with nine (29%) medium and
twenty (64.5%) low feasibility attacks. Note that this is a qualitative comparison of the two
architectures; the quantitative assessment of network architectures based on security metrics
is an open research problem and is beyond the scope of this work.
Note that all of the intelligent and configurable devices on a trusted network must be
authenticated and posture validated. If the legacy devices are allowed to join the network
without such authentication and validation, it can potentially eliminate all the benefits of
a TPCN. We discussed earlier how to incorporate client functionality in legacy and small
devices.
We plan to implement a prototype TPCN on top of a cyber-security testbed that we have
developed [63]. The testbed is developed to perform assessments and study attack/defense
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scenarios in a large scale power infrastructure. It consists of a number of real and emulated
devices and two different simulators. Real RTUs, control station systems, and historians
have been used in the testbed. We have also emulated a number of IEDs. The simulation of
power generation and distribution is done using PowerWorld, a power grid simulator which
is connected to the real devices [64]. It provides the grid parameters to the devices and
issues commands in some cases. All network communications are passed through RINSE
[65], a network simulator which simulates the communication infrastructure.
For the TPCN prototype, we plan to use Trusted Network Connect (TNC) [23] open
source health check protocols (IF-MAP). Legacy control devices can be augmented with
simple open source clients to authenticate and send posture information. TNC’s open source
projects can also be used for simple PVS and AAA servers. Many of the existing access
points (Ethernet switches and wireless access points) in our testbed already support NAD
functionality.
Trusted network technology can help address the challenges involved in securing indus-
trial control systems that are vital to operating critical infrastructure assets. Adding trust
to industrial control networks eliminates security problems posed by inadequate controls,
non-compliant devices and malicious users. It dramatically reduces vulnerabilities to mal-
ware attacks that constitute the majority of external attacks. The likelihood of internal
attacks is also reduced via compliance verification, port-based access control, device and
user authentication, and role-based access control.
Table 4.1: Feasibility of attack patterns
Category Attack Pattern PCN TPCN TPCN SC
Abuse of
Functionality
Inducing Account Lockout H L Strong
Authentication
Exploiting Password Re-
covery
H L Strong
Authentication
Trying All Common Ap-
plication Switches and Op-
tions
H L Configuration
Verification
Exploiting Incorrectly Con-
figured SSL Security Levels
H L Configuration
Verification
Spoofing Faking the Source of Data M L Message
Authentication
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Table 4.1: Feasibility of attack patterns (continued)
Category Attack Pattern PCN TPCN TPCN SC
Spoofing Principal H L Strong
Authentication
Man-in-the-Middle Attack H L Device
Authentication
Creating a Malicious Client M L Accounting
External Entity Attack H L VPN Access Control
Probabilistic
Techniques
Brute Forcing Password L L Strong
Authentication
Brute Forcing Encryption L L N/A
Rainbow Table password
cracking
L L Strong
Authentication
Manipulating Opaque
Client-based Data Tokens
M M N/A
Exploiting
Authentication
Bypassing Authentication H L Port-based
Access Control
Reflection Attack in Au-
thentication Protocol
H H N/A
Exploiting of Session Vari-
ables, Resource IDs and
other Trusted Credentials
M M Software Verification
Resource
Depletion
Denying Service via Re-
source Depletion
H M Compliance
Verification
Depleting Resource via
Flooding
H M Traffic Filtration
Exploitation of
Privilege or Trust
Manipulating Writeable
Configuration Files
H L Configuration
Verification
Lifting credential(s)/key
material embedded in
client distributions
M L Software
Verification
Lifting cached, sensitive
data embedded in client
distributions
M L Software
Verification
Accessing Functionality
Not Properly Constrained
by ACLs
H M Small Rule Sets
Exploiting Incorrectly Con-
figured Access Control Se-
curity Levels
H M Role-based Access
Control
Injection Manipulating User-
Controlled Variables
H L Configuration
Verification
Manipulating Audit Log H L Audit Verification
Poisoning DNS Cache H L Trusted DNS
LDAP Injection H H N/A
Sniffing Information Sent
Over Public Networks
M M IPSec
Protocol
Manipulation
Manipulating Inter-
component Protocol
M M N/A
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Table 4.1: Feasibility of attack patterns (continued)
Category Attack Pattern PCN TPCN TPCN SC
Manipulating Data Inter-
change Protocol
M M N/A
Time & State Manipulating User State H L Configuration
Verification
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5 Evaluation of Patch Management Strategies
5.1 Introduction
Successful patch management is crucial to the security of large organizations. New vulnera-
bilities are discovered in software applications almost every day. These vulnerabilities open a
gateway for attackers to penetrate secure systems and exploit their resources. In response to
discovery of vulnerabilities, software vendors develop patches to fix them. However, secure
and mission critical organizations cannot apply new patches without testing them. This is
because a new patch can break the system resulting in loss of functionality, or more impor-
tantly, it can potentially open a new vulnerability in the system, thus resulting in loss of
security. As a result, in a secure patch management system, there are two processes after a
vulnerability is discovered and before the patch is applied to the software: one is the process
to develop a patch by the vendor and the other is the pre-deployment testing process. Both
of these processes take some time, during which the system is susceptible to attacks using
that known vulnerability.
Pre-deployment testing is usually done in an ad-hoc fashion, inspecting the patch for
known problems or applying it to replicate machines to see whether it breaks the system.
This method, although effective under many circumstances, does not consider the tradeoff
between the time spent for testing a patch and the window of exposure. Given that a faulty
patch can introduce new vulnerabilities to the system, the tradeoff is non-trivial.
In this chapter, we study real-world vulnerability discovery for three popular web browsers:
Mozilla Firefox 2, Microsoft Internet Explorer 7, and Apple Safari 2 [66]. First we study
an analytical model for the trade-off between pre-deployment testing and the total number
of open vulnerabilities in a system. This model uses the exponential vulnerability discovery
model (AML model) [67] which is shown to fit the real data well [68]. We fit the model to
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the vulnerability discovery data for the three web browsers.
To evaluate the trade-off, we then develop a stochastic model for the patch management
system and solve it using a simulation tool. From both the simulation and the analytical
model, an optimal pre-deployment testing time is obtained. The optimal time ensures that
pre-deployment testing is neither so short that patching introduces new vulnerability to the
system, nor so long that the system has a long window of exposure.
Finally, we validate the results by showing that the simulation and analytical models fit
the real-world vulnerability data for the web browsers with small errors and that simulation
results match the analytical model.
5.1.1 Contributions
Although many models have been proposed for vulnerabilities or faults in software or hard-
ware systems, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to quantitatively study the
trade-off of pre-deployment testing and find the optimal testing time. The related work on
vulnerability lifecycle and vulnerability discovery models is presented in Sections 5.2.1 and
5.2.2. The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We study patch management and especially the problem of pre-deployment testing.
• We develop an analytical model for vulnerability discovery, patch development, and
patch testing and analytically find the optimal testing time.
• Also a stochastic model is developed for vulnerability discovery and patch testing. The
model is solved using simulation.
• We use the analytical and stochastic models on real vulnerability information from the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD). It is found that the error in our model is less
than 12% for real vulnerabilities.
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5.2 Patching Process
This section describes the process of patching a piece of software as well as probabilistic
models built to describe different events involved in such a process.
5.2.1 Life Cycle of Vulnerabilities
A vulnerability has an eight-phase life cycle (some of the phases are taken from the literature
[69]):
Introduction : In this phase, the vulnerability is released as a part of software. This can
happen during the development or maintenance of the software.
Discovery : This is the time when the vulnerability is discovered.
Private exploitation : During this period a small group of attackers use the vulnerability
without the general public knowing.
Disclosure : The time when the vulnerability is published.
Public exploitation : The phase during which the general communities of hackers use the
vulnerability.
Patch release : When the vendor fixes the vulnerability with a patch.
Patch testing : Time during which the organization tests the patch for problems or new
vulnerabilities.
Patch deployment : When patch is applied to the machine(s).
Vulnerabilities can be avoided during design and implementation phases of software de-
velopment using testing, verification, and (semi)formal method techniques. However, little
can be done for existing vulnerabilities before they are disclosed. So, we focus on the life
cycle of the vulnerability after its disclosure. In fact some studies [70, 71] show that the
majority of attacks exploit publicly known vulnerabilities. It is important for an organiza-
tion to find vulnerabilities as quickly as possible and find or develop appropriate patches to
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fix them. Vulnerability Discovery Models (VDMs) and Vulnerability Exploitation Models
(VEMs) try to capture dynamics involved in this element of patch management.
Many references emphasize the importance of pre-deployment testing for successful ap-
plication of patches [72]. However, there is a strong tradeoff between pre-deployment testing
and the vulnerability of a system. On one hand, more time spent on testing means fewer
new vulnerabilities introduced to the system and a more successful patching process. On
the other hand, it opens a bigger window of opportunity for attackers to exploit that specific
vulnerability. None of the previous works consider this tradeoff and they mainly refer to
testing as an “always-good” strategy. We show that there exists an optimal amount of test-
ing which results in the minimum vulnerability. To the best of our knowledge, this tradeoff
has not been studied before.
5.2.2 Vulnerability Discovery Models (VDM)
In this section, different models proposed for the vulnerability discovery process are studied.
There have been several attempts to model vulnerability discovery. Some of these models
use similar models from other fields of science (e.g. thermodynamics) and apply them to
vulnerability discovery. Others formulate the underlying process using differential equations
and/or fit models to real vulnerability data.
Anderson Thermodynamic Model (AT)
Anderson [73] proposes this model for vulnerability discovery. He argues that the number
of vulnerabilities discovered at each instant is inversely proportional to time. Denote the
number of new vulnerabilities at each time by w(t) and the total cumulative number of
vulnerabilities by Ω(t). The AT model is described by Equation 5.1 in which a and k are
application specific constants. Hence, Ω(t) has a logarithmic form.
w(t) =
k
a× t
(5.1)
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Rescorla Exponential Model (RE)
Rescorla [69] builds this model to fit real data. In the RE model, w(t) decays exponentially
with time. Thus, Ω(t) exponentially approaches a fixed value which is the total number
of vulnerabilities in the system. N and a are the application specific constants in the RE
model.
Ω(t) = N × (1− e−at) (5.2)
Logarithmic Poisson Model (LP)
The LP model [74] expresses the total number of vulnerabilities using Equation 5.3.
Ω(t) = a× ln(1 + b× t) (5.3)
In the LP model, a and b are the constants which should be found by fitting the model
to vulnerabilities of a specific application.
Alhazmi-Malaiya Logistic Model (AML)
The AML model [67] is based on capturing the underlying process of vulnerability discovery.
It is observed that the attention given to a piece of software increases after its introduction,
resulting in discovery of many vulnerabilities. It peaks at some time and after a while it
gradually declines because of the fact that new versions of the software are introduced and
fewer users use the older version.
Based on the above assumption, the AML model expresses Ω(t) using Equation 5.4.
dΩ(t)
dt
= A× Ω× (B − Ω) (5.4)
The time domain solution to this model is given by Equation 5.5.
Ω(t) =
B
B × C × e−ABt + 1
(5.5)
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In Equations 5.4 and 5.5, A, B, and C are the application specific constants.
Alhazmi et al. [68] evaluate different models explained above against real data from
vulnerability databases. They perform various statistical tests on the models and evaluate
their deviation from real-world data. It is found that the best model for vulnerability
discovery is the AML model. It fits real vulnerability data for all different softwares and has
the least error while others fail to fit some real experiments.
In this work, without loss of generality, we use the AML model fitted to real-world data
as our vulnerability discovery model. Nevertheless, the analysis and simulation are general
and they can use any vulnerability discovery model.
5.2.3 Patch Development
Patch development is another random process involved in patching and it refers to the
process of making a fix for a known vulnerability by the vendor. Although speeding up,
patch development is still a slow and time consuming process. Mean patch development
time depends strongly on the vendor of the software. Symantec [75] reports mean patch
development time for different web browsers. This time for Firefox and Internet Explorer is
five days while for Safari it is three days.
We model vendor dependency and consider different mean patch development times.
5.2.4 Patch Testing and Deployment
Testing and deployment are the last phases of the patching process. Pre-deployment testing
is an important part of this process. Although it is recommended by previous studies, we
argue that it is a double-edged sword. It can help correctly apply new patches and prevent
introduction of new vulnerabilities. At the same time, it provides attackers a window of
time to attack the system before testing is done. Deployment is usually fast compared to
patch development and testing, taking on the order of a few minutes.
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5.3 Analytical Model
In this section, we describe an analytical model to show the tradeoff between pre-deployment
testing and the vulnerability of the system.
Although some studies describe vulnerability exploitation models (VEMs) [76], they are
mostly limited to the specific software application under study and the specific attacker
model. For instance, the exploitation model of a worm is different from that of a hacker
targeting a specific organization. To keep the model general and avoid such specificities,
we do not use an exploitation model in this work. We simply study vulnerabilities in a
system and use the total number of open vulnerabilities at each time as a measure of the
susceptibility of the system.
Assume that the number of new vulnerabilities found in a piece of software at time t
is given by w(t). Note that w(t) is discrete in time; however, it can be approximated with
little error with a continuous time function. Further assume that the cumulative number of
vulnerabilities in a system is given by Ω(t), which approaches a final value as time passes.
This final value is the total number of vulnerabilities that will ever be discovered for that
software. This function does not account for hidden vulnerabilities that are never discovered.
Nonetheless if a vulnerability is forever undiscovered, it does not pose a threat and it is of
little interest.
If we denote the patch development time by TP and pre-deployment testing time by TT ,
the total number of open vulnerabilities at time t for a perfect patching system (in which
patches introduce no new vulnerability) is given by Equation 5.6.
Vperfect(t) =
∫ t
t−TP−TT
w(τ)dτ (5.6)
Equation 5.6 is obtained using the fact that every vulnerability discovered from time 0
to t − TP − TT is patched by time t. The only open vulnerabilities are those for which no
patch has been developed yet or those under test.
We know that in reality patching is not perfect. In fact, each patch can introduce a new
vulnerability to the system. Assume that on average, each untested patch introduces f new
patches to the system. If f is greater than 1 (each patch introduces more than one new
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vulnerability on average), the system is unstable and the number of vulnerabilities grows
indefinitely with time, so we study the system for 0 ≤ f < 1. If no testing is done, the
number of new vulnerabilities by previous patches at time t is given by Equation 5.7.
Vfaulty(t) = f ×
∫ t−TP−TT
0
w(τ)dτ (5.7)
Pre-deployment testing, however, can find some of these new vulnerabilities before ap-
plying the patch to the software. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, no real data
is available for the number of new vulnerabilities discovered when testing a patch. However,
these vulnerabilities are related to the same software version and the same vendor. As a
result, we assume that they can be modeled using the vulnerability discovery trend for that
software. Since the vulnerability discovery trend heavily depends on the software and its
version, but it is accurate for a specific version of a software application, we believe that this
assumption is valid.
Consequently, if each patch is tested for TT before it is deployed, the number of new
vulnerabilities introduced during testing is given by Equation 5.8.
Vtested−faulty(t) = [1−Ω(TT )−Ω(0)]×Vfaulty(t) = f× [1−Ω(TT )−Ω(0)]×
∫ t−TP−TT
0
w(τ)dτ
(5.8)
Equation 5.8 is obtained from the fact that during testing Ω(TT ) vulnerabilities are discovered
in the patch.
Some of the VDMs have a small non-zero value at time 0 as an artifact. The term Ω(0)
is added to the equation to compensate for that. If no such artifact exist, the multiplier can
be simplified to (1− Ω(TT )).
Note that Equation 5.8 is correct for Ω(TT ) − Ω(0) < 1. This is because a patch on
average has at most one new vulnerability. The total number of open vulnerabilities at time
t follows Equation 5.9.
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VTotal(t) =Vperfect(t) + Vtested−faulty(t)
=
∫ t
t−TP−TT
w(τ)dτ + f × [1− Ω(TT )− Ω(0)]×
∫ t−TP−TT
0
w(τ)dτ
=Ω(t)− Ω(t− TT − TP ) + α(f, TT )× [Ω(t− TT − TP )− Ω(0)] (5.9)
In Equation 5.9, for simplicity, the term f × [1− Ω(TT )− Ω(0)] is denoted by α(f, TT ).
The tradeoff can be observed from Equation 5.9. By increasing the testing time (TT ), the
first term grows because the window of exposure (integral limits) widens. On the other hand,
the second term shrinks because more testing results in more faults discovered.
The optimal pre-deployment testing at each time t is the amount of TT that minimizes
Equation 5.9, the total number of open vulnerabilities at time t. If it is desired to have
one optimal TT for all times and remove the time dependency, the optimal TT is given by
Equation 5.10.
Optimal TT = TT | min
∫ L
0
VTotal(τ)dτ (5.10)
In Equation 5.10, L is the lifetime of the software. The optimal testing time minimizes
the number of open vulnerabilities at all times. The upper bound of the integral in real-world
applications is about two or three years. After this time, there are usually very few new
vulnerabilities discovered for that software.
The analysis clearly shows that pre-deployment testing is not always good. There is a
certain amount of testing which minimizes the number of vulnerabilities in the system. More
testing increases the window of exposure for little gain and is detrimental to the security of
the system.
5.4 Stochastic Model
This section describes the stochastic model of patch management. We simulate the stochas-
tic model to find the optimal testing time using simulation as well. The model includes
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Figure 5.1: The stochastic model of the patching system
vulnerability discovery as well as patch development, testing, and deployment processes.
Patching is modeled in this work using Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs) [77]. SANs
are generalized forms of Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs.) In addition to the components of
SPNs, SANs also include input gates (shown by triangles pointing left), output gates (shown
by triangles pointing right), probabilistic cases (shown by small circles on activities), and
instantaneous activities (shown by thin vertical lines). Input gates specify general enabling
conditions, output gates define general completion functions, cases represent a probabilistic
placement of tokens in the outputs with a specific probability for each case, and instantaneous
activities denote activities that are completed in zero time. Mobius [78] is the tool used for
simulation of the SAN model. All times in the model are expressed in months. Here, the
details of the SAN model are explained and different choices of the parameters are discussed.
The model consists of three sub-models (Atomic models) illustrated in Figure 5.1. They
model vulnerability discovery, patch development, and patch testing/deployment processes.
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The three sub-models are joined into a composite patch system model using “Join” rep-
resentation. This means that places with the same name in different sub-models refer to the
same place in the composite model.
The first Atomic model, “vulnerability,” expresses the vulnerability discovery model. In
this model, two places contain undiscovered and discovered vulnerabilities and an activity
(VDM) takes tokens from the former and puts them in the latter (Figure 5.1a). The initial
marking of the undiscovered vulnerabilities is equal to the total number of vulnerabilities.
We set the initial marking of the discovered vulnerabilities as one (and not zero) because
making this marking zero also sets the discovery rate to zero and no vulnerability will ever
be discovered.
For our simulation, we use the AML vulnerability discovery model, although the stochas-
tic model is general and any VDM can be used for it. The choice of AML model is because
it fits the real vulnerability discovery data from the three web browsers with small error.
To use the AML model, the rate of VDM activity is set to A × Ω × (B − Ω) in which
Ω is the marking of the discovered vulnerability and A and B are global variables. Note
that VDM is a variable rate activity in which the rate is a function of the vulnerabilities
discovered so far. In the stochastic model, we do not use the time domain solution for Ω(t);
rather, the underlying differential equation describing Ω (i.e. Ω˙ = A×Ω× (B −Ω) ) is used
to model vulnerability discovery. This is one of the differences between the analytical and
stochastic models.
In our study, we assign real fitted values to A and B so that the model represents
vulnerability discovery for Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Safari. The second Atomic model
describes the patch development process (Figure 5.1b). Patch development time is software
and vendor dependent. For the web browsers under study, the patch development times
are set to those listed in Table 5.1. These times are reported for different browsers in the
Symantec report [71].
Patch development continues until the total number of patches equals the number of
discovered vulnerabilities. This is done using the input gate “develop.” The next element
models the deployment phase of the patching process (see Figure 5.1c). If pre-deployment
testing is being done on patches, a timed activity moves new patches to tested patches
78
Table 5.1: Patch development time for different browsers
Web Browser Patch Development Time
IE 7 5 days
Mozilla 2 5 days
Safari 2 3 days
ready for deployment. We change the testing time to find the optimal testing period. The
distribution of testing activity is deterministic.
For a given testing period and faulty fraction (f), the fraction of patches that introduce
a new vulnerability after testing is computed as (f × [1− (Ω(TT )−Ω(0))]). This fraction is
assigned to the second case of the “testing” activity which adds a new fault to the system.
The first case of the activity is when the vulnerability is discovered and it puts a new token
in the “ready patches” place (Figure 5.1c).
Applying a ready patch takes a small amount of time compared to development of the
patch and pre-deployment testing, so it is modeled using an instantaneous activity named
“apply patch.”
5.5 Simulation Results and Discussion
This section presents the results from the analytical model and different experiments on
the stochastic model. To study the effect of testing on the vulnerability of the system, we
first need reliable data for the vulnerability discovery trend. For this, we use the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) and collect the vulnerabilities discovered in the three popular
web browsers as well as the date of public disclosure.
For our study, we use Mozilla Firefox 2, Microsoft Internet Explorer 7, and Apple Safari
2 browsers. The reason for choosing these particular versions is that they are not old; at the
same time, they are not the most recent versions (i.e. Firefox3 or Safari 3) for which very
few vulnerabilities are discovered to this day. The vulnerabilities can be in the core of the
browser or in any of its extensions or add-ons.
Then, we fit the AML model to these vulnerabilities by minimizing the mean-squared
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error. The cumulative numbers of vulnerabilities (Ω) for the three browsers from the real
data as well as the fitted models and the parameter values are shown in Figure 5.2.
We have simulated the stochastic model in Mobius [78] using the parameters from the
three web browsers.
Figure 5.3 shows the cumulative number of vulnerabilities discovered obtained by simu-
lating the stochastic model. The quantity plotted in this figure is the marking of (i.e. the
number of tokens in) the place holding the discovered vulnerabilities (named “disc vul” in
the model).
The effects of different parameters such as faulty fraction (f), testing time (TT ), and
browser dependency are studied in different experiments. In each experiment, the parameter
under study is changed and other parameters are set to some fixed value. This does not
suggest that those fixed values are typical in any way. It is done to keep other parameters
invariant so that we can observe the effect of the parameter under study. Of course, in a
real system, the behavior is a function of all these parameters.
To study the effect of faulty patches, the number of open vulnerabilities is plotted versus
time for different f values in Figure 5.4. The number of open vulnerabilities is the number
of unpatched discovered vulnerabilities plus the number of faults introduced during previous
patch deployments. For this experiment, no pre-deployment testing is done and the results
are simulated for Firefox 2. Notice three facts from Figure 5.4. First, the number of patches
lags behind the number of discovered vulnerabilities. This is due to the time it takes for
the vendor to develop new patches. Second, when there is no faulty patch (f = 0), the
number of open vulnerabilities goes to zero eventually. The non-zero value in the middle is
the difference between the number of vulnerabilities and patches. Third, for faulty patches,
there are always residual faults that remain in the system.
The next experiment studies the effect of testing on the number of open vulnerabilities.
This experiment is done for two f values (0.2 and 0.5) and three testing periods (two weeks,
one week, and one day). Internet Explorer 7 is used as the model. The results are shown in
Figure 5.5. Observe that for a given time, a specific testing period minimizes the area under
the curve from zero to that time representing the total number of open vulnerabilities over
that time. This amount of pre-deployment testing is the optimal testing.
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Figure 5.2: Vulnerability discovery for different browsers
The parameters used in the experiment are arbitrary values chosen for demonstration of
the effects only. The exact optimal testing period for a given faulty fraction can be obtained
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Figure 5.3: Vulnerability discovery from the stochastic model
from Equation 5.10. In the next section we show that the results from the analytical model
match those obtained here from simulation.
Intuitively, more testing or smaller faulty fraction would result in fewer residual vulner-
abilities in the system. However, interestingly, two weeks of testing with 50% fault result
in the same residual vulnerability as one day of testing with 20% fault. This means that in
order to compensate for faultier patches, a lot more testing has to be done. We verify this
result in the next section.
Finally, the last experiment studies the software dependency of pre-deployment testing.
For this experiment, we plot the number of open vulnerabilities at each time for the three
web browsers given a faulty fraction of 0.3 and testing periods of two weeks and one day. The
results are shown in Figure 5.6. The patch development times for this experiment are five
days for Firefox and IE and three days for Safari. These times are taken from the Symantec
report [71].
There are two observations to be made for this experiment. First, the evolution of open
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Figure 5.4: The number of open vulnerabilities for various faulty fractions
vulnerabilities over time is highly dependent on the software (in this case the web browser).
Second, there is a common trend between different web browsers and testing times. The
number of open vulnerabilities is high at the beginning before the vendor gets a chance
to develop patches for the initial problems. It shrinks to a minimum between one and six
months after the initial phase is passed. It then grows rapidly or peaks at around one year
into the process. This sharp growth is because users become more familiar with the software
and the rate of vulnerability discovery is very high at this point. Finally, it approaches the
terminal after about three years.
5.6 Verification and Validation
In this section, we validate the sub-models used in the analytical and stochastic models in
this work. Furthermore, we verify the results obtained by simulating the stochastic model
using the analytical model.
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Figure 5.5: The number of open vulnerabilities for various testing times
First, to validate the vulnerability discovery model, we calculate the mean squared error
(MSE) of the fitted AML model compared to the actual data from the vulnerability database
(Figure 5.2). The MSEs for Firefox, IE, and Mozilla are 27.5, 22.7, and 11.7 respectively.
Also the percentages of error for these browsers are 6.94%, 5.50%, and 11.74% respectively.
The errors for IE and Firefox show that the model is a good fit for the actual data. For
Safari, the error is a little larger because of fewer samples and cumulative public disclosure
of vulnerabilities which results in a staircase-like trend.
Next, we validate the stochastic vulnerability discovery model (Figure 5.3) by calculating
its error from the actual data. The percentages of error for stochastic models of Firefox, IE,
and Safari are 12.0%, 12.8%, and 12.5%. Most of the error is because of the initial error in
the model for the first two samples (i.e. one day and three days).
To verify the simulation results, we compare them to those obtained from the analytical
model. Equation 5.10 gives the optimal pre-deployment testing time for any period of
lifetime. It is important to notice that the optimal time depends on the goal one wants to
84
Figure 5.6: The number of open vulnerabilities for the different browsers
achieve. For instance, the goal of minimizing the number of open vulnerabilities over the
two-year lifetime of the software results in a different optimal time than that of minimizing
the number of open vulnerabilities at a specific time. In the analysis provided here, without
loss of generality, assume that the goal is to minimize the number of open vulnerabilities
over the two-year lifetime of the software. Since a new version of the browser is introduced
after two-years, this can be a meaningful goal.
First, we solve the analytical model for the second simulation experiment. The model
is solved for f = 0.2 and the three testing times (one day, one week, and two weeks).
By solving Equation 5.9, the total numbers of open vulnerabilities over two years for the
three experiments are 317.3, 262.2, and 195.9 respectively. These values do not refer to real
vulnerabilities; rather, they are the summation of all possible windows of exposure. The
values from the analytical model and the stochastic model agree in what they suggest. That
is, two weeks of testing is better than one week or one day. The reason becomes apparent
when we explicitly solve the analytical model for IE 7 to find the optimal testing time. By
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solving Equation 5.10, the optimal testing time is 0.7845 months or about 23 days (total
open vulnerabilities over two years=116.8). That is why two weeks of testing achieves better
results than one week or one day in the simulation. In fact, the analytical model gives insight
into the results obtained in the simulation section.
In addition, we verify the result found in the second experiment that 20% fault with one
day of testing has the same number of residual vulnerabilities as 50% fault with two weeks
of testing. From the analytical model, and by substituting the actual values for IE 7, the
value of f× [1− (Ω(TT )−Ω(0))] is the same for f=0.2 and TT=0.033 (months) as f=0.5 and
TT=0.5 (months). This quantity is what we called α and shows the residual vulnerability.
The analytical value obtained for α in both cases is 24.2 which again is the same value from
the simulation in Figure 5.5.
Finally, we obtain the optimal testing time for all of the web browsers for the last sim-
ulation experiment. The optimal TT for IE, Firefox, and Safari (f=0.3) are 0.784 month
(=23 days), 0.353 month (=10 days), and 1.928 month (=57 days) respectively. This verifies
why the residual vulnerability after two weeks of testing for Firefox is zero, but for IE and
Safari it is not (Figure 5.6). Two weeks of testing is greater than the optimal testing time
of Firefox, but smaller than those of IE or Safari. Hence, α is zero for Firefox while it is
non-zero for IE and Safari.
It is important to realize what the verifications in this section suggest. They do not prove
that the analytical model and the models used in the simulation are correct. On the other
hand, they show that these models, capturing medium-level details of the system, indicate
the same tradeoff and they match in what they suggest. It is possible to come up with
more sophisticated models to capture low level details of a patching system. However, the
fundamental tradeoff always exists in the system: pre-deployment testing results in more
exposure and fewer new vulnerabilities.
By comparing the results with the actual real-world vulnerability data for different
browsers, we have shown that these medium level models can capture the reality with a
margin of about 12% error.
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6 TrustGraph: Trusted Graphics Subsystem
6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the design and implementation of TrustGraph [79], a trusted graphics
subsystem for high assurance systems. We first provide background on the graphics sub-
system and the terms and concepts usually used in its context. The background material
presented should be enough for those without knowledge of graphics systems to understand
the rest of the chapter.
6.1.1 Contributions
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We enumerate and describe different classes of attacks possible using the API of a
graphics subsystem.
• We describe the design and implementation of a secure graphics subsystem on top of
a simple and tiny graphics library.
• To the best of our knowledge, TrustGraph is the first graphics subsystem with some
of its critical components formally model-checked (the policy enforcement and the
window manager logic).
• It is also the first graphics subsystem that reduces the channel capacity of the graphics
API covert channel attacks.
• Finally, we perform static analysis on the actual implementation of TrustGraph using
compiler-based techniques, and we identify and correct several coding flaws.
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6.2 Background
A graphics subsystem is a software system responsible for providing a graphical user inter-
face (GUI) for the applications and building the display output through the graphics card.
It allows the applications to interact with the graphics hardware through an application pro-
gramming interface (API) which we hereafter refer to simply as the interface. The graphics
subsystem also handles the inputs from the input devices such as mouse and keyboard and
directs them to the appropriate application. Examples of graphics subsystems include the
X Window System [80] for Linux-like operating systems, DirectFB for Linux and embedded
systems, and Quartz [81] for Mac OS X. The graphics subsystem often includes an inte-
grated windowing system which is responsible for handling and managing the windows on
the screen.
The following terms and concepts are used in the context of graphics. We use the generic
terms with a bias towards those adopted by DirectFB [7].
Window: A visual area, usually rectangular, which displays the graphical outputs and
accepts the inputs for an application.
Layer: Each layer represents an independent graphics buffer in the system. Different layers
are blended into the final image using the transparency information for each layer (i.e.
alpha blending). For example, one layer can be used for the background, another for
an application window in the middle, and yet another for a video playing on top.
Surface: A reserved piece of memory (from the video card or the system memory) which
holds the pixel data for a window. All drawing operations requested by the application
are done directly on this piece of memory.
Event Buffer: A buffer that holds all of the input events for a window (e.g. keystrokes or
mouse events).
Data Buffer: A buffer which holds the image or video data to be displayed on a window.
Window Manager: A piece of software that manages a set of windows. The window
events such as resizing, reordering, or moving call the appropriate window manager
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of a graphics subsystem
methods. The window manager is also responsible for redirecting the input events to
the appropriate window.
In this chapter, we refer to the set of all windows (W ), surfaces (S ), event buffers (EB),
and data buffers (DB) as the graphics resources (R) (or simply the resources).
Figure 6.1 shows the simplified architecture of a graphics subsystem. A typical sequence
for establishing a GUI starts from the application creating an interface (called the main
interface) to the graphics subsystem. The main interface can optionally create a data buffer
to load image or video data. The main interface then creates one or more windows for
that application through the window manager. Each window then creates a surface and an
event buffer to hold its pixel values and the input events respectively. The window manager
then forwards the input events to the appropriate application through its event buffer and
eventually its main interface.
Resource creations and acquisitions are done through a set of graphics methods (M )
(hereafter referred to as methods) provided by the graphics subsystem through the interfaces.
For example, one method (Create-Surface) creates a surface for a window (f : W → S)
and another one (Get-Event-Buffer) assigns an already existing event buffer to a window
(f : W → EB). A complete list of the graphics methods is provided in Section 6.4.3.
There are also global operations (OP) (hereafter referred to as operations) which operate
on a set of resources. For instance, taking a screenshot of the display is an operation which
operates on the set of all windows and their surfaces to dump an image of the display. Also
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a graphics subsystem provides a set of drawing functions (D) which are called by a window
to manipulate its surface (f : S → S). For example, when an application wants to draw a
rectangle on its window, a drawing function is called which gets the surface of the window
and changes its pixel values to include a rectangle. A graphics subsystem (GS ) is a 5-tuple
that includes the set of all graphics resources (R =
⋃
(W,S,EB,DB)), the graphics methods
(M ), the operations (OP), the drawing functions (D), and a window manager (WM ); i.e.
GS = 〈R |M | OP | D |WM〉.
6.3 Threat Model
The threat model used in this work assumes that the applications running at different security
levels are not trusted. They have the potential to leak information and violate the security
policy as a result of intentional malicious behavior or unintentional bugs or programming
errors. The trusted computing base (TCB), on the other hand, includes the hardware of
the system (CPU, main memory, and devices), the video card, and the logic used to provide
the separation between the processes at different security levels. This logic can be a VMM
(hypervisor or separation kernel) as explained in the introduction or a trusted operating
system; however, it is easier to establish the isolation property of a tiny VMM than an
entire operating system. The security policy can be any arbitrary policy such as MLS,
MILS, or type enforcement (TE). As a proof of concept, we implement a Bell-LaPadula-like
[82] security policy for MLS systems.
We assume that the only interaction between the applications and the graphics subsystem
is done through the interface defined by the graphics subsystem. The subsystem itself is
protected from modifications by residing in a lower software layer (i.e. in the VMM) or in a
privileged virtual machine (e.g. dom0 of Xen). The goal is to prevent the applications from
violating the security policy by using the graphics subsystem to communicate.
Now we describe various attacks and leakage points which can be used to violate a
security policy. A graphics subsystem is a single piece of software which handles data from
multiple security levels. This makes it the weak link in the security chain. The first security
issue in a graphics subsystem is that all of the resources (windows, surfaces, buffers, etc.)
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are security agnostic. A surface holding the graphic data from a top secret application is
not different from the one holding unclassified data. The applications can dynamically bind
to these resources and read the potentially sensitive data from them; thus it is possible for
the applications to communicate through these resources or for an application to snoop the
graphics data of another application.
Another security threat in an unsecured graphics subsystem is unsecured methods. These
methods enable the applications to build their GUI and interact with the graphics hardware.
There are two types of unsecured methods: those used for creating or acquiring the resources
and those used to handle the inputs. The former can be used maliciously to snoop the
graphics data from the security-agnostic resources while the latter can be used to sniff the
input events from another window. For instance, an application can retrieve an interface
to the surface of another window in a higher security level and read its pixel data (using
a method such as GetSurface). Note that applications can enumerate all the windows on
the display. This is necessary for facilities such as “alt-tab” or crash recovery applications.
Moreover, a window that currently does not have the focus can acquire the input events
(using GrabKeyboard or GrabPointer methods). As a result, the window of a malicious
application which is sitting behind the other windows and is not even visible can sniff the
password typed by the user on a top secret window.
Unsecured operations can also leak information. Global operations such as copying/pasting
and taking screenshots (e.g. using the PrintScreen key of the keyboard) can easily leak data
across the security levels.
In addition, overlapping windows can endanger the confidentiality of the system. A win-
dow can make itself transparent (or partially transparent). There are two security concerns
when a lower security window sits on top of a higher one. First, a transparent window on
top can get the pixel values of the window behind it, hence accessing the sensitive data.
Second, there can be access control mechanisms in place which limit the visual access of the
user to different windows. For instance, a face detection camera can identify the user in
front of the monitor and allow or deny his access to different windows. In such a system, a
low clearance user gets access to the top window with the unclassified information, while in
fact he can see the content of a higher security window behind it using transparency.
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Finally, the large code size and complexity make graphics systems such as X inherently
bad choices for trusted graphics. X was developed at the time when computer graphics had
low color depth and there was no hardware acceleration [83]. Years of enlarging the code
base and adding new features to X have resulted in a large and inefficient graphics system.
In fact, the code size of X is comparable to that of the kernel itself. The obsolete features
and components of X exacerbate the situation: many of these resources can be used as
communication channels not regulated by the security policy. In short, X is too large and
complex for secure graphics.
6.4 Design
6.4.1 Principles
TrustGraph is built upon a number of security design principles. We first explain these
principles and then describe the design of TrustGraph. We explain how the design decisions
comply with the security principles.
The following security design principles are used when building TrustGraph:
I. Simplicity: It is important for secure systems to be as simple as possible. Complex de-
sign, large code base, and/or unknown or unused features are sources of vulnerabilities.
Simple and small systems are easier to design, understand, and verify.
II. Complete Mediation: Access mediation must be applied to any access or communica-
tion attempt in the system in order for the security policy to be satisfied. In fact, the
graphics subsystem is one of the components in which mediation is either not done or
not completed.
III. Principle of Least Privileges: Each entity in the system must have the smallest set of
privileges that allows it to do its tasks unimpeded. Hence, TrustGraph must allow the
applications to lower the privileges of their GUIs.
IV. Least Common Mechanism: Shared resources in the system must be as minimal as
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possible to avoid overt or covert communications between the subjects using those
resources. As discussed earlier, it is impractical to have a different video output for
each security compartment. However, TrustGraph limits the sharing of the resources
to prevent such vulnerabilities.
V. Open Design: Finally, secure systems must have an open design for them to be verifi-
able. The design of TrustGraph is described in details to adhere to this principle.
6.4.2 Labeled Resources
For the graphics methods and operations to comply with the security policy, all of the
resources in the graphics subsystem have to be labeled with a security tag. The main
interfaces, data buffers, windows, event buffers, and surfaces must all be labeled with security
tags. As a proof of concept, TrustGraph implements MLS levels and categories as the security
tags and uses the Bell-LaPadula model augmented with declassification as the security policy.
The design, however, is not limited to MLS or the BLP policy. More general security policies
such as type-enforcement, role-based access control, or attribute-based access control can be
used in TrustGraph.
6.4.3 Secure Methods
The next step is to secure the methods in the graphics subsystem. Two types of secure
methods exist in TrustGraph: the methods used to create or acquire resources (the label-
propagating methods) and the methods used to grab inputs (the input grabbing methods).
Label-Propagating Methods
Any method that is used to securely create a new graphics resource or to securely obtain an
existing one is called a label-propagating method. These methods must check and propagate
the security tags appropriately. The label-propagating methods are as follows:
• Create Main Interface: The method is used to create the main interface to the graphics
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subsystem. It must propagate the security tag of the application to the main interface.
It receives the security tag from the operating system or the VMM.
• Create Data Buffer: This method is called from the main interface to create a data
buffer. It propagates the security tag of the main interface to the data buffer.
• Create Window: It is called from the specific layer interface of the main interface. It
creates a window and propagates the main interface security tag to it.
• Create Surface: This method is called from the main interface to create a surface. It
propagates the main interface label to the surface.
• Create Event Buffer: It is called from the window or main interface. It propagates the
corresponding security tag to the event buffer.
• Get Window: This method is called from the specific layer interface of the main
interface to acquire an already existing window. If the window has a higher security
level than the main interface, it can result in information leakage from a higher security
level into a lower one. Consequently, in such a situation the access is denied. A main
interface can only read from a window with lower or equal security level. Hence, in
such a condition, the window acquisition is granted to the main interface while the
security level of the window is elevated to that of the main interface. This is done
because an application writes its graphical data which has the same security level as
the application to its window. The elevation of security level prevents leakages in
future window acquisitions.
• Get Surface: The method is called from a window interface to acquire an already
existing surface. Similar to getting a window, if the window has a lower security level
than the surface, the access is denied. Otherwise, the window is granted access and
the surface security level is elevated to that of the window.
• Get Event Buffer: Similar to getting a surface, this method is called from the window
interface to acquire an existing event buffer. If the event buffer has a higher security
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Figure 6.2: Label flow in TrustGraph
level than the window, the access is denied. Otherwise, the window is granted access
and the event buffer security level is elevated to that of the window.
A security label in TrustGraph is an MLS label which contains a level followed by a set
of categories. As defined in the BLP model [82], a label dominates another one if it has a
higher level and its set of categories is a super-set of that of the other label. For example, the
label 〈TopSecret, {ProjectA, ProjectB}〉 dominates the label 〈Secret, {ProjectB}〉. The
label flow is shown in Figure 6.2. Each arrow is marked with the method used to create or
acquire the corresponding resource. The label flow is shown in the context of a virtualized
system with the graphics subsystem running in the privileged partition.
All label flows are internal to the TrustGraph code except one: creating the main inter-
face. This method must receive the application security tag from the VMM (or the operating
system in a non-virtualized model). This is done through a small piece of code called “mem-
brane.” Membrane is responsible for receiving the application security tag from the VMM
and delivering it to TrustGraph when the main interface is being created.
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Declassification
To implement the principle of least privileges, it must be possible for the main interfaces to
create windows with dominated security labels. This ensures that if the application wants
to perform a low security task, it can open a low security window. However, the problem
with declassification of windows is that the application can maliciously or unintentionally
declassify its sensitive data. This allows other applications which did not have access to the
data before, to gain such an access. Consequently, declassification must restrict the access
of a window to higher security resources (such as a higher level surface), yet it must not
allow other applications that did not have access to the window to gain such an access. The
same argument applies to a window acquiring a surface or an event buffer.
As a result, each resource is labeled with two labels: a permanent label (PL) and a
declassification label (DL). When a resource acquires another resource, it is only granted
access if its DL dominates the other resource’s PL. Hence, no entity gains new accesses when
a resource is declassified. For the main interface, DL is always equal to PL.
Therefore, the label flow is as follows. “DOM” denotes the domination as defined before.
Create Resource:
{Resource PL = Creator PL;
Resource DL = Creator DL;}
Acquire Resource:
If (Acquirer DL DOM Resource PL)
{Resource PL = Acquirer PL;
Resource DL = Acquirer DL;
Grant;}
else
{ Deny; }
Declassify:
Window DL = L (only if Main interface PL DOM L)
Note that if declassification is not used, the system works as a simple multilevel security
system (PL=DL for all resources). The PL can be viewed as the highest possible security
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level that the resource may contain. Since a window may still contain data with the security
level as high as the application when declassified, the PL can never be lowered by the
application. The DL, on the other hand, can be interpreted as the highest label which the
application believes the window should have access to.
If a more general security tag is used (e.g. types or attributes), declassification should
reduce the privileges of the resource being declassified, but it must not grant new access
rights to other resources. For instance, if type-enforcement is used as the policy, the main
interface can declassify a window to a type which has a strictly smaller set of accessible types
than the original type. On the other hand, the set of types which have access to the new
type must remain the same or become smaller after the declassification. Similar arguments
apply for attribute-based and role-based systems.
Input Grabbing Methods
Whenever an input grabbing method is called, all the subsequent events of the corresponding
input device are delivered to the window, ignoring the focus. These methods can result in
input sniffing where a window sniffs all the input events of the window under focus. The
sniffer can optionally redirect the event to its proper destination after sniffing it to avert sus-
picion. There are typically five types of input events: key press, key release, mouse/joystick
button press, mouse/joystick button release, and mouse/joystick movement.
For TrustGraph to secure the input grabbing methods, it must redirect input events to
the requesting window only if it has the focus. There are four types of input grabbing meth-
ods: Grab Keyboard, Grab Key, Grab Pointer, and Grab Unselected Keys. Respectively,
these methods redirect all keyboard events, specific key events, mouse/joystick events, and
unselected key events to the application.
The window manager always keeps track of the window under focus, so whenever an
input grabbing method is called, TrustGraph checks with the window manager to make sure
that the requester is under focus. If the condition is true, the input is granted to the window
(move-to-focus model). Otherwise, the current status of the inputs is kept intact; i.e., input
events are sent to the window which currently receives them. Another model for changing
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the focus is called click-to-focus in which an unfocused window may receive mouse left or
right click events. In this case, upon receiving those events, the unfocused window requests
the focus in order to receive keystroke events.
One attack that is not addressed by this mechanism is click-jacking, where a lower security
window suddenly requests focus and the user mistakenly types a few characters or clicks on
the wrong window. To mitigate this attack, TrustGraph has a click-jacking prevention
(CJP) feature which issues a warning before granting the focus to a window with a different
security label than the current window. If the security labels are the same, however, the
focus transition is done transparently. For convenience, CJP can be turned on or off at the
compile time of TrustGraph.
6.4.4 Secure Operations
The global operations are implemented in a graphics subsystem to facilitate the usage and
augment the system with additional functionalities. However, they can cause information
leakage in the system. The operations differ from the methods in that they have a more
global scope. Two such operations exist in TrustGraph: copy-pasting and screenshots.
• Copy-pasting: Copying is done by setting a global container called the Clipboard Data
through the main interface. The clipboard data includes the MIME type of the data
as well as the data itself. To prevent leakages, the clipboard in TrustGraph is labeled
with the same security label as the main interface. Consequently, if the interface that
gets the clipboard data (i.e. pasting the data) has a dominating security label, the
data will be returned. Otherwise, NULL is returned.
• Screenshots: Screenshots can be taken from the screen by pressing the PrintScreen
key of the keyboard. Regardless of the focus, the entire display is dumped whenever a
screenshot is taken. To prevent leakage of information, an application can only dump
the pixel values of the dominated windows. Hence, whenever PrintScreen is pressed,
TrustGraph gets the security label of the window which currently has the focus. It
then zeroizes the pixel values of any window that does not have a dominated label in
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the screenshot. This ensures that no application can get the pixel values of a higher
application by taking a screenshot from the entire display.
By controlling all the methods and operations and validating their compliance with the
security policy, TrustGraph follows the principle of complete mediation.
6.4.5 Window Manager
The window manager controls a set of windows called the window stack. If a window is
resized, moved, reordered, or closed, the appropriate method of the window manager is
called to rearrange the window stack.
In Section 6.3, we explained how overlapping windows pose a threat to trusted graphics.
Lacking security controls, a lower security level window could in principle read the pixel
values from a higher security one behind it. It might also evade visual access control mech-
anisms. As a result, the security label dominance imposes the same strict ordering on the
windows on the screen. The window manager of TrustGraph imposes this ordering on all
windows. The methods used for inserting and reordering windows are modified to always
preserve the window ordering.
The ordering is done based on PL, not DL. If the ordering had been based on DL, another
window with higher DL than the current window could have been positioned on top of it.
Nevertheless, if the window on top had a lower PL, it could snoop higher security level
data, resulting in information leakage. Note that when the ordering is done based on PL, a
window can snoop data with higher security level than its DL. However, since all the resource
acquisition methods check the PL before granting access, this data cannot be leaked to any
other application and the system is secure.
If the windows have incompatible security labels (i.e. neither label1 DOM label2, nor
label2 DOM label1), they cannot overlap at all. They can only float on the display as
separate rectangles without one sitting on top of another. If the user tries to overlap the
windows, the moving window will not move any further than the edge of the other window.
Although these measures impose restrictions on the user interactions, they do not make the
system unusable. For instance, if a user requires a large window for one application, he can
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minimize incompatible windows or drag them to the corner of the display. We were able to
work with the system despite these restrictions without much inconvenience. The location
restrictions can be exploited to form a covert channel between the windows. We discuss
the techniques to mitigate covert channel attacks that exploit graphical methods in Section
6.6.4.
6.5 Implementation
TrustGraph is built on top of an existing graphics and windowing software to avoid the
redundant effort to code the basic graphics functionality. Although X is the default graphics
software in the Linux operating system, it was not chosen for this purpose due to its large
code base, complex design, and inefficiencies. Instead, we have modified DirectFB to build
TrustGraph. DirectFB is simple and lightweight and it has small overhead. Hence, it is
often used in embedded systems. Unlike X, it does not use the client-server model which
adds to the complexity of the graphics software. By choosing a simple base graphics system,
we adhere to our first design principle: simplicity.
TrustGraph is implemented by modifying DirectFB version 1.2.0. The code size of Di-
rectFB is about 40,000 LOC (lines of code) with a default window manager of about 3,800
LOC. This is significantly smaller than X’s 1,837,000 LOC. The entire implementation of
TrustGraph requires less than 3,000 LOC of fresh code and modification.
To implement labeling, the following resources are augmented with security labels: IDi-
rectFB, IDirectFBDataBuffer, IDirectFBWindow, IDirectFBSurface, and IDirectFBEvent-
Buffer. Each label comprises an integer security level in the range of [0, 255] and a set of up
to five different categories from the set {c0, c1, ..., c255}.
All of the resource creation and acquisition methods are modified to propagate and check
the labels. Table 6.1 lists the label propagation and checking for the methods in TrustGraph.
The input grabbing methods are also modified to ensure focus before redirecting input events
to a window. These methods are part of the default window manager. The wm grab method
of the default window manager handles all input grabbing requests. CJP is also implemented
by modifying the wm request focus method.
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For secure copy-pasting, the ClipboardData structure is augmented with a security label.
In addition, two methods of the main interface have been modified to enforce the security
policy. The SetClipboardData method is modified to set the security tag of the ClipboardData
to that of the main interface that perform a “copy.” The GetClipboardData method is also
modified to provide the ClipboardData to any dominating security label and deny any other
request.
Screenshots are handled in the input module of DirectFB. Whenever the PrintScreen key
of the keyboard is pressed on any window, the input module filters that event and dumps the
display by calling the function dump primary layer surface. In order to secure screenshots,
this function is modified to zerioze the pixel data of non-dominated windows.
To implement strict security-label-based ordering, the three main functions of the win-
dow manager, wm add window, wm restack window, and wm remove window, are modified.
Events on the windows call one of these functions to change the window ordering.
Table 6.1: Label-propagating methods in TrustGraph
CreateMainInterface Main interface PL = Application label;
CreateDataBuffer Data buffer PL = Main interface PL;
CreateWindow Window PL = Window DL = Main interface PL;
CreateSurface Surface PL = Surface DL = Main interface PL;
CreateEventBuffer Event buffer PL = Window PL;
Event buffer DL = Window DL;
GetWindow If(Main interface PL DOM Window PL)
Window PL = Window DL = Main interface PL;
else
deny;
GetSurface If(Window DL DOM Surface PL)
Surface PL = Window PL;
Surface DL = Window DL;
else
deny;
GetEventBuffer If(Window DL DOM Event buffer PL)
Event buffer PL = Window PL;
Event buffer DL = Window DL;
else
deny;
SetWindowLevel If(Main interface PL DOM L)
Window DL=L;
else
deny;
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6.5.1 Compatibility
TrustGraph provides backward compatibility with the X applications using the XDirectFB
library. This library enables the applications developed for X to run seamlessly over DirectFB
or TrustGraph. It is also possible to develop native applications or to port the existing X
applications to use the TrustGraph (DirectFB) API directly. Many applications have already
been ported to the DirectFB API, including Mozilla [84].
6.5.2 End-to-End Implementation
As a proof of concept, we have implemented an end-to-end virtualized architecture using
TrustGraph. We have used Xen [5] and sHype [85] as the hypervisor and the mandatory
access control (MAC) module. Xen’s access control module (ACM) is in fact an implemen-
tation of IBM’s sHype and it supports type enforcement and Chinese wall security policies.
In this architecture, TrustGraph runs in the privileged partition (dom0) of Xen and any
graphical request by the virtual machines is sent to dom0 via hyper calls (see Figure 6.2).
We have modified sHype security labels to carry the MLS labels (i.e. a level and a set
of categories). In our current implementation, the MLS security policy is enforced inside
TrustGraph. However, it is also possible for the graphics subsystem to ask the hypervisor’s
ACM for the access decisions. Note that we do not know whether Xen provides strong
isolation and non-interference between the virtual machines or not, and these properties are
yet to be proven. It is used in our implementation just as a proof of concept.
For the end-to-end implementation, we have used Xen 3.3.1 with XSM and ACM (sHype)
features turned on. Fedora 10 is used in dom0 and the virtual machines (dom1) run Fedora
8.
6.6 Evaluation and Formal Methods
To evaluate the implementation of TrustGraph, we have performed different levels of testing.
First, we have tested the functionality of TrustGraph through a number of applications.
Then we have implemented a number of successful attacks on vanilla DirectFB based on
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the threat model. We show that these or similar attacks are prevented in TrustGraph.
For the most critical parts of the implementation, i.e. label flow logic and the window
manager ordering logic, we have used formal methods to check the implementation. Finally,
an analysis of the possible covert channels on top of TrustGraph is presented and their
capacities are estimated and then reduced using the concept of fuzzy time.
6.6.1 Functionality Testing
Testing the functionality of TrustGraph is done by developing a number of native applica-
tions. These applications test different modules and functionalities of TrustGraph.
Three applications have been developed to test windowing, input handling, and im-
age/video loading. The windowed application checks the window manager, correct window
ordering, and window insertion and re-stacking. The input handling application tests the
input grabbing methods and input redirection. Finally, the last application tests the data
buffer and the successful loading of image and video modules. The functionality tests have
been performed on a Fedora 10 workstation (kernel version 2.6.27.9) with an Nvidia Quadro
FX 570M video card. X has been disabled for all the tests.
6.6.2 Attack Evaluation
To show the types of attacks possible under a graphics subsystem which are blocked by
TrustGraph, we have implemented three sample attacks. Note that these are not ad-hoc
attacks; they are designed in a bottom-up approach based on the threat model discussed
in Section 6.3. In fact, the reader can easily design and implement similar attacks under
DirectFB or X. The attacks are not indicative of implementation problems of any graphics
subsystem. These graphics subsystems, in their vanilla form, were not designed, nor should
they be used, for trusted systems. On the other hand, the attacks show the necessity of a
secure graphics subsystem and how it can block the security policy violations.
Three attacks have been implemented to test TrustGraph. In the first attack, two ap-
plications conspire to communicate in the violation of the security policy. One application
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acquires an interface to the window of another application by enumerating all the windows
on the display and retrieving an interface to its layer. It then dumps the surface regularly
for the new messages and writes its messages back on the surface. The other application can
communicate with the first one by simply reading and writing to its surface. The system
has no control over this channel and the two applications can easily communicate.
In the second attack, a window attaches to the event buffer of another window, reads
and removes some of the events, and puts a number of false events back to the event buffer.
This violates both the confidentiality and the integrity of the other window.
In the third attack, the attacker grabs the specific key events (e.g. the function keys
F1-F12 or the escape key) regardless of the focus. Whenever these keys are pressed on the
victim window, they are redirected to the attacker. Since the specific operations of the
victim application are bound to these key presses, the attacker can infer those operations
whenever it receives the key press events.
The attacks are successful under vanilla DirectFB. Similar attacks can be designed and
implemented under X. TrustGraph, however, stops these attacks. The first and second
attacks are stopped when the first application gets the interface, while the third attack is
blocked when the attacker grabs the keys.
In fact, while implementing the functionality testing programs, an accidental bug was
introduced to the windowed application where a window was trying to get a higher level
surface. We observed an abnormal behavior when one of the windows failed to start. Finally,
by inspecting the log, we realized that TrustGraph successfully detected and prevented the
buggy assignment.
6.6.3 Formal Verification
Formal method techniques are used to verify some of the more critical parts of the Trust-
Graph implementation such as the label flow logic and the window manager ordering logic.
We have used ACL2 to describe and check the correctness of those parts.
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ACL2
ACL2 (A Computational Logic for Applicative Common Lisp) [86] is an automated reasoning
system consisting of a language and a mechanical theorem prover. It is the “industrial
strength” successor to the Boyer-Moore theorem prover [87].
Both the ACL2 language and its implementation are built on the side-effect free version
of Common Lisp [88].
In common Lisp everything including the code and the data is a list. Lists hold data
such as integers, lists, fractions, or characters as a list. For instance, (120) is an integer, (1
2 3 6) is a list of integers, (a) is a character, and (1/6) is a fraction—all represented as lists.
The code is also written using lists, usually with the first element representing the opera-
tor or function name and the rest of the elements representing the arguments. For instance,
Table 6.2 shows some ACL2 scripts with their equivalent pseudo code meaning.
Table 6.2: ACL2 scripts and their pseudo code meanings
ACL2 Scripts Psedo Code
(* 3 4) 3 * 4
(* (+ n 1) n) n*(n+1)
(if x y z) if x then y else z
(>= 5 6) 5 >= 6 ?
(cons x y) (x y)
(car (x y z)) first element of (x y z) = x
(cdr (x y z)) the rest of (x y z) = (y z)
(defun minus_one (n) (- n 1)) function minus_one (n) {return n-1}
When using ACL2, first the operation or the model is described using this syntax and a
number of function definitions (defun). Then, we describe a number of theorems (defthm)
that the ACL2 tool tries to prove about that operation or model. To clarify the point,
consider the following example from the ACL2 book [86]. Assume that we want to prove
that the length of the concatenation of two lists is equal to the sum of their lengths. First,
we define the concatenation function. The function is defined recursively.
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(defun my-app (x y)
(if (atom x)
y
(cons (car x) (my-app (cdr x) y))))
Then we express the desired theorem in ACL2 syntax:
(defthm my-app-length
(equal (len (my-app x y))
(+ (len x) (len y))))
The ACL2 theorem prover tries to prove this theorem about the concatenation operation.
It uses some basic axioms that it has in its libraries and proves the theorem by breaking it
into some smaller theorems (subgoals). Upon successful proof of the theorem, ACL2 outputs
the list of rules and axioms it used to prove that theorem. The ACL2 theorem prover is
sound, but incomplete. As a result, if it proves a theorem, the theorem is always true, but
if it fails to prove it, the theorem might be true or false.
As another example, the following theorem shows that the summation of integers from
1 to n equals n*(n+1)/2:
(defun sum(n)
(if (zp n)
0
(+ n sum(-n 1)) ))
(defthm algebra1
(implies (natp n)
(equal (sum n)
(* n (+ n 1) 1/2) )))
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ACL2 has been used for a variety of theorem-proving and model-checking problems from
the correctness of the write-invalidate cache system to the Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm.
For a list of problems solved using ACL2, refer to its official web site [89].
Detailed description of how ACL2 works or how to prove theorems or check models with
ACL2 is beyond the scope of this report. The reader may refer to the ACL2 book [86] for
more information.
Formal Verification of TrustGraph
To check the correctness of the logic implemented in the TrustGraph window manager and
the label flows, we have performed formal verification on them using ACL2. Note that
verifying the entire implementation of a graphics subsystem is very difficult if not impossible
due to its large size. Hence, we chose to check the most critical components of TrustGraph
upon which the entire security is dependent.
First, we verify the label flow logic. Four main methods are modeled: acquiring window,
surface, event buffer, and setting window level. Table 6.3 shows the ACL2 scripts for these
four methods. Each method behaves as described in Table 6.1. If the acquirer has a declas-
sification label that dominates the resource’s permanent label, it is allowed to acquire the
resource. When acquired, both labels of the acquirer are propagated to the resource.
To prove the correctness of label flow, we define four ACL2 theorems as shown in Table
6.4. The first theorem ensures that no application can acquire a window if it does not have a
dominating label. The second theorem proves a similar property for windows and surfaces.
The third theorem ensures that no window can attach to a higher security event buffer.
Finally, the fourth theorem considers the combined effect; i.e., an application cannot access
a higher security event buffer through another window interface. We also model and prove
the correctness of the logic of window ordering in the window manager. Table 6.5 shows the
scripts that model window insertion, order checking, and the theorem to prove that inserting
windows preserves the correct ordering. Similar scripts are used for restacking windows.
Using the model, ACL2 messages, and proof sub goals, we were actually able to find a
number of flaws in the initial implementation of TrustGraph. First, a security tag can never
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Table 6.3: TrustGraph label flow scripts
(defun get_win (win int_PL)
(if (dom int_PL (car win))
(list int_PL int_PL)
nil))
(defun get_surface (surface win)
(if (dom (car (cdr win)) (car surface))
(cons (car win) (cdr win))
nil))
(defun attach_event_buffer (event_buffer win)
(if (dom (car (cdr win)) (car event_buffer))
(cons (car win) (cdr win))
nil))
(defun set_win_label (win int_PL label)
(if (dom int_PL label)
(list (car win) label)
win))
(defun dom (resa resb)
(if (AND (>= (car resa) (car resb))
(subset (cdr resb) (cdr resa)) )
T
nil))
(defun subset (lista listb)
(if (consp lista)
(AND (member (car lista) listb)
(subset (cdr lista) listb))
T))
be NULL. This bug was found when ACL2 failed to prove the label propagation theorems
and the output showed that no assumption can be made about “(CONSP label).” In the
ACL2 context, the “CONSP” predicate means that both elements of a label (the permanent
and declassification labels) always exist and are not NULL. To fix this bug, the NULL
condition is checked after any creation or acquisition just in case a component fails to set a
label as a result of an unpredictable condition.
Also, the initial condition of the window manager was not secure. ACL2 messages showed
that although adding and restacking functions preserve the correct ordering, there is no
guarantee that if we start with a window stack, the ordering is correct initially. Additional
checks were put in place to guarantee that when the graphics subsystem starts, the windows
are in the correct order.
Finally, another flaw was that there was a type mismatch for some of the security labels.
This bug was found when ACL2 failed to prove the label propagation theorems because
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Table 6.4: Label flow security theorems
(defthm no_leak
(implies
(AND
(consp win)
(NOT (dom int_PL (car win))))
(= (get_win (set_win_label win int_PL labell) int_PL)
nil)))
(defthm no_leak2
(implies
(AND
(consp win)
(consp surface)
(NOT (dom (car (cdr (set_win_label win int_PL label))) (car surface))))
(= (get_surface surface (set_win_label win int_PL label))
nil)))
(defthm no_leak3
(implies
(AND
(consp win)
(consp event_buffer)
(NOT (dom (car (cdr (set_win_label win int_PL label))) (car event_buffer))))
(= (attach_event_buffer event_buffer (set_win_label win int_PL label))
nil)))
(defthm no_leak4
(implies
(AND
(consp win)
(consp surface)
(NOT (dom (car (cdr (set_win_label win int_PL label))) (car surface))))
(= (get_surface surface (set_win_label (get_win win int_PL) int_PL label))
nil)))
no assumption could be made about the type of each label (e.g. INTEGERP or CHAR-P
predicates of ACL2 corresponding to labels being integer or characters). This is because
if the labels have mismatching types, the comparison cannot be made. For the system to
operate correctly, all labels must be type consistent. For example, if a byte representing the
MLS level is unsigned in some portions of the code and signed in other places, it can result
in a security breach. A main interface with a signed char level of 120 actually gets access to
a resource with an unsigned char level of 251 because when the comparison operator is used,
the resource level is interpreted as -5. All security levels in TrustGraph are implemented as
unsigned chars. Each security compartment is also an unsigned char and each resource can
have a set of up to five different categories.
After correcting the flaws, ACL2 was able to prove the label flow theorems using 29
109
Table 6.5: Window ordering model
(defun insert_win (x y)
(if (or (endp y)
(<= x (car y)))
(cons x y)
(cons (car y) (insert_win x (cdr y)))))
(defun my_inorder (y)
(if (AND (consp y)
(not (equal (cadr y) nil)))
(AND (<= (car y) (cadr y))
(my_inorder (cdr y)) )
t))
(defthm my_thrm
(implies
(my_inorder y)
(my_inorder (insert_win x y)) ))
axioms and rules and by breaking them into 15 sub-goals. The window ordering theorem
was also proved by ACL2 using 17 rules and 30 sub-goals. Note that the scripts in Tables
6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 are the corrected versions.
6.6.4 Covert Channel Analysis
Covert channel attacks [90] can pose a threat to the security of high-assurance systems by
using the shared resources in a way not intended in their design, in order to leak information
and violate the security policy. It is often very difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate or
even enumerate all possible covert channels in a system. The best current recommendations
for dealing with covert channels are specified by the TCSEC [91] and its successor the
Common Criteria [92] evaluation schemes. In these schemes it is recommended that first
the channel capacities of the possible covert channels are estimated. Then, using some
mitigation techniques, the channel capacity must be reduced to an acceptable level (usually
100 bits/sec is considered acceptable).
We are interested in the covert channel attacks that use the dynamics of the graphics
subsystem to communicate information. Such channels use the graphics methods to transfer
sensitive data one bit (or a few bits) at a time. To estimate the capacity of a graphics
covert channel, we have implemented a prototype covert channel on top of TrustGraph.
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As mentioned before, the applications can enumerate all the windows on the display. Our
covert channel uses this fact to transfer data. At each time slot, if the number of windows
on the display is even, it conveys a “0” and if it is odd it conveys a “1.” At each time
slot, if the sender wants to send a “1” and the number of windows is even, it opens a small
dummy window and does not do so otherwise. The dual procedure is done for transferring
a “0.” We have measured the capacity of our channel by transferring a 10 MB file over
the channel. The total transfer time was about 10 min and 30 sec, which means that the
channel capacity is around 127,000 bits/sec. Given that the window opening and closing
activity of the system is reasonable (not more that one window per second), the noise level
on such a channel is negligible; hence, the channel capacity is equal to the bandwidth. The
capacity measured here is well beyond the acceptable rate. Similar channels can be designed
using the other resource creation/acquisition methods. As another example, the sender can
acquire the window of the receiver at each time slot, releasing its access to the window, thus
sending one bit at a time.
To reduce the capacity of such covert channels, we use the idea of fuzzy time [93]. A
random delay of maximum 100 ms is imposed on all of the resource creation and acquisition
methods in TrustGraph. The amount of delay is selected using the Merssene-Twister random
number generator [94]. After introducing this delay, we measured the new capacity to be
strictly less than 20 bits/sec. Note that the average delay for each method is about 50 ms.
The elegance of this approach is that it does not introduce any delay to the drawing op-
erations. These operations are performed by the application on an already acquired surface,
so they cannot leak information across different applications. Hence, the random delay does
not slow down the visual effects or the graphics acceleration. For benign applications, it just
slows down the window opening by an average of a few tens of milliseconds (depending on
how many resources are created) which is masked by the application starting delay and is
not even noticeable by the user.
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6.6.5 Compiler-Based Verification
The model verified using the formal method techniques is different from the actual imple-
mentation of TrustGraph. The model represents the high level workings of TrustGraph
using ACL2 while the actual implementation is much more detailed and is done in C. There
have been some attempts [86] to directly compile a formal model described in ACL2 to a C
implementation for small modules. However, for an implementation as complex as that of
TrustGraph, soon the system becomes too complex and large to directly build by compiling
the model.
In order to narrow down the gap between the formal model and the actual implementa-
tion, we use a more feasible option than direct compilation. We check the C implementation
by performing compiler-based static analysis on the code. If the code passes the checks or
the security violations are corrected, the code can become much closer to achieve control
flow integrity (CFI). Having control flow integrity means that the formal model correctly
represents the system (at least for the abstractions captured by the model) and one cannot
change the behavior of the code by exploiting vulnerabilities.
ROSE Compiler Infrastructure
To perform compiler-based verification we use the ROSE compiler infrastructure [95]. ROSE
is a tool for performing source-to-source translation. ROSE can be used to build tools for
analyzing source codes from large scale applications (millions of lines). Such tools can be
useful for many purposes:
• automated analysis and/or modification of source code
• instrumentation
• data extraction
• building domain-specific tools
The intermediate representation (IR) used by ROSE is called SAGE III which is detailed
enough to build an abstract syntax tree (AST) that is well suited to source-to-source trans-
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lation; i.e., ROSE does not lose any information about the structure of the original source
code. The mid-end contains an evolving set of analyses and optimizations. The Edison De-
sign Group (EDG) front-end is used to parse C and C++ applications. ROSE converts the
intermediate representations (IRs) produced by the front-ends into abstract syntax trees.
Compass Tool
To check for security or coding violations, we use a tool named Compass [96]. It is currently
distributed as part of ROSE, and represents one of many tools that can be built using the
ROSE open compiler infrastructure. Compass runs on top of ROSE and it uses ROSE to
convert a source code to an IR. It then analyzes the code for various security or coding
violations using the features provided by ROSE which include Abstract Syntax Tree (AST),
control flow graph, system dependence graph, call graph, class hierarchy graph, etc.
Each security or coding violation is formulated as a checker in Compass. Users can select
the checkers to run on a piece of code or they can define their own checkers.
Compass checks for more than 100 different violation types which include the following
major categories:
• Input Validation: forbidden functions, const string, buffer overflow, etc.
• Memory Bugs: double free, no free, NULL dereference, delete, etc.
• Complexity Violations: deep nesting, computations, cyclomatic complexity (CC), etc.
• Race Conditions: same handler for many signals, etc.
The complete list of Compass checkers is given in Appendix A. Some of the violations
can directly result in vulnerability of the code (e.g. memory bugs or input validation) while
others are violations of coding best practices and may or may not result in a vulnerability
(e.g. too much complexity).
After checking TrustGraph, Compass found a long list of violations in its code. Table
6.6 lists three samples of the violations. The first line shows a bitwise operation without
an explicit bit mask. This can result in signed/unsigned confusion or overflow of the value,
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which may result in control flow violation. The second example shows the use of ternary
operator (condition ? expression : expression). The ternary operator is not appropriate for
high-integrity C programming [97]. The reason is that if the expression involves an object,
the ternary operator behaves differently than an explicit test. Finally, the third example
illustrates a piece of memory that is allocated but is not “freed” in this scope.
The complete list of code violations found in TrustGraph can be found in Appendix B. By
correcting all these violations, the gap between the low level implementation of TrustGraph
and its formal model narrows substantially.
Table 6.6: Sample violations in TrustGraph code found using static analysis
Source Violating Code
palette.c:172.47-
61
palette->entries[i].r = lookup3to8[ (i & 0xE0) >> 5 ];
wm.c:901.45-80 return wm local->funcs->RestackWindow(
window, wm local->data, window->window_data, relative,
relative ? relative->window_data : NULL, relation );
core.c:828.6-49 CoreCleanup *
dfb core cleanup add( CoreDFB *core, CoreCleanupFunc func, void *data, bool emergency)
{
CoreCleanup *cleanup;
cleanup = D_CALLOC( 1, sizeof(CoreCleanup) );
6.7 Related Work
There have been a number of efforts in the literature for building trusted MILS and MLS
systems using virtualization. IBM’s PR/SM [98] and VMM-based security kernel for VAX
architecture [99] represent two of the earlier attempts.
NSA’s NetTop [100] and MILS [101] and IBM’s sHype [85] are three of the more recent
VMM-based high assurance systems. Karger [102] studies the requirements of the MLS
systems and discusses their implications for the design of VMMs. Terra [103] and Secvisor
[104] also build trusted systems through virtualization. Using the fact that VMMs reside in
a lower layer than the guest operating system, they provide code attestation and isolation for
the virtual machines. Walker et al. [105] use formal techniques to verify the Linux security
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kernel.
Karger and Safford [3] describe the I/O virtualization complexities and study the per-
formance and security tradeoffs of different I/O models. AMD [106] and Intel [107] support
the Input Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) approach for assigning I/O devices
to virtual machines. However, this approach is not suitable for a graphics system which is
inherently shared between the virtual machines.
Woodward [108] describes the requirements for a trusted graphics system for Compart-
mented Mode Workstation (CMW), one of the early attempts to build a high assurance MLS
system. Epstein and Picciotto [109] study the security problems of X.
There have been different efforts to build trusted X. Epstein [110, 111, 112] and Wood-
ward [108] describe different trusted X implementations. Picciotto [113] presents two ap-
proaches for implementing trusted cut and paste operation in X. Another work by Picciotto
and Epstein [114] surveys the architectures and security policies implemented by the trusted
X implementations. Finally, the work by Feske and Helmuth [115] is another recent effort
at building secure GUI.
A recent attempt for building trusted graphics is done by adding security hooks to X
(known as X Access Control Extension or XACE) and extending a two-level trust hierarchy
to it [116]. However, simply dividing clients into “trusted” and “untrusted” is too coarse-
grained. A more flexible policy model is implemented by extending the SE-Linux policy
[117] to X using XACE hooks [118]. Nevertheless, this implementation only mediates known
channels under X and does not provide any type of assurance [6]. Considering the large size
of X and the obsolete features in its code, it is difficult to provide assurance for SE-Linux-
enabled X. Moreover, none of the existing trusted graphics subsystems provide capacity
reduction for the graphics API covert channels. Finally, Paget [119] describes how design
flaws in the Win32 API can be exploited to escalate privilege.
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7 Simplified Graphics Subsystem
7.1 Introduction
This chapter describes a simplified design of a graphics subsystem. We simplify a graphics
subsystem by keeping only the necessary functionalities and eliminating all the unnecessary
complexities. The simplified design allows us to perform a more complete verification of
the system which can potentially lead to fewer vulnerabilities. In fact, the simplified design
enables us to build a complete formal model of the system and verify it using formal methods.
7.1.1 Contributions
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We precisely describe and design a simplified graphics subsystem.
• An analysis is performed on the necessary functionalities in the core of the simplified
design and the features that can be eliminated. A solution is proposed to support the
eliminated functionalities.
• The implementations of the graphical resources are presented.
• The simplified graphics subsystem is then formally modeled and a number of security
properties are proved about the system. We present the steps involved in formal
modeling of the system and theorem development. The steps described can be used to
model similar systems at the abstraction level presented.
The related works for the simplified graphics subsystem are the same as those presented
for TrustGraph (Section 6.7.) To avoid repetition, we do not present them in this chapter.
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7.2 Graphics Resources, Methods, and Operations
The simplified design has four main graphics resources. They have the same definitions as
in TrustGraph, but for the sake of completeness we review their functionalities here.
Window: A window (W ) is the visual area that displays the graphical information of an
application. A window is always assigned a surface.
Surface: A surface (S ) is a pixel buffer that holds the pixel data for a window. The drawing
functions of a graphics subsystem operate directly on a surface in order to draw an
object.
Event Buffer: An event buffer (EB) holds all of the input events for a window (e.g.
keystrokes or mouse events).
Data Buffer: A data buffer (DB) holds non-vector graphical data (images or videos) to be
displayed in a window.
All windows, surfaces, event buffers, and data buffers are referred to as the graphical
resources (R). As in TrustGraph, each of the graphical resources is tagged with two security
labels. A label is a standard MLS label with a sensitivity level and a set of categories. Each
graphical resource has a permanent label and a declassification label. All of the interactions
between an application and the graphics subsystem are done through the main interface (I ).
The main interface automatically gets the same security label as the application through the
VMM. Moreover, the main interface only has a permanent label.
Graphical resources are created or dynamically acquired using the graphical methods
(M ). A graphical method can be viewed as a function either from the main interface to the
graphical resources (M : I → R) or from the graphical resources to the graphical resources
(M : R → R). In general, the graphical methods are M : {R, I} → R. A complete list
of graphical methods in the simplified graphic subsystem and their respective functions is
given in Table 7.1.
An important part of a graphics subsystem is the drawing (blitting) functions (D). These
functions are used by an application to draw on an already acquired (or created) surface.
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Table 7.1: Simplified graphical methods
Create Window f : I → W
Get Window f : I → W
Create Surface f : W → S
Get Surface f : W → S
Create Event Buffer f : W → EB
Attach Event Buffer f : W → EB
Create Data Buffer f : W → DB
Get Data Buffer f : W → DB
Aside from the capacity of the memory, the drawing functions are among the main differences
of a high-end and a low-end video card. A high-end video card supports sophisticated
drawing functions in the hardware (e.g. 3D shapes and shading) while with a low-end video
card only simple drawing functions (e.g. lines or triangles) are handled in the hardware and
more sophisticated functions must be emulated in software.
There are two major types of drawing: geometric (vector) and image/video. Geometric
drawing is done by modifying the pixel values of a surface using an algorithm to add an
object (e.g. line, circle, rectangle, etc.) to the window. It is a function that maps a surface
to another surface D : S → S (with different pixel values). Image/video drawing is done
by loading a data buffer to a surface D : DB → S. Hence, drawing functions are mappings
from surfaces or data buffers to surfaces D : {S,DB} → S.
A graphics subsystem also includes a set of global operations (OP) that work with a
set of resources. The most common operations include taking screenshots (usually from
many windows), copy-pasting (between two windows), and drag-and-dropping (between two
windows). The simplified graphics subsystem supports copy-pasting and screenshots. They
are secured as described in Section 6.4.4 for TrustGraph.
The relationships among graphical resources, drawing functions, graphical methods, and
graphical operations are illustrated in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: A simplified graphics subsystem
7.3 Necessities
When designing a simplified graphics subsystem, we have to include only the necessary func-
tionalities to keep the design as simple and small as possible. Hence, we should understand
the necessities of the features implemented, especially those that have strong security impli-
cations. Drawing functions manipulate already acquired surfaces, so they are restricted to
the security compartment of their applications. Here we study the other graphics features
that work across different security compartments.
7.3.1 Dynamic Graphical Methods
The dynamic graphical methods in a graphics subsystem have strong security implications.
For instance, if an application cannot dynamically acquire the surface of another application
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(using the GetSurface method), there would be no need to label the surfaces and check the
security policy on each surface method. The same is true of windows, event buffers, and
data buffers. Thus, it is important to justify the necessity of dynamic graphical methods.
There are two main reasons to have dynamic methods in a graphics subsystem:
1. Applications often create windows on the fly. When a browser opens a new pop-up or
when an application opens a new dialog, new windows have to be created dynamically.
Removing dynamic methods makes the graphics subsystem unusable.
2. Image/video manipulation programs use dynamic methods to work with graphical
data. For example, when an effect is added to an image/video or when parts of one
image are added to another image, the program dynamically acquires the surface of a
window. Removing dynamic methods breaks these programs.
7.3.2 Enumerating Windows
The graphics subsystems allow applications to enumerate the windows on the display. This
is the reason that an application can acquire the resources created by another application.
Being able to enumerate windows is necessary for three main reasons.
1. Task managers use windows enumeration to find out what windows are open on the
display.
2. Facilities such as “Alt-Tab” (also called Task Switcher or Flip) sometimes use windows
enumeration to switch between different windows.
3. Some crash-recovery applications use windows enumeration to find the windows asso-
ciated with non-responsive applications.
Disabling windows enumeration breaks the above mentioned applications.
7.3.3 Graphical Operations
The main reason to have graphical operations in a system is ease of use. Copy-paste,
drag-and-drop, and screenshots add flexibility to a graphics subsystem if done securely.
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Since securing the graphical operations is relatively straightforward, as described in the
previous chapter, we keep them in the simplified design to preserve the system’s usability
and flexibility.
7.4 Eliminated Features and Compatibility
Some of the features that exist in TrustGraph and DirectFB have been eliminated in the
simplified graphics subsystem to keep the system as simple as possible. We first provide the
complete list of features eliminated from TrustGraph and then explain how the functionalities
that they provide can be supported.
7.4.1 Eliminated Features
The first feature eliminated from the simplified design is the font interface. This interface
allows an application to define a custom font face and size, and write text directly to a
surface. The interface defines a number of functions to manipulate a font, set or retrieve a
string of text, and define the encoding of the text. The interface gets these settings from
the application, determines the appropriate pixel data (for the specific text and font), and
puts the pixel data on a surface.
The second feature eliminated is the palette interface. Under TrustGraph, the palette
interface allows an application to define many custom colors at a time and retrieve them using
an index. This feature facilitates drawing functions, especially if the application contains a
large number of them. Note that without a palette, an application can still define a single
color (by RGB values) as used by the drawing functions.
Finally, the last feature removed from TrustGraph is the image/video provider interface.
The interface allows an application to load/access different image or video formats into a
data buffer. Removing this feature essentially means that all image and video codecs can
also be removed for the simplified design.
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7.4.2 Compatibility
In order to preserve the functionalities that the eliminated features provide, they must be
pushed into a library on top of the simplified graphics subsystem. The library performs
the rendering required for supporting fonts, palette, and different image/video formats and
loading the pixel values directly into the surface of the application. Note that since the
surface is already acquired by the application, the library cannot violate the security policy
of the graphics subsystem. Also, pushing these functionalities to an additional library further
simplifies the core of the graphics subsystem, which facilitates formal evaluation of the
system.
Furthermore, applications often use additional libraries (e.g. GDK or GTK+) to work
with widgets. The widget libraries provide the functionalities of the eliminated features
(fonts, palettes, and image/video providers). To support X applications on top of Trust-
Graph, we use the XDrirectFB library. This library also supports the eliminated features.
7.5 Implementation
We describe the implementation of the main graphical entities in this section. The imple-
mentation is done in C and it directly corresponds to the formal model developed in the
next section.
7.5.1 Window
A window has five major components: surface, bound, alpha, permanent label, and declas-
sification label. The “surface” is a pointer to the surface holding the pixel values of the
window. The “bound” identifies the position and size of the window. A window in gen-
eral can have any shape (e.g. a polygon). In the simplified graphics subsystem, a window
can only be rectangular. The third property, alpha, specifies the transparency value of the
window. Finally, the fourth and fifth properties specify the permanent and declassification
labels of a window. Table 7.2 illustrates the implementation of a window.
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Table 7.2: Implementation of a window
struct Window {
WindowID id;
Surface *surface;
Rectangle bound;
int alpha;
MLSLabel permanent;
MLSLabel declassification;
};
7.5.2 Surface
A surface has four major components: pixel buffer, configuration, permanent label, and
declassification label. The “pixel buffer” is a pointer to a two-dimensional array holding the
pixel values. The “configuration” holds the size of the surface and the pixel format used
(the number of bits and YUV versus RGB representations). The security labels are similar
to those defined for a window. Table 7.3 illustrates the implementation of a surface. The
drawing functions directly modify the pixel buffer of a surface to draw shapes.
Table 7.3: Implementation of a surface
struct Surface {
SurfaceID id;
PixelBuffer *buffer;
SurfaceConfig config;
MLSLabel permanent;
MLSLabel declassification;
};
7.5.3 Event Buffer and Data Buffer
A event buffer has three major components: event list, permanent label, and declassification
label. The event list is a pointer to a linked list containing the input events. A data buffer
has four major components: buffer, length, permanent label, and declassification label. The
buffer holds the image/video data loaded into the data buffer. The length specifies the size of
the buffer. The security labels are similar to those defined for a window. Table 7.4 illustrates
the implementation of a data buffer and an event buffer.
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Table 7.4: Implementation of a data buffer and an event buffer
struct EventBuffer {
EventBufferID id;
EventList *events;
MLSLabel permanent;
MLSLabel declassification;
};
struct DataBuffer {
DataBufferID id;
const void *buffer;
unsigned int length;
MLSLabel permanent;
MLSLabel declassification;
};
We have implemented the main features of the simplified graphics subsystem includ-
ing the resources and the graphical methods. Additional features such as complex drawing
functions and global operations can be implemented by reusing and simplifying the imple-
mentation of similar features in DirectFB. Also, DirectFB includes a small default window
manager that can be reused in the simplified system.
7.6 Formal Modeling Steps
Having a simplified design allows us to formally verify the entire “model” of the graphics
system. We now describe how the simplified graphics system is formally modeled and verified
step by step. The process is described in three main steps: modeling the resources (the
entities), modeling the methods (the functions on the resources), and writing the theorems
(the desired properties to be proved about the system). Using these steps, one can model
not only a graphics subsystem, but also similar systems at the given abstraction level.
7.6.1 Modeling Resources
Each resource in the simplified graphics subsystem (e.g. window, surface, etc.) has a number
of properties. These properties are described in the data structure of the entity as different
variables. For example, a window has an ID, a pointer to its surface, a rectangular boundary,
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an alpha value, and two security labels. The window properties are described as variables in
a C structure that describes a window. In order to formally model a window, all properties
of a window must be described in the formal language. Here, the formal model is developed
using ACL2. In ACL2, all codes and data are expressed using lists (a.k.a. cons). Hence,
our models are also described in lists. Each resource is modeled as a list with the properties
of that resource constituting the elements of the list. For instance, a window is a list with
the following elements: ID, surface, boundary, etc. Since ACL2 does not restrict the type
of the elements, they can have appropriate types as required by the model. In our window
example, the ID element of the window is an integer, the surface is a list describing the
surface, the boundary is a list of four coordinates, etc. The window implementation and
model are illustrated side-by-side in Table 7.5. The model states that the first element of a
window list is its ID, the second element is its surface and so on.
Table 7.5: Modeling a window
Implementation ACL2 Model
struct Window {
WindowID id;
Surface *surface;
Rectangle bound;
int alpha;
MLSLabel permanent;
MLSLabel declassification;
};
(
id
surface
bound
alpha
permanent_label
declassification_label
)
A similar process is repeated to model a surface in Table 7.6. The complete model of the
graphical resources is described in the next section.
Table 7.6: Modeling a surface
Implementation ACL2 Model
struct Surface {
SurfaceID id;
PixelBuffer *buffer;
SurfaceConfig config;
MLSLabel permanent;
MLSLabel declassification;
};
(
id
buffer
config
permanent_label
declassification_label
)
The security labels of the graphical resources are implemented as C structures too. Each
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label consists of an MLS level and a set of, at maximum, five categories. A security label
is again modeled as a list with the first element being the level and the next five elements
being the categories (Table 7.7). Note that each security label in the formal model of the
resources (Tables 7.5 and 7.6) is in fact a list as illustrated in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7: Modeling a security label
Implementation ACL2 Model
struct MLSLabel {
unsigned char level;
unsigned char cat1;
unsigned char cat2;
unsigned char cat3;
unsigned char cat4;
unsigned char cat5;
};
(
level
cat1
cat2
cat3
cat4
cat5
)
7.6.2 Modeling Methods
The next step is to model the graphical resources that operate on the resources. In each
case we model the logic of the method using the formal syntax. The methods that create a
resource initialize that resource’s data structure. Some properties of a resource are initialized
to a default value (e.g. alpha value of a window or pixel data of a surface). These properties
are later modified by other graphical methods. The security labels of the resource, however,
must be set to those of the source. For example, Table 7.8 illustrates the model of the “Cre-
ateSurface” method. It returns a surface list with the first element (pixel data) initialized to
zero, the second and third elements (permanent label and declassification label) initialized to
those of the creator window. Note that “win return pl” and “win return dl” are just helper
functions used to return the fourth and fifth elements of a window respectively.
Table 7.8: Modeling CreateSurface
(defun create_surface (win)
(list 0 (win_return_pl win) (win_return_dl win)))
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A resource acquisition method is more involved. It first checks whether the acquirer’s
declassification label dominates the permanent label of the resource being accessed. If so,
the access is granted; otherwise, it is denied. Table 7.9 shows a resource acquisition method
and its model. The model matches the implementation line by line. If the label domination
property is satisfied, the surface is assigned to the window. In the implementation, this is
done by assigning the surface pointer to the surface element of the window structure. In
the model, the assignment is done by returning the surface. Note that when a surface is
acquired, the pixel data of the surface remain the same, so the model sets the pixel data
(first element) to that of the surface being accessed. Other resource acquisition methods are
modeled similarly.
Table 7.9: Modeling GetSurface
Implementation ACL2 Model
GetSurface (Window *win, Surface **surface){
if(dominate(win->declassification,
(*surface)->permanent)){
win->surface = *surface;
return STATUS_OK;
}
else{
win->surface=NULL;
return STATUS_BAD_ACCESS;
}
}
(defun get_surface (win surface)
(if (dom (win_return_dl win)
(sur_return_pl surface))
(list (sur_return_pixel_data surface)
(win_return_pl win) (win_return_dl win)
)
nil
)
)
The drawing functions of a graphics subsystem modify the pixel data of a surface to draw
objects on a window. The complexities of drawing different geometric objects are irrelevant
to our analysis of a graphics subsystem’s behavior. As a result, a drawing function (draw) is
modeled as a function that simply modifies the pixel data of a surface. Here, the modification
is modeled by incrementing the pixel data element by one (Table 7.10).
7.6.3 Writing Theorems
In order to prove properties about a system, one has to describe the desired behavior in the
form of theorems. We prove a number of security properties about the simplified subsystem
by first writing them in English and then translating them to theorems.
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Table 7.10: Modeling drawing functions
(defun draw (surface)
(if surface
(list (modify_pixels (sur_return_pixel_data surface)) (sur_return_pl surface)
(sur_return_dl surface))
nil))
Each theorem in ACL2 is defined by the defthm construct. A theorem usually consists
of a number of assumptions and a statement to be proved. Hence, one way of describing a
theorem in ACL2 is using the (implies P Q) construct. The first argument of this construct
is a list of assumptions and the second argument is the statement. To clarify how the security
theorems for the simplified graphics system are developed, we describe two in detail. The
complete list of the theorems is presented in the next section.
One desired property is to show that no unauthorized window can access a surface. In
other words, if the declassification label of a window does not dominate the permanent label
of a surface, the GetSurface function must return NULL. To prove this property we have to
assume that the security labels of the window and the surface are not empty. Table 7.11
illustrates the security property and the formal theorem. The property matches the theorem
line by line.
Table 7.11: A security theorem on GetSurface
Desired Property ACL2 Theorem
If
the security labels of window and surface are not NULL and
the declassification label of the window does not dominate
the permanent label of the surface,
then GetSurface is denied.
(defthm no_leak_get_surface
(implies
(AND (consp win) (consp surface)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl win)
(sur_return_pl surface))))
(= (get_surface surface win) nil)))
As another example, consider the desired property which states that two unauthorized
windows cannot communicate using a data buffer as the communication channel. More
precisely, assuming that the security labels are not empty, if the first window’s declassifi-
cation label does not dominate the second window’s permanent label, the first window’s
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GetDataBuffer call on a buffer created by the second window must be denied. This property
and its formal theorem are illustrated in Table 7.12.
Table 7.12: A security theorem on GetDataBuffer
Desired Property ACL2 Theorem
Assuming that the security labels are not empty,
if win1’s declassification label does not dominate
win2’s permanent label,
a GetDataBuffer call by win1 on
a buffer created by win2 is denied.
(defthm no_leak_win_win_data_buffer
(implies
(AND (consp win1) (consp win2)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl win1)
(win_return_pl win2))))
(= (get_data_buffer
(create_data_buffer win2) win1) nil)))
The other desired properties of the simplified graphics subsystem are converted into
formal theorems in a similar way.
7.7 Formal Verification
Table 7.13 illustrates the complete list of graphical resources models.
Table 7.13: Formal model of the graphical resources
Window (surface bound alpha permanent_label declassification_label)
Surface (pixel_data permanent_label declassification_label)
EventBuffer (queue permanent_label declassification_label)
DataBuffer (data permanent_label declassification_label)
Label (level category1 category2 category3 ...)
The formal model also contains a number of helper functions which facilitate accessing
different components of the graphical resources. For example, “win return surface” returns
the surface component of a window, “win return bound” returns the bound of a window,
etc. The helper functions are listed in Table 7.14
We then model the simplified graphics subsystem by formally describing its main features.
Each model represents the behavior and the functionality of a feature. Note that the formal
model is much more comprehensive than the one developed for TrustGraph. Table 7.15 lists
the complete model.
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Table 7.14: Helper functions of the formal model
(defun win_return_surface (win)
(car win))
(defun win_return_bound (win)
(car
(cdr win)))
(defun win_return_alpha (win)
(car
(cdr (cdr win))))
(defun win_return_pl (win)
(car (cdr
(cdr (cdr win)))))
(defun win_return_dl (win)
(car (cdr
(cdr (cdr (cdr win))))))
(defun sur_return_pixel_data (surface)
(car surface))
(defun sur_return_pl (surface)
(car
(cdr surface)))
(defun sur_return_dl (surface)
(car (cdr
(cdr surface))))
(defun buff_return_pl (buff)
(car
(cdr buff)))
(defun buff_return_dl (buff)
(car (cdr
(cdr buff))))
(defun subset (lista listb)
(if (consp lista)
(AND
(member (car lista) listb)
(subset (cdr lista) listb))
T))
(defun dom (resa resb)
(if
(AND
(>= (car resa) (car resb))
(subset (cdr resb) (cdr resa)))
T
nil))
When a resource is created (e.g. create win, create surface, create event buffer, and
create data buffer), its security labels are initialized with those of the creator. When a
resource is acquired (e.g. get win, get surface, attach event buffer, and get data buffer), if
the declassification label of the acquirer “dominates” the permanent label of the resource, it
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Table 7.15: Formal model of the simplified graphics subsystem
(defun create_win (int_PL)
(list 0 1 2 int_PL int_PL))
(defun create_surface (win)
(list 0 (win_return_pl win) (win_return_dl win)))
(defun create_event_buffer (win)
(list 0 (win_return_pl win) (win_return_dl win)))
(defun create_data_buffer (win)
(list 0 (win_return_pl win) (win_return_dl win)))
(defun get_win (win int_PL)
(if (dom int_PL (win_return_pl win))
(list (win_return_surface win) (win_return_bound win) (win_return_alpha win) int_PL int_PL)
nil))
(defun get_surface (surface win)
(if (dom (win_return_dl win) (sur_return_pl surface))
(list (sur_return_pixel_data surface) (win_return_pl win) (win_return_dl win))
nil))
(defun attach_event_buffer (event_buffer win)
(if (dom (win_return_dl win) (buff_return_pl event_buffer))
(list (car event_buffer) (win_return_pl win) (win_return_dl win))
nil))
(defun get_data_buffer (data_buffer win)
(if (dom (win_return_dl win) (buff_return_pl data_buffer))
(list (car data_buffer) (win_return_pl win) (win_return_dl win))
nil))
(defun set_win_label (win int_PL label)
(if (dom int_PL label)
(list (win_return_surface win) (win_return_bound win) (win_return_alpha win)
(win_return_pl win) label)
win))
(defun modify_pixels (pixel_data)
(if pixel_data
(+ pixel_data 1)
nil))
(defun draw (surface)
(if surface
(list (modify_pixels (sur_return_pixel_data surface)) (sur_return_pl surface)
(sur_return_dl surface))
nil))
(defun change_alpha (win)
(if win
(list (win_return_surface win) (win_return_bound win) (+ (win_return_alpha win) 1)
(win_return_pl win) (win_return_dl win))
nil))
is granted access to the resource. Otherwise, the method returns NULL. An application can
declassify a window through its main interface (using set win label) only if the new label is
dominated by the application’s label. “Draw” models any drawing function in the graphics
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subsystem. It simply modifies the pixel values of a surface. Finally, the “change alpha”
function models changing the transparency of a window.
The complete list of theorems about the graphics subsystem is shown in Table 7.16. The
theorems are developed from the desired properties as described in the previous section.
Table 7.16: Security theorems of the simplified graphics subsystem
(defthm no_leak_get_win
(implies
(AND (consp win) (NOT (dom int_PL (win_return_pl win))))
(= (get_win (set_win_label win int_PL label) int_PL) nil)))
(defthm no_leak_get_surface
(implies
(AND (consp win) (consp surface)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl (set_win_label win int_PL label)) (sur_return_pl surface))))
(= (get_surface surface (set_win_label win int_PL label)) nil)))
(defthm no_leak_attach_event_buffer
(implies
(AND (consp win) (consp event_buffer)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl (set_win_label win int_PL label)) (buff_return_pl event_buffer))))
(= (attach_event_buffer event_buffer (set_win_label win int_PL label)) nil)))
(defthm no_leak_get_data_buffer
(implies
(AND (consp win) (consp data_buffer)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl (set_win_label win int_PL label)) (buff_return_pl data_buffer))))
(= (get_data_buffer data_buffer (set_win_label win int_PL label)) nil)))
(defthm no_leak_overall
(implies
(AND (consp win) (consp surface)
(NOT (dom int_PL (sur_return_pl surface))) (dom int_PL (win_return_pl win)))
(= (get_surface surface (get_win win int_PL)) nil)))
(defthm no_leak_win_surface
(implies
(AND (consp (create_win int_PL)) (consp surface)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl (set_win_label (create_win int_PL) int_PL label))
(sur_return_pl surface))))
(= (get_surface (draw surface) (set_win_label (create_win int_PL) int_PL label)) nil)))
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Table 7.16: Security theorems of the simplified graphics subsystem (continued)
(defthm no_leak_win_event_buffer
(implies
(AND (consp (create_win int_PL)) (consp event_buffer)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl (set_win_label (create_win int_PL) int_PL label))
(buff_return_pl event_buffer))))
(= (attach_event_buffer event_buffer (set_win_label (create_win int_PL) int_PL label)) nil)))
(defthm no_leak_win_data_buffer
(implies
(AND (consp (create_win int_PL)) (consp data_buffer)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl (set_win_label (create_win int_PL) int_PL label))
(buff_return_pl data_buffer))))
(= (get_data_buffer data_buffer (set_win_label (create_win int_PL) int_PL label)) nil)))
(defthm no_leak_win_win_surface
(implies
(AND (consp win1) (consp win2)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl win1) (win_return_pl win2))))
(= (get_surface (create_surface win2) win1) nil)))
(defthm no_leak_win_win_event_buffer
(implies
(AND (consp win1) (consp win2)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl win1) (win_return_pl win2))))
(= (attach_event_buffer (create_event_buffer win2) win1) nil)))
(defthm no_leak_win_win_data_buffer
(implies
(AND (consp win1) (consp win2)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl win1) (win_return_pl win2))))
(= (get_data_buffer (create_data_buffer win2) win1) nil)))
(defthm no_leak_int_int_win
(implies
(AND (consp int1) (consp int2) (NOT (dom int1 int2)))
(= (get_win (create_win int2) int1) nil)))
(defthm no_leak_draw
(implies
(AND (consp win) (consp surface)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl (set_win_label win int_PL label)) (sur_return_pl surface))))
(= (get_surface (draw surface) (set_win_label win int_PL label)) nil)))
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Table 7.16: Security theorems of the simplified graphics subsystem (continued)
(defthm no_leak_alpha
(implies
(AND (consp win) (consp surface)
(NOT (dom (win_return_dl win) (sur_return_pl surface))))
(= (get_surface surface (change_alpha win)) nil)))
The first four theorems of Table 7.16 verify that no leakage can happen when a re-
source acquires another resource (e.g. window, surface, event buffer, and data buffer). The
fifth theorem considers the overall effect of all resource acquisition methods. The next
three theorems (no leak win surface, no leak win event buffer, and no leak win data buffer)
verify that an application cannot access a resource through a new window if it normally
does not have access to that resource. The next four theorems (no leak win win surface,
no leak win win event buffer, no leak win win data buffer, no leak int int win) verify that
two resource cannot communicate using another resource as the medium. Finally, the last
two theorems (no leak alpha and no leak draw) prove that drawing and changing the alpha
value do not leak information.
ACL2 was able to prove the theorems using 216 axioms and rules and by breaking them
into 63 sub-goals. Note that the axioms are all internal to ACL2. They are mathematical
properties (e.g. commutativity of integer addition) automatically selected by the ACL2 tool
to prove the theorems. The correctness of the axioms is proven by ACL2 in advance.
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8 Conclusion and Future Work
This work investigated trusted and high assurance systems in detail. First, we studied differ-
ent commercial technologies that can be used to build trusted, MILS, and MLS systems. The
study covers tamper resistant hardware devices, processors, operating systems, network ar-
chitectures, databases, and storage technologies. We then selected a candidate architecture
based on virtualization, trusted boot and execution, and protected I/O. We have imple-
mented the candidate architecture and identified several security gaps in it. The gaps are
the lack of trust in the network, the question of pre-deployment testing for patches/updates
applied in a trusted network, and the lack of trust in the I/O subsystems, especially in
graphics. We have addressed each security gap in a chapter. A trusted network architecture
has been proposed and its security properties and high availability customization are stud-
ied in the context of process control systems. We then focused on the problem of updates
in a trusted network. More specifically, using stochastic and analytical modeling, we have
evaluated the optimal pre-deployment testing period for software patches. Finally, we have
designed, implemented, and evaluated a trusted graphics subsystem to cover the gap of trust
in the I/O systems. The evaluation is done through different levels of verification which in-
clude functionality testing, attack evaluation, formal verification, covert channel analysis,
and compiler-based verification.
Future work can take different directions. For trusted networks, we plan to implement
a prototype TPCN on top of a cyber-security testbed that we have developed [63]. The
testbed is developed to perform assessments and study attack/defense scenarios in a large-
scale power infrastructure. With an implementation of a trusted network on top of the
testbed, one can evaluate the security services against real attack scenarios.
For patch/update management, more detailed models and empirical distributions can
be used to describe the vulnerability discovery process. In addition, a more sophisticated
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model for patch development time can result in error reduction. Empirical data can be used
to express the probability distribution of this delay. Finally, real experiments on testing
patches can result in more accurate models for the number of faults discovered during the
testing period.
Future work can also focus on studying trusted graphics in a service-oriented architecture.
The challenge is to define the trust requirements of an end-to-end service-oriented graphics
system that deals with cross-domain security policies, implement a prototype graphics server,
and develop a methodology for an integrated end-to-end analysis. For an end-to-end analysis
of trust, the intermediate goal is to develop security techniques for graphics in high assurance
MLS systems, in the context of supporting collaboration among applications that operate
under different security policies.
Another direction for future work is to formally verify some of the critical components of
the VMM. Verification of the VMM involves formal proof of the properties such as “memory
non-interference” and “state-less switch.” This along with the TXT trusted boot and pro-
tected I/O mechanisms provides a comprehensive high assurance MLS system. Using the
trustworthy VMM as the platform, a scheme can be developed to establish and verify the
properties of the VMs. Property-based attestation enables the VMM to validate the config-
urations or postures of the VMs similar to the way clients prove their postures in a trusted
network. The challenge here is that the information available at the operating system level
is usually lost at the VMM level because the hypervisor works at a lower abstraction level.
For instance, files, memory regions, and network sessions are viewed as disk blocks, pages,
and packets in the VMM. To recover the lost abstractions at the VMM level, one can use the
idea of virtual machine introspection (VMI). Using property-based attestation, the VMM
can validate the posture of the VMs, provide some level of assurance about those properties
via the TPM chip, and enforce a flexible and dynamic security policy on the interactions of
the VMs.
Finally, we plan to extend the formal verification technique to more general security
policies. Security policy models such as type-enforcement, role-based access control, and
attribute-based access control provide more expressiveness and flexibility. Formal verification
of the security kernel which enforces a more general policy model ensures that even if a
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number of components in the system are breached, the security policy is enforced correctly
and the system as a whole remains secure.
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Appendix A: Compiler-Based Checkers
Table A.1 provides a complete list of Compass checkers used for compiler-based analysis of
TrustGraph.
Table A.1: Complete list of Compass checkers
Allocate And Free Memory In The
Same Module
Allowed Functions Assignment Operator Check Self
Avoid Using The Same Handler For
Multiple Signals
Bin Print Asm Functions Assignment Return Const This
Bin Print Asm Instruction Binary Buffer Overflow Boolean Is Has
Buffer Overflow Functions byte-by-byte comparisons between
structures
Binary Interrupt Analysis
Computational Functions Making string literals const-qualified Char Star For String
Constructor Destructor Calls Virtual
Function
Control Variable Test Against Function Comma Operator
Copy Constructor Const Arg Cpp Calls Setjmp Longjmp Cyclomatic Complexity
Cycle Detection Const Cast Data Member Access
Deep Nesting Default Case Do Not Assign Pointer To Fixed Ad-
dress
Default Constructor Discard Assignment Do Not Call Putenv With Auto Var
Do Not Delete This Do Not Use C-style Casts Empty Instead Of Size
Duffs Device Dynamic Cast Enum Declaration Namespace Class
Scope
Explicit Char Sign Explicit Copy Float For Loop Counter
Explicit Test For Non Boolean Value File Read Only Access Floating Point Exact Comparison
Fopen Format Parameter For Loop Construction Control Stmt Friend Declaration Modifier
For Loop Cpp Index Variable Declara-
tion
Forbidden Functions Function Call Allocates Multiple Re-
sources
Function Definition Prototype Function Documentation Loc Per Function
Induction Variable Update Internal Data Sharing Localized Variables
Lower Range Limit Magic Number Malloc Return Value Used In If Stmt
Name All Parameters New Delete Multiple Public Inheritance
No Asm Stmts Ops No Exceptions No Overload Ampersand
No Exit In Mpi Code No Goto No Rand
No Second Term Side Effects Operands to sizeof should not contain
side effects
No Template Usage
No Vfork Non Associative Relational Operators No Variadic Functions
Non Standard Type Ref Args Non Standard Type Ref Returns Non Virtual Redefinition
Null Dereference Omp Private Lock Nonmember Function Interface Names-
pace
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Table A.1: Complete list of Compass checkers (continued)
Other Argument Place Constant On The Lhs One Line Per Declaration
Pointer Comparison Prefer Algorithms Operator Overloading
Prefer fseek() to rewind() Prefer Setvbuf To Setbuf Protect Virtual Methods
Right Shift Mask Set Pointers To Null Push Back
Single Parameter Constructor Explicit
Modifier
Size Of Pointer Ternary Operator
Use strtol() to convert string token to
an integer
Sub Expression Evaluation Order Time to Direct Manipulation
Unary Minus Uninitialized Definition Upper Range Limit
Void Star Variable Name Equals Database Name
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Appendix B: Code Violations in TrustGraph
Table B.1 lists the security or coding violations in TrustGraph.
Table B.1: The list of security or coding violations in TrustGraph
Source Violation Suggestion
clipboard.c :264.11-40 in function: dfb clipboard get Every malloc must be fol-
lowed by a free
Explicitly free the allocated mem-
ory.
clipboard.c :186.6 Variable shared does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
clipboard.c :189.6 Variable new data does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
clipboard.c :244.6 Variable shared does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
clipboard.c :280.6 Variable shared does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
clipboard.c :264.19-24 This checker checks if the return value of calling malloc is
part of an If-Statement conditional test. call to malloc does
not have a corresponding If-statement conditional in this
block.
Check the NULL condition using If-
statement.
colorhash.c :133.6 Variable shared does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
colorhash.c :171.6 Variable shared does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
colorhash.c :186.6 Variable shared does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
colorhash.c :204.6 Variable shared does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
colorhash.c :234.6 Variable shared does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
colorhash.c :297.11-35 This checker checks that only one variable declaration oc-
curs per line.
Break the variable definition to
multiple lines.
colorhash.c :313.16-
316.16
Place the constant on the left hand side in this comparison! Place the constant on the LHS.
colorhash.c :309.48-69 Finding a RightShift with no Bit Mask Define a bit mask to avoid sign con-
fusion.
core.c :828.6-49 in function: dfb core cleanup add Every malloc must be
followed by a free.
Explicitly free the allocated mem-
ory.
core.c :243.1-244.37 dfb core create This function is too complex CC = 35 > 30 Reduce complexity by breaking the
function into multiple functions.
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Table B.1: The list of security or coding violations in TrustGraph (continued)
Source Violation Suggestion
core.c :983.16-68 Result of assignment should be discarded. Remove the assignment if not
needed.
core.c :1015.16-62 Result of assignment should be discarded. Remove the assignment if not
needed.
core.c :905.1-906.50 matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
core.c :956.1-957.36 matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
core.c :992.1-993.47 matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
core.c :1005.1-1006.30 matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
core.c :436.13-438.66 This checker checks that relational binary operators (==
, ! =, <, >, <=, >=) are not treated as if they were non-
associative.
Make sure LHS and RHS are asso-
ciative.
core.c :277.6 Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
core.c :344.17-38 Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
core.c :437.32-73 Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
core.c :999.41-44 Finding examples of using upper range inclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
core parts.c :53.6 Variable ret does not seem to be used right after its decla-
ration.
Try to move it down in the code.
core parts.c :55.6 Variable ret does not seem to be used right after its decla-
ration.
Try to move it down in the code.
core parts.c :103.6 Variable ret does not seem to be used right after its decla-
ration.
Try to move it down in the code.
core parts.c :104.6 Variable ret does not seem to be used right after its decla-
ration.
Try to move it down in the code.
core parts.c :105.6 Variable ret does not seem to be used right after its decla-
ration.
Try to move it down in the code.
core parts.c :146.6 Variable ret does not seem to be used right after its decla-
ration.
Try to move it down in the code.
core parts.c :180.6 Variable ret does not seem to be used right after its decla-
ration.
Try to move it down in the code.
gfxcard.c :210.11-81 In function: dfb graphics core initialize Every malloc must
be followed by a free.
Explicitly free the allocated mem-
ory.
gfxcard.c :299.11-81 In function: dfb graphics core join Every malloc must be
followed by a free.
Explicitly free the allocated mem-
ory.
gfxcard.c :990.26-
991.36
Scope is nested deeper than allowed. Use helper functions to decrease the
nesting.
gfxcard.c :539.1-540.70 dfb gfxcard state check This function is too complex : CC
= 55 > 30
Reduce complexity by breaking the
function into multiple functions.
gfxcard.c :941.1-942.82 dfb gfxcard fillrectangles This function is too complex : CC
= 56 > 30
Reduce complexity by breaking the
function into multiple functions.
gfxcard.c :729.1-730.72 matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
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Table B.1: The list of security or coding violations in TrustGraph (continued)
Source Violation Suggestion
gfxcard.c :873.1-874.45 matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
gfxcard.c :1085.1-
1089.60
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
gfxcard.c :2100.1-
2101.52
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
gfxcard.c :964.16-20 Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
gfxcard.c :1527.11-13 Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
gfxcard.c :1150.6-28 This checker checks that only one variable declaration oc-
curs per line.
Break the variable definition to
multiple lines.
gfxcard.c :1220.21-36 This checker checks that only one variable declaration oc-
curs per line.
Break the variable definition to
multiple lines.
gfxcard.c :1221.21-36 This checker checks that only one variable declaration oc-
curs per line.
Break the variable definition to
multiple lines.
gfxcard.c :1024.31 Finding a RightShift with no Bit Mask Define a bit mask to avoid sign con-
fusion.
gfxcard.c :1055.31 Finding a RightShift with no Bit Mask Define a bit mask to avoid sign con-
fusion.
gfxcard.c :457.12-
459.49
Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
gfxcard.c :1024.31: Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
gfxcard.c :1515.34-57 Finding examples of using upper range inclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
input.c :1399.1-1400.64 fixup key event This function is too complex : CC = 58 >
30
Reduce complexity by breaking the
function into multiple functions.
input.c :1785.1-1788.49 id to symbol This function is too complex : CC = 55 > 30 Reduce complexity by breaking the
function into multiple functions.
input.c :1161.16 Scope is nested deeper than allowed. Use helper functions to decrease the
nesting.
input.c :448.6-491.6 This checker checks that only loop control expressions ap-
pear in the for loop constructor block
Put other expressions outside the
constructor.
input.c :515.6-519.6 This checker checks that only loop control expressions ap-
pear in the for loop constructor block
Put other expressions outside the
constructor.
input.c :960.1-961.43 matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
input.c :1016.1-1017.36 matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
input.c :1035.1-1036.40 matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
input.c :1625.26-28 Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
input.c :1625.54-56 Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
input.c :449.11 Variable driver does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
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Table B.1: The list of security or coding violations in TrustGraph (continued)
Source Violation Suggestion
input.c :435.6 Variable shared does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
input.c :1311.15-73 This checker checks that relational binary operators (==
, ! =, <, >, <=, >=) are not treated as if they were non-
associative.
Make sure LHS and RHS are asso-
ciative.
input.c :1493.10-57 This checker checks that relational binary operators (==
, ! =, <, >, <=, >=) are not treated as if they were non-
associative.
Make sure LHS and RHS are asso-
ciative.
input.c :448.6 Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
input.c :515.6 Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
input.c :1211.25-57 Finding examples of using upper range inclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
layer context.c :640.26-
641.36
Scope is nested deeper than allowed. Use helper functions to decrease the
nesting.
layer context.c :93.1-
94.66
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
layer context.c :773.1-
776.65
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
layer context.c :568.6: Variable layer does not seem to be used right after its dec-
laration.
Try to move it down in the code.
layer context.c :788.11 Variable layer does not seem to be used right after its dec-
laration.
Try to move it down in the code.
layer context.c :62.1 Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
layer context.c :238.6 Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
layer context.c :434.20-
32
goto found Use loop statements instead.
layer context.c :238.6 Finding any ’and’ or ’or’ with a side effect somewhere on
the right hand side.
The RHS may never be evaluated.
Remove the side effect.
layer context.c :291.6 Finding any ’and’ or ’or’ with a side effect somewhere on
the right hand side.
The RHS may never be evaluated.
Remove the side effect.
layer context.c
:1416.11-27
This checker checks that only one variable declaration oc-
curs per line.
Break the variable definition to
multiple lines.
layer control.c :80.6 Variable shared does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
layer control.c :125.6 Variable shared does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
layer control.c :241.10-
29
Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
layer control.c :329.10-
29
Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
layer control.c :393.26-
36
goto found Use loop statements instead.
layer control.c :404.21-
31
goto found Use loop statements instead.
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Table B.1: The list of security or coding violations in TrustGraph (continued)
Source Violation Suggestion
layer control.c :385.15-
31
Finding examples of using upper range inclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
layer region.c :413.1-
416.58
fb layer region flip update This function is too complex :
CC = 50 > 30
Reduce complexity by breaking the
function into multiple functions.
layer region.c :469.21 Scope is nested deeper than allowed. Use helper functions to decrease the
nesting.
layer region.c :71.1-
72.65
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
layer region.c :418.6 Variable ret does not seem to be used right after its decla-
ration.
Try to move it down in the code.
layer region.c :597.6 Variable ret does not seem to be used right after its decla-
ration.
Try to move it down in the code.
layers.c :428.6-45 in function: dfb layers register Every malloc must be fol-
lowed by a free.
Explicitly free the allocated mem-
ory.
layers.c :184.26 Scope is nested deeper than allowed. Use helper functions to decrease the
nesting.
layers.c :125.11 Variable buf does not seem to be used right after its decla-
ration.
Try to move it down in the code.
layers.c :283.11 Variable shared does not seem to be used right after its
declaration.
Try to move it down in the code.
layers.c :124.16-31 Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
layers.c :176.26-55 Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
layers.c :293.16 Finding any ’and’ or ’or’ with a side effect somewhere on
the right hand side.
The RHS may never be evaluated.
Remove the side effect.
layers.c :421.6-425.6 Place the constant on the left hand side in this comparison! Place the constant on the LHS.
layers.c :545.11-546.64 Place the constant on the left hand side in this comparison! Place the constant on the LHS.
layers.c :325.11 in function: dfb layer core shutdown Set all dynamically
allocated pointers to NULL after calling free().
Explicitly set the pointers to
NULL.
layers.c :360.11 in function: dfb layer core leave Set all dynamically allo-
cated pointers to NULL after calling free().
Explicitly set the pointers to
NULL.
layers.c :384.31-34 Finding examples of using upper range inclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
local surface pool.c
:59.1-65.56
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
local surface pool.c
:76.1-77.19
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
local surface pool.c
:82.1-83.24
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
local surface pool.c
:102.6
Variable local does not seem to be used right after its dec-
laration.
Try to move it down in the code.
local surface pool.c
:127.6
Variable local does not seem to be used right after its dec-
laration.
Try to move it down in the code.
local surface pool.c
:67.6
in function: local surface pool call handler Set all dynam-
ically allocated pointers to NULL after calling free()
Explicitly set the pointers to
NULL.
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Table B.1: The list of security or coding violations in TrustGraph (continued)
Source Violation Suggestion
palette.c :62.1-78 matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
palette.c :178.11 This checker checks that only one variable declaration oc-
curs per line.
Break the variable definition to
multiple lines.
palette.c :205.11 This checker checks that only one variable declaration oc-
curs per line.
Break the variable definition to
multiple lines.
palette.c :293.6-296.6 Place the constant on the left hand side in this comparison! Place the constant on the LHS.
palette.c :172.47-61 Finding a RightShift with no Bit Mask Define a bit mask to avoid sign con-
fusion.
palette.c :200.47-60 Finding a RightShift with no Bit Mask Define a bit mask to avoid sign con-
fusion.
palette.c :171.35-49 Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
palette.c :198.35-49 Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
palette.c :269.10-45 Finding examples of using upper range inclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
prealloc surface pool.c
:47.1-48.28
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
prealloc surface pool.c
:74.1-79.53
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
prealloc surface pool.c
:117.55
Finding a RightShift with no Bit Mask Define a bit mask to avoid sign con-
fusion.
prealloc surface pool.c
:126.26
Finding a RightShift with no Bit Mask Define a bit mask to avoid sign con-
fusion.
prealloc surface pool.c
:84.13-76
Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
screen.c :488.21-48 Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
screen.c :510.21-48 Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
screens.c :449.6-47 in function: dfb screens register Every malloc must be fol-
lowed by a free.
Explicitly free the allocated mem-
ory.
screens.c :188.21-23 Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
screens.c :210.21-23 Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
screens.c :232.21-23 Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
screens.c :105.16-28 Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
screens.c :188.26-54 Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
screens.c :442.6-446.6 Place the constant on the left hand side in this comparison! Place the constant on the LHS.
screens.c :558.11-559.30 Place the constant on the left hand side in this comparison! Place the constant on the LHS.
screens.c :348.11 in function: dfb screen core shutdown Set all dynamically
allocated pointers to NULL after calling free().
Explicitly set the pointers to
NULL.
screens.c :381.11 in function: dfb screen core leave Set all dynamically allo-
cated pointers to NULL after calling free().
Explicitly set the pointers to
NULL.
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screens.c :321.28-31 Finding examples of using upper range inclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
shared surface pool.c
:61.1-62.20
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
shared surface pool.c
:67.1-68.25
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
state.c :54.1-58.32 matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
state.c :395.10-18 Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
state.c :153.16 in function: dfb state destroy Set all dynamically allocated
pointers to NULL after calling free().
Explicitly set the pointers to
NULL.
state.c :155.11 in function: dfb state destroy Set all dynamically allocated
pointers to NULL after calling free().
Explicitly set the pointers to
NULL.
state.c :161.11 in function: dfb state destroy Set all dynamically allocated
pointers to NULL after calling free().
Explicitly set the pointers to
NULL.
surface.c :53.1-54.66 matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
surface.c :76.16-18 Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
surface.c :217.16-24 Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
surface.c :213.16-26 goto found Use loop statements instead.
surface.c :223.16-26 goto found Use loop statements instead.
surface.c :460.16-26 goto found Use loop statements instead.
surface.c :297.37 Finding a RightShift with no Bit Mask Define a bit mask to avoid sign con-
fusion.
surface buffer.c :573.1-
576.52
dfb surface buffer dump This function is too complex : CC
= 108 > 30
Reduce complexity by breaking the
function into multiple functions.
surface buffer.c
:1120.1-1122.51
update allocation This function is too complex : CC = 52
> 30
Reduce complexity by breaking the
function into multiple functions.
surface buffer.c
:941.26-942.79
Scope is nested deeper than allowed. Use helper functions to decrease the
nesting.
surface buffer.c
:944.26-945.79
Scope is nested deeper than allowed. Use helper functions to decrease the
nesting.
surface buffer.c
:844.26-857.26
Finding switch statements with no default Add a default.
surface buffer.c :592.6 Pointer gz ext is initialized to a fixed address. A pointer may not be necessary.
surface buffer.c
:784.21-790.21
This checker checks that only loop control expressions ap-
pear in the for loop constructor block
Put other expressions outside the
constructor.
surface buffer.c
:796.21-802.21
This checker checks that only loop control expressions ap-
pear in the for loop constructor block
Put other expressions outside the
constructor.
surface buffer.c
:1052.1-1057.46
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
surface buffer.c
:1201.21-23
Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
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surface buffer.c
:1214.21-23
Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
surface buffer.c :186.6 Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
surface buffer.c
:396.21-28
Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
surface buffer.c :136.6 Finding any ’and’ or ’or’ with a side effect somewhere on
the right hand side.
The RHS may never be evaluated.
Remove the side effect.
surface buffer.c :186.6 Finding any ’and’ or ’or’ with a side effect somewhere on
the right hand side.
The RHS may never be evaluated.
Remove the side effect.
surface buffer.c :358.6-
32
This checker checks that only one variable declaration oc-
curs per line.
Break the variable definition to
multiple lines.
surface buffer.c :389.15 Finding a RightShift with no Bit Mask Define a bit mask to avoid sign con-
fusion.
surface buffer.c
:583.36-68
Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
surface pool.c :58.1-
59.40
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
surface pool.c :71.1-
72.40
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
surface pool.c :242.11-
22
Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
surface pool.c :287.11-
22
Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
surface pool.c :182.10-
39
Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
surface pool.c :436.16-
26
goto found Use loop statements instead.
surface pool.c :444.11-
21
goto found Use loop statements instead.
surface pool.c :171.10-
172.82
Finding any ’and’ or ’or’ with a side effect somewhere on
the right hand side.
The RHS may never be evaluated.
Remove the side effect.
surface pool.c :626.6 Finding any ’and’ or ’or’ with a side effect somewhere on
the right hand side.
The RHS may never be evaluated.
Remove the side effect.
surface pool.c :378.13-
54
Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
system.c :435.6-22 This checker checks that only one variable declaration oc-
curs per line.
Break the variable definition to
multiple lines.
system.c :453.6-42 This checker checks that only one variable declaration oc-
curs per line.
Break the variable definition to
multiple lines.
windows.c :1303.28-58 Casting the const away form a type is not allowed. Remove the casting.
windows.c :202.21 Scope is nested deeper than allowed. Use helper functions to decrease the
nesting.
windows.c :533.6-539.6 This checker checks that only loop control expressions ap-
pear in the for loop constructor block
Put other expressions outside the
constructor.
windows.c :100.1-
101.65
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
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windows.c :137.1-
144.53
matching function prototype not available Explicitly define a function proto-
type.
windows.c :195.11-80 Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
windows.c :353.24-85 Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
windows.c :374.26-76 Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
windowstack.c :174.11-
18
Induction variables should not be updated inside of its loop
body.
Use extra loops to avoid updating
the induction variable.
windowstack.c :573.10-
14
Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
windowstack.c :796.16-
19
Finding examples of using lower range exclusive Always use inclusive lower limits
and exclusive upper limits.
windowstack.c :792.11-
22
goto found Use loop statements instead.
windowstack.c :802.16-
27
goto found Use loop statements instead.
windowstack.c :797.15-
62
This checker checks that relational binary operators (==
, ! =, <, >, <=, >=) are not treated as if they were non-
associative.
Make sure LHS and RHS are asso-
ciative.
windowstack.c :458.35-
69
Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
wm.c :165.11-70 in function: dfb wm core initialize Every malloc must be
followed by a free.
Explicitly free the allocated mem-
ory.
wm.c :250.11-70 in function: dfb wm core join Every malloc must be fol-
lowed by a free.
Explicitly free the allocated mem-
ory.
wm.c :130.11-21 goto found Use loop statements instead.
wm.c :149.11-21 goto found Use loop statements instead.
wm.c :157.16-26 goto found Use loop statements instead.
wm.c :168.16-26 goto found Use loop statements instead.
wm.c :186.11 in function: dfb wm core initialize Set all dynamically al-
located pointers to NULL after calling free().
Explicitly set the pointers to
NULL.
wm.c :271.11 in function: dfb wm core join Set all dynamically allocated
pointers to NULL after calling free().
Explicitly set the pointers to
NULL.
wm.c :901.45-80 Do not use the ternary operator(?:) in expressions Use explicit conditional statements.
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